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Crime and Consciousness:
Science and Involuntary Acts
Deborah W. Dennot
[T]he state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his
digestion.1

INTRODUCTION
In 1906, psychologist Edouard Clapar~de experimented
with the mind. He pricked the hand of a memory-impaired
patient while greeting her with a pin concealed between his
fingers. As always, the patient failed to recognize Claparode
when the two soon met again; yet, she refused to shake his
hand, explaining that it might be unpleasant but she did not
know why.2 With this test, Clapar~de revealed the dynamics of
1 Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I am most
grateful to the following individuals for their comments on this Article: Jerome
Bruner, Paul Chevigny, Edward Chikofsky, Dwight Denno, Hal Edgar, Phoebe
Ellsworth, Cynthia Estlund, Robert Ferguson, Lawrence Fleischer, Katherine
Franke, Kent Greenawalt, Christopher Hale, Nancy King, Dorie Klein,
Benjamin Libet, Jack Litman, Henry Monaghan, Ren~e Romkens, Kendall
Thomas, Vance Torbert, Lloyd Weinreb, Ian Weinstein, and R. George Wright.
For comments on earlier versions of this Article, I thank the participants in
presentations given at Cleveland Marshall School of Law (the Criminal
Justice Forum), Columbia University School of Law, Emory University School
of Law, Fordham University School of Law, the Institute of Advanced Legal
Studies (Department of Advanced Studies, University of London), the
University of Kentucky College of Law (Randall-Park Colloquium), the Law &
Society Association Annual Meeting, New York University School of Law (the
Hoffimger Criminal Justice Colloquium), the Renaissance Weekend 50 panels,
Vanderbilt University School of Law, and Woodhull Medical and Mental
Health Center (Grand Rounds, Department of Psychiatry). I very much
appreciate the extraordinary reference support provided by the staffs at
Fordham Law School Library, the Diamond Library at Columbia Law School,
and the New York Public Library. This Article benefitted from the superb
research assistance offered by Janice Greer, Natalie Milani, Michael Pereira,
Marianna Politzer, and Michael Rudy, as well as the administrative excellence
provided by Daniel Auld and Christian Steriti. Any errors in this Article are,
of course, mine only.
1. Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459, 483 (1885) (Bowen, L. J.).
2. E. Clapar~de, Recognition and "Me-ness," in ORGANIZATION AND
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"covert awareness"-the inconsistency between individuals'
conscious acts and their unconscious memories, perceptions,
3
and judgments.
Clapar~de's research was unusual for its time. For most of
the twentieth century, the topic of consciousness, apart from
Freudian theory, 4 was not considered fit for serious scientific
PATHOLOGY OF THOUGHT 58, 68-75 (David Rapaport ed., trans., 1951)
(discussing a patient suffering from Korsakoffs psychosis, a serious memory
disorder that prevents individuals from recalling recent experiences).
3. Alan Cowey, Grasping the Essentials, NATURE, Jan. 10, 1991, at 102
(1991) [hereinafter Cowey, Grasping]. Current definitions of these conscious
and unconscious processes, and the controversies concerning them, are
presented in Part II of this Article. The term "covert awareness" refers to the
empirical study of unconscious processes; it is therefore devoid of the
psychoanalytic and psychodynamic theories that typically accompany the
meaning of the term "unconscious."
See Alan Cowey, MacCurdy and
Memories: The Originsof Implicit Processing and Covert Awareness, 50 BRAIN
RES. BULL. 449, 449 (1999); Glyn W. Humphreys et al., Covert Processingin
Different Visual Recognition Systems, in THE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF
CONSCIOUSNESS 39, 39 (A.D. Milner & M.D. Rugg eds., 1992); see also

Matthew Hugh Erdelyi, Psychodynamics and the Unconscious, 47 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 784, 784 (1992) (explaining that "[alithough the unconscious
need not be logically tied to the psychodynamic approach, in practice it usually
is"); John F. Kihlstrom et al., The Psychological Unconscious:Found, Lost, and
Regained, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 788, 788 (1992) (noting that "the
psychological unconscious documented by latter-day scientific psychology is
quite different from what Sigmund Freud and his psychoanalytic colleagues
had in mind in fin de si6cle Vienna"). Modern research differentiates between
the general concept of "unconscious cognitive processes" and the specific
theories presented in Freud's idea of the dynamic unconscious (psychoanalytic
theories) or in the ideas of those who adopt Freud's broad outline, but not
necessarily all of its details (psychodynamic theories). Philip M. Merikle,
Perception Without Awareness: CriticalAwareness, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 792,
792 (1992). In line with recent research and commentary, this Article uses the
terms "conscious" and "unconscious" because increasingly they are interpreted
more broadly and are not associated simply with psychoanalytic and
psychodynamic theories.
4. Typically, Freud is credited with the "discovery" of the unconscious.
Merikle, supra note 3, at 792. A general awareness of the unconscious mind,
however, can be traced to antiquity. See LANCELOT LAW WHYTE, THE
UNCONSCIOUS BEFORE FREUD 26 (1960). Historians credit the modern origin
of the distinction between conscious and unconscious processes to philosophers
responding to Ren6 Descartes's identification of the "mind" with conscious
thinking. See id. at 26-28. "[T]he idea of unconscious mental processes was,
in many aspects, conceivable around 1700, topical around 1800, and became
effective around 1900, thanks to the imaginative efforts of a large number of
individuals of varied interests and many lands." Id. at 63 (emphasis omitted);
see also HENRI F. ELLENBERGER, THE DISCOVERY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE
HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF DYNAMIC PSYCHIATRY 3 (1970) (noting that the
origins of "the systematic investigation of the unconscious mind ... can be
traced back in time through a long line of ancestors and forerunners"). After
the 1868 publication of Eduard von Hartmann's bestseller, Philosophy of the
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study.5 Consciousness was the "ghost in the machine," 6 an
unobservable, immeasurable, phenomenon rendered irrelevant
to objective science. 7 Starting in the 1970s,8 however, interest
in the topic surged to the current point of "explosion."9 The
scientific "race" to understand consciousness is on 10 and the
potential for discovery seems boundless."
This race within science has far-reaching legal
implications. Criminal law, in particular, presumes that most
human behavior is voluntary and that individuals are
consciously aware of their acts. On the other hand, it also
presumes that individuals who act unconsciously, such as
sleepwalkers, are not "acting" at all.'2 Under the criminal law's
voluntary act requirement, unconscious individuals can be
totally acquitted even if their behavior causes serious harm. 13
In contrast to these legal "dichotomies" (voluntary/

Unconscious, the use of the term "unconscious" became fashionable. EDUARD
VON HARTMANN, PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS (William Chatterton
Coupland trans., Macmillan 1884) (1868). An 1877 article by the English
philosopher and scientist George Henry Lewes reveals the sophisticated level
of dialogue concerning the meaning and definition of these concepts. George
Henry Lewes, Consciousness and Unconsciousness, 2 MIND 156, 157-63 (1877).
5. See infra notes 6-7, 119-30, 180-81 and accompanying text.
6. See generally GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 15-18 (1966).
"Ghost in the machine" is Gilbert Ryle's derisive phrase depicting the
Cartesian view of the human body as an entirely physical thing (the machine)
and the human mind as an entirely nonphysical thing (the ghost) that
somehow resides within and controls the body. See id. at 11, 15-18. Ryle
attempts to undermine academia's centuries-long reliance on the mind/body
dualism, contending that the distinctions offered by Descartes are false. Id.
7. BERNARD J. BAARS, A COGNITIVE THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 5 (1988)
(noting that "the twentieth century so far has been remarkable for its rejection
of the whole topic [of consciousness] as 'unscientific'); see also Anthony G.
Greenwald, Unconscious Cognition Reclaimed, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 766, 766
(1992) (noting that until recently, academic psychologists' skeptical view of the
empirical validity of unconscious cognition "partly explains the omission of the
topic of unconscious cognition from many textbooks, and even the omission of
the word unconscious from the vocabularies of many psychologists").
8. There were a few exceptions to this paralysis. See, e.g., Cowey,
Grasping, supra note 3, at 102 (discussing the work of John MacCurdy,
lecturer in psychopathology at Cambridge, who developed a method of
studying such dissociations objectively and quantitatively in the 1920s, most
notably through the technique of forced-choice guessing).
9. See JOHN G. TAYLOR, THE RACE FOR CONSCIOUSNESS 8 (1999).
10. See id. at 3.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra notes 41-47, 59-62, 353-79 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 48, 72, 343-45 and accompanying text.
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4
involuntary, conscious/unconscious), modern neuroscientific'
research has revealed a far more fluid and dynamic
15
relationship between conscious and unconscious processes. If
such fluidity exists, human behavior is not always conscious or
voluntary in the "either/or" way that the voluntary act
requirement presumes. 16 Rather, consciousness manifests
17
itself in degrees that represent varying levels of awareness.
This Article confronts this clash between legal and scientific
perspectives on consciousness by proposing new ways to
structure the voluntary act requirement so that it incorporates
18
the insights of modern science on the human mind.

14. In this Article, the term "neuroscience" pertains "generally to the
various sciences of the brain and mind-neurophysiology, cognitive science,
artificial intelligence, psychology, psychiatry, and so on." David Hodgson,
Guilty Mind or Guilty Brain?. Criminal Responsibility in the Age of
Neuroscience, 74 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 661, 661 (2000).
15. See infra Part II.
16. See Hodgson, supra note 14, at 665 ("There is in fact a widening gulf
between the categories used by neuroscience and the non-scientific categories
used by the law."); see also DAVID HODGSON, THE MIND MATTERS:
CONSCIOUSNESS AND CHOICE IN A QUANTUM WORLD 137-41 (1991) (applying
consciousness research findings to legal reasoning). Consciousness research
effuses controversy. This Article examines how the law may integrate this
research by working at the general level to avoid debating and judging the
relative merits of particular studies or philosophies, which go on elsewhere.
Likewise, this Article presumes the following: (1) most of the more widely
accepted research concerning an understanding of consciousness meets the
appropriate evidentiary standards for admissibility, (2) this understanding of
consciousness should be debated by the experts, and (3) such an
understanding should ultimately be judged by the jury, who are the "experts"
on the kind of human behavior with which consciousness deals. This Article's
presumption concerning the evidentiary acceptability of most consciousness
research seems uncontroversial given that the criminal law explicitly
embraces the reality of consciousness-indeed, it has made consciousness its
foundation-as opposed to more debatable scientific evidence where the very
existence of the syndrome or features it is attempting to support is open to
question. Discussion regarding the details of the evidentiary viability of
consciousness research is beyond the scope of this Article.
17. See infra Part II.
18. A number of authors have made prodigious headway in this direction.
See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL

LAW 420-48 (1997); Larry Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship Among
Voluntary Acts, Strict Liability, and Negligence in Criminal Law, in CRIME,
CULPABILITY, AND REMEDY 84 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1990); David
Hodgson, Folk Psychology, Science, and the Criminal Law, in TOWARD A
SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS II: THE SECOND TUCSON DISCUSSIONS AND

DEBATES 157, 163-67 (Stuart R. Hameroff et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter

SECOND TUCSON DISCUSSIONS AND DEBATES]; Michael Corrado, Automatism

and the Theory of Action, 39 EMORY L.J. 1191 (1990); Kimberly Kessler
Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 597 (2001);
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Conventionally, analyses of criminal law and the mind

have
incorporated debates
about free will versus
determinism. 19 This Article does not revisit this frequently
examined issue, 20 choosing instead to adopt the Model Penal
Code's (MPC) stance that a focus on what is voluntary need not
"inject into the criminal law questions about determinism and
free will."2 1 Likewise, this Article relies on criminal law cases
and particular doctrines concerning voluntary acts but excludes
22
omissions, a topic reviewed in depth elsewhere.
Part I examines the criminal law's voluntary act
requirement, particularly in the context of the MPC's
influential provision, which reflects the law and psychology of
the era in which the MPC was originally developed-the 1950s.
Part II analyzes the new science of "consciousness," a term
that typically refers to the sum of a person's thoughts, feelings,
Sanford J. Fox, Physical Disorder,Consciousness, and Criminal Liability, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 645 (1963); Hodgson, supra note 14; Douglas Husak & Brian
P. McLaughlin, Time-Frames, Voluntary Acts, and Strict Liability, 12 LAW &
PHIL. 95 (1993); James Marshall, Relation of the Unconscious to Intention, 52
VA. L. REV. 1256 (1966); Michael S. Moore, Responsibility and the
Unconscious, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1563 (1980) [hereinafter Moore,
Responsibility]; Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes of Indifference, 49 RUTGERS L.
REV. 105 (1996); Kevin W. Saunders, Voluntary Acts and the Criminal Law:
Justifying Culpability Based on the Existence of Volition, 49 U. PITT. L. REV.
443 (1988); Emily Grant, Note, While You Were Sleeping or Addicted: A
Suggested Expansion of the Automatism Doctrine to Include an Addiction
Defense, 2000 ILL. L. REV. 997 (2000); Andrew E. Lelling, Comment,
Eliminative Materialism, Neuroscience and the Criminal Law, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 1471 (1993). This Article breaks new ground by integrating into the law
a realm of scientific discovery that has so far been unexamined by other legal
paradigms and which, therefore, may create new legal paradigms.
19. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 90-112 (1968); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 74-75 (1968).
20. Thomas A. Green, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of
Pound: An Essay on Criminal Justice, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1915, 1915 (1995)
("Enough has been written from a philosophical perspective on the
relationship between free will and the law that it is not easy to justify yet
another such undertaking."); see also Deborah W. Denno, Human Biology and
Criminal Responsibility: Free Will or Free Ride? 137 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 66263 (1988) (discussing a broad range of criminal defenses within the context of
the free will versus determinism debate).
21. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 215 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments, 1985) [hereinafter MODEL PENAL CODE 1985].
22. For a brief synopsis of this discussion, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER,
BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAw 44-53 (1998). See also George P. Fletcher,
On the Moral Irrelevanceof Bodily Movements, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1443 (1994)
(providing a general discussion and critique of different views on the
significance of omissions in criminal law doctrine).
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and sensations, as well as the everyday circumstances and
culture in which those thoughts, feelings, and sensations are
formed. Research on consciousness has been a source of great
interest to a wide range of disciplines, except for law. This
discussion provides a framework for structuring how theories
and research on consciousness can be applied to criminal law
doctrine. Despite the differences and debates among cognitive
scientists on the topic, one idea becomes clear: No consensus of
scientific
support
exists
for
the
concept
of a
conscious/unconscious dichotomy. Part III investigates how
defenses involving voluntary acts can be confused conceptually
with other key criminal law defenses, primarily insanity,
thereby resulting in vastly disparate dispositions for similarly
situated defendants. Part IV considers possible solutions to
this predicament.
It proposes that the voluntary act
requirement should be simplified and consist of three parts: (1)
voluntary acts, (2) involuntary acts, and (3) semi-voluntary
acts. Semi-voluntary acts would incorporate cases that have
previously been shoehorned into the first two categories. The
result of integrating increasing knowledge about the
unconscious into the criminal law will mean that individuals
will be held both more and less responsible than the
23
conventional understanding.
There are many line-drawing dilemmas throughout the
criminal law. However, this Article contends that the problems
with the voluntary act requirement are especially acute. First,
the voluntary act requirement is the initial filter (at least
conceptually) for all individuals potentially subject to the
criminal justice system. The criminal justice system, therefore,
has to assess actors with the widest possible range of mental
states, behaviors, and potential defenses because it has yet to
determine if they should proceed through the criminal justice
system or be acquitted entirely. A forced voluntary/involuntary
dichotomy amidst such heterogeneity can produce particularly
artificial choices with potentially extreme variations in
sanctions for similar types of behaviors depending on how they
are categorized (e.g., involuntary, insane, voluntary, and
dangerous). Second, other criminal law doctrines (such as
mens rea) have a relatively broader line-drawing selection (e.g.,
the four mental states under the MPC) within a more
23. Moore, Responsibility, supra note 18, at 1674 (contending that "[tihe
discovery of the unconscious should lead [psychoanalysts] to view human
beings as both more and less responsible than was commonly thought").
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homogenous group of individuals (persons who have already
been determined to have committed only voluntary acts).
Therefore, the line-drawing choices and their consequences are
less extreme than those faced by voluntariness determinations.
Third, voluntariness determinations are more prescriptive of
the kinds of acts and mental states that constitute
involuntariness in contrast to other kinds of binary doctrinessuch as sanity/insanity or reasonableness/unreasonableness.
While these doctrines can rely heavily on science, they do not
specifically designate mental states or behaviors that, if
proven, would legally justify a certain outcome (for example,
acquittal due to the involuntariness of a sleepwalking
defendant).
This Article's recommendations help eliminate the
problems created by the current legal conception of
voluntariness. In so doing, this Article argues that the criminal
law is sufficiently robust to incorporate modern research on
consciousness without being dismantled philosophically. The
criminal law, however, cannot remain static. This Article's
proposal of a new semi-voluntary category requires significant
reconceptualization of the voluntary act requirement. Such a
marked change will also have a profound effect on other
criminal law doctrines. If the criminal law can confront and
modify the chimera of "either/or" embedded in the voluntary act
requirement, it can join science with a more nuanced, and more
just, view of the human mind.
I. THE LAW OF VOLUNTARY ACTS AND
CONSCIOUS AWARENESS
Doctrinally, all criminal liability depends on one
"fundamental predicate": A defendant's guilt must be based on
conduct and that conduct must include a "voluntary act" or an
omission to engage in a voluntary act that the defendant is
physically capable of performing. 24 In general, voluntary acts
or actions 25 have three key elements: (1) an internal event, or
24. MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 explanatory note at
213; see also id. § 1.13(3) at 209 (defining "voluntary" under "General
Definitions" by reference to Model Penal Code § 2.01). But see infra notes 395-

99 and accompanying text (contending that the voluntary act requirement is
rarely followed by the courts and it is unclear about the extent to which courts
accept it).
25.

Several commentators define "acts" or "voluntary acts." See, e.g., 1

JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 415 (Robert Campbell ed., John
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volition; (2) an external, physical demonstration of that
volition; and (3) a causal connection between the internal and
external elements. 26 Under the MPC, liability cannot be based
2
on "mere thoughts," involuntary acts, or physical conditions. "
These MPC standards comport with key United States
28
Supreme Court decisions.
Murray 5th ed. 1911) (1861) ("In truth, the only parts of the train which are
my act or acts, are the muscular motions by which I raise the weapon, point
it... and pull the trigger."); OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 91
(Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1881) ("An act is always a voluntary muscular
contraction, and nothing else. The chain of physical sequences which it sets in
motion or directs to the plaintiffs harm is no part of it, and very generally a
long train of such sequences intervenes."); SIR JOHN SALMOND,
JURISPRUDENCE § 131, at 370 (10th ed. 1947) ("We habitually include all
material and relevant circumstances and consequences under the name of the
act ... not merely the muscular contractions by which the result is effected.");
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 11, at 19 (2d ed.
1961) ("The muscular contraction, regarded as an actus reus, cannot be
separated from its circumstances."). But see generally MICHAEL S. MOORE,
ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
CRIMINAL LAW 6 (1993) (discussing the doctrinal confusion concerning the
metaphysical, moral, and legal attempts to define and specify an act
requirement); Michael S. Moore, Actus Reus, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME &
JUSTICE 15-24 (Joshua Dressler et al. eds., 2002) (providing an overview of the
properties and criticisms of the voluntary act requirement).
26. Corrado, supra note 18, at 1194. The enigma of voluntariness is
captured in Wittgenstein's famous question: "[W]hat is left over if I subtract
the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?" LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 161 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed. 1958). As Joshua Dressler points out, the fact that a person's
arm went up does not suggest that person raised her arm. JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 9.02, at 86 (3d ed. 2001). What is "left
over," then, must be voluntariness, which implies the actor's control. In People
v. Freeman, 142 P.2d 435, 439 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943), the court similarly
emphasized the issue of control: "[Wihere the evidence shows the conscious
mind of the accused ceased to operate and his actions were 'controlled by the
subconscious or subjective mind' the jury should be instructed as to the legal
effect of such unconsciousness." Harry Frankfurt argues that voluntariness
and responsibility do not require that the agent be able to act otherwise. See
Harry G. Frankfurt, Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, 66 J.
PHIL. 829, 829-30 (1969). As Corrado points out, "[ilf Frankfurt is right, a
person may have acted voluntarily and be responsible for his behavior even if
he could not have done otherwise." Corrado, supra note 18, at 1222-23.
27. MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 explanatory note at
213.
28. See id. at 217. The MPC Commentaries refer directly to Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that it is cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to convict the
defendant for the status of being a narcotics user without evidence that he had
actually used narcotics within the jurisdiction). Unfortunately, because the
determination of what is in fact an "involuntary act" is itself a difficult and
"inherently elusive" judgment, states have an incentive to regard the
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The MPC spurred countrywide implementation of a
voluntary act requirement. 29 Most states have an explicit
requirement or a provision that approximates such a
requirement. 30 One state, however, has since repealed its
determination as needless. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 544 (1968)
(Black, J., concurring). For an insightful discussion of Powell v. Texas, see
Kent Greenawalt, "Uncontrollable" Actions and the Eighth Amendment:
Implications of Powell v. Texas, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 927 (1969).
29. See infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text. The American Law
Institute (ALI) began drafting the Model Penal Code and Commentaries in
1952 for purposes of state-wide implementation. Between 1953 and 1960, the
ALI considered thirteen Tentative Drafts that comprised various portions of
the text and accompanying comments. MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note
21, Part I, General Provisions, §§ 1.01-2.13, at xii. The Tentative Draft for
Model Penal Code § 2.01 was published in 1956. MODEL PENAL CODE
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 1956). By 1962, the ALI approved of and promulgated
the Proposed Official Draft of the entire Code (without Commentaries).
MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, Part I, General Provisions, §§ 1.012.13, at xii. A decade later, work started on updating the Commentaries for
final publication. Id. Apart from some minor grammatical changes, the final
Model Penal Code § 2.01 provision that the ALI approved in 1962 was
virtually the same as that drafted in 1956. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.01, at 11 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1956), with MODEL PENAL CODE 1985,
supra note 21, § 2.01, at 212 (noting the similarity in language between the
1956 and 1962 versions). It has not been changed since. The provision reads
as follows (excluding omission and possession):
Section 2.01. Requirement of Voluntary Act; Omission as Basis of
Liability; Possession as an Act.
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based
on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission to
perform an act of which he is physically capable.
(2) The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of
this Section:
(a) a reflex or convulsion;
(b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep;
(c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic
suggestion;
(d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the
effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or
habitual.
Id.
30. See infra Appendix, Voluntary Action in State Statutes: Then and
Now [hereinafter Appendix]. The MPC provides an overview of how many
states eventually adopted, in whole or in part, the MPC's voluntary act
requirement. MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 218
n.14. The overview also includes states that had proposed codes for a
voluntary act requirement. See id. With a few exceptions, research for this
overview ended on January 1, 1979. Id. § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 214 n.t. This footnote
compares the statutory landscape on January 1, 1979, consisting of revised
state codes and proposed codes as reported in the Commentaries, id. at 218
n.14, with state codes in effect on January 1, 2001. In subsequent footnotes,
references to "the Commentaries" refer to the MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 cmt.
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voluntary act requirement 3' and six out of seven states never
32
codified the explicit requirement they had initially proposed.
1 at 218 n.14.
The Commentaries list twenty revised state codes and seven proposed
state codes that, as of 1979, explicitly required a voluntary act. Id. The list
indicates states whose code or proposed code contained a definition of a
"voluntary act," in addition to a voluntary act requirement, by citing multiple
provisions. See id. The following states had a voluntary act requirement as of
January 1, 1979: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah. MODEL
PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 218 n.14.
Today, of those twenty revised state codes, nineteen retain an explicit
voluntary act requirement. See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-3 (1994); ARIz. REV. ANN.
STAT. § 13-201 (West 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-204(a) (Michie 1997);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-502 (2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 242 (2001);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-200 (1993); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-1 (West
1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-1(a) (Michie 1998); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
501.030(1) (Michie 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 562.011(1) (West 1999); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-2-202 (2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:1(I) (1996); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-1(a) (West 1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.10 (McKinney
1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(A)(1) (Anderson 1999); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 161.095(1) (2001); 18 PA. CONS. STAT, ANN. tit. 18, § 301(a) (West 1998);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.01(a) (Vernon 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2101(1) (1999). The Maine provision was repealed in 1981. See infra note 31
and accompanying text.
Of those nineteen current states codes containing a voluntary act
requirement, ten define "voluntary act." See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-1(2) (1994);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-105(37) (West 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1501(9) (2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 243 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702201 (1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.010(3) (Michie 1999); MO. ANN. STAT. §
562.011(2) (West 1999); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.00(2) (McKinney 1998); OR.
REV. STAT. § 161.085(2) (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601(1) (1999). Of
those nineteen current state codes containing a voluntary act requirement,
three define an "involuntary act" or describe acts that are not voluntary. See
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(32) (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-1(a) (West
1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(D)(2) (Anderson 1999). Furthermore,
of those nineteen current state codes containing a voluntary act requirement,
six do not define "voluntary act," "involuntary act," or describe acts that are
not voluntary. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-201 (Michie 1997); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/2 (1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-1-3 (1998); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 626:1(I) (1996); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 103 (West 1998); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.06 (Vernon 1994).
31. The Maine provision was repealed in 1981. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 51 (West 2001). But see State v. Case, 672 A.2d 586, 589 (Me. 1996)
(noting that to constitute voluntary conduct for which a person could be held
criminally liable, the "act must be the result of an exercise of defendant's
conscious choice to perform [it], and not the result of reflex, convulsion, or
other act over which a person has no control" (alteration in original)).
32. Of the seven states whose proposed codes, as of 1979, contained an
explicit voluntary act requirement, see supra note 30, only one has since been
codified. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.600 (Michie 2000) (requiring a voluntary
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Some state codes3 3 and the federal criminal code 34 have no
act); id. § 11.81.900(b)(62) (defining a voluntary act). The other six states
mentioned in the MPC Commentaries as having proposed codes containing
voluntary act requirements have not since codified those requirements. See
MD. CODE ANN. Criminal Procedure

§§

1-101-13-206 (2001); MASS. ANN.

LAWS chs. 263-74 (Law Co-op. 1992 & Supp. 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 750.1-752.1011 (West 1991 & Supp. 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-10-1727-120 (Law Co-op. 1985 & West Supp. 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-11-10139-17-1703 (1997 & Supp. 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-1-1-61-12-15

(Michie 2000 & Supp. 2001).
33. The MPC Commentaries list eleven state codes and one proposed state
code that contained no explicit voluntary act requirement. MODEL PENAL
CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 218-19 n.14. Of those twelve
states, eleven have not amended their codes since 1979 to include a voluntary
act requirement. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-1 to -296 (West 2001 &
Supp. 2002); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-101 to -5215 (2001 & Supp. 2002); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 775.01-775.25 (West 2000 & Supp. 2002); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
687-747 (West 1993 & Supp. 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609-644 (West 1987
& Supp. 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-1-1 to -50-4 (Michie 1994 & Supp.
2002); VA. CODE ANN.

§§

18.2-1 to -510 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 2002); WASH.

REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.04.010 to -.88.140 (West 2000 & Supp. 2002); WIS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 939.01 to -.74 (West 1996 & Supp. 2001); cf. NEB. REV. STAT. §
28-109(23) (1995) (defining "voluntary act" as "an act performed as a result of
effort or determination," but lacking a voluntary act requirement); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-02-01(1) (1997) (requiring an "act" for the commission of an
offense, but not qualifying the required "act" with "voluntary" or a similar
adjective). In contrast, South Dakota's current code states that "[plersons who
committed the act charged without being conscious thereof' are incapable of
committing a crime. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-3-1(4) (Michie 1998). Such an
"involuntary conduct defense" constitutes an implicit voluntary act
requirement. Two states whose codes are not mentioned in the MPC
Commentaries have an implicit voluntary act requirement couched in
language almost identical to the South Dakota provision. See IDAHO CODE §
18-201(2) (Michie 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194.010(5) (Michie 2001).
The codes of California and Oklahoma, discussed infra note 36, also contain
similar provisions.
34. Commentators agree that the federal criminal code is problematic,
and these problems affect the federal criminal law's treatment of voluntary
and involuntary acts. Title 18 of the United States Code-the so-called
"federal criminal code" containing most federal criminal statutes-is the
product of successive Congresses legislating on an ad hoc basis, in response to
the crises of the moment. See Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code
Reform: Past and Future, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 45, 57 (1998); see also Robert
H. Joost, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Is It Possible?, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
195, 195 (1997) (describing Title 18 as "duplicative, ambiguous, incomplete,
and organizationally nonsensical"). Interestingly, Title 18 contains no general
part. See Paul H. Robinson, Reforming the Federal Criminal Code: A Top Ten
List, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 225, 227-28 (1997). A general part is the section of
a criminal code which sets forth basic principles applicable to specific offenses
enumerated in subsequent parts of the code. Id. MPC § 2.01 falls within the
MPC's general part (Part I). Because Title 18 contains no general part, it
follows that the federal criminal code contains no voluntary act requirement
analogous to § 2.01 of the MPC. Efforts at reforming the federal criminal law,

HeinOnline -- 87 Minn. L. Rev. 279 2002-2003

280

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:269

code-explicit voluntary act requirement, although a defendant's
volitional impairments can mitigate the sentence under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 35 In turn, some states have a
which started in 1966, have been unsuccessful. See Gainer, supra, at 93-129.
Since 1982, neither House has seriously considered federal criminal code
reform. Id. at 124, 129; see also CHARLES R. WISE, THE DYNAMICS OF
LEGISLATION 315-17 (1991) (providing examples of abortive Congressional
efforts at reforming the federal criminal code). Some progress was made,
however, in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Title II of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984). In that Act, Congress delegated authority to the
United States Sentencing Commission (Sentencing Commission), an
independent agency in the judicial branch created to establish and oversee
federal criminal sentencing policies and practices. See U.S. SENTENCING
COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, 1 (1998) [hereinafter USSCG].
35. The Sentencing Commission, through its Guidelines, aims to narrow
judges' sentencing discretion by increasing the number of offense grades,
thereby decreasing the likelihood of disparate treatment of similarly situated
offenders. See USSCG, supra note 34, at ch. 1, pt. A, 3; see also Robinson,
supra note 34, at 246, 250-51 (noting that few offense grades increase the
likelihood of sentencing disparities for similar offenses). For example, the
Sentencing Commission has established a sentencing table containing fortythree levels, which overlap to discourage unnecessary litigation. See USSCG,
supra note 34, at ch. 1, pt. A, 4(h). By way of contrast, Article VI of the MPC
contains only five offense grades: first, second, and third degree felonies,
misdemeanors, and petty misdemeanors. MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra
note 21, art. VI. The Sentencing Commission prescribes guideline ranges
specifying an appropriate sentence by coordinating offense behavior and
offender characteristics. See USSCG, supra note 34, at ch. 1, pt. A, 2. The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 requires courts to select a sentence from within
the range set by the guidelines. Id. An appellate court may review a sentence
selected from within the appropriate range to determine if the Guidelines were
incorrectly applied. Id. However, the Act permits departures from the
Guidelines where a case presents atypical features. Id. A court must specify
its reasons for departing, however, and appellate courts may review the
reasonableness of a departure. Id.
The Guidelines contemplate two types of departures: guided departures
and unguided departures. Guided departures rely on numerical or nonnumerical suggestions, or analogies to such suggestions, contained in the
Guidelines. See id. ch. 1, pt. A, 4(b). Unguided departures may, but need not,
rest upon grounds referred to in Chapter Five, Part K (departures) of the
Guidelines. Id.; see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95-96 (1996)
(holding that the only disallowed departures are those specifically prohibited
by the Guidelines). A court's power to make unguided departures reflects the
Sentencing Commission's belief that courts will not often exercise their legal
freedom to depart from the guidelines. See USSCG, supra note 34, at ch. 1, pt.
A, 4(b). Section 5K2.13 of the Guidelines authorizes departures "if the
defendant committed the offense while suffering from a significantly reduced
mental capacity." Id. § 5K2.13. The Commentary following § 5K2.13 makes
clear that a defendant may claim to have been suffering from a "significantly
reduced mental capacity" based on either cognitive impairment or volitional
impairment when the offense was committed. Id. cmt. n.1. The Commentary
describes a cognitive impairment as "a significantly impaired ability to ...
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defense of involuntary conduct or a comparable intermediate
voluntary act provision that falls between an explicit
requirement and no requirement whatsoever. 36 In sum, there
understand the wrongfulness of the behavior comprising the offense or to
exercise the power of reason." Id. The Commentary describes a volitional
impairment as "a significantly impaired ability to ... control behavior that the
defendant knows is wrongful." Id. However, even where a court finds that the
defendant acted while suffering from a significant cognitive or volitional
impairment, three situations will still negate a court's departure power: (1)
where the reduced mental capacity resulted from the defendant's voluntary
drug use or intoxication; (2) where the violent nature of the offense itself
indicates a need to protect the public; or (3) where the defendant's criminal
history indicates a need to protect the public. Id.
The contentious presence of the volitional component in the Guidelines's
definition of "significantly reduced mental capacity" is the result of the Third
Circuit's decision in United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 544-49 (3d Cir.
1997). See USSCG, supra note 34, app. 6, amend. 583 (noting that § 5K2.13
was amended to add the volitional component of the application note based on
the McBroom decision). McBroom held that a downward departure from the
Guidelines's suggested range may be justified in cases where defendants
cannot control behavior that they know is wrong. McBroom, 124 F.3d at 458.
Some commentators, however, question the existence of "volitional
impairment" and thus its validity as a mitigating factor in sentencing. See,
e.g., Carlos Pelayo, Comment, "Give Me A Break! I Couldn't Help Myself"'?:
Rejecting Volitional Impairment as a Basis for Departure Under Federal
Sentencing Guidelines Section 5K2.13, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 732-35 (1999)
(concluding that the test for "significantly reduced mental capacity," like the
M'Naghten test for legal insanity, should contain only a cognitive ability
component). Pelayo, for example, acknowledges only two categories of action
that may be classified as involuntary and therefore justifying reduced
sentences: physical reflexive mechanisms (such as the patellar reflex) and
irresistible external compulsion (such as strong A, who pushes weak B into C).
Id. at 742-43. In almost all other cases, so the criticism goes, a "defective will"
does not amount to a "volitional impairment" entitling a defendant to a
reduced sentence under the Guidelines. Id. at 749-50.
36. Between the poles of an explicit voluntary act requirement and no
voluntary act requirement, the MPC Commentaries discuss state codes and
proposed state codes that contained intermediate provisions. The MPC
Commentaries note that Vermont's proposed code required the equivalent of a
voluntary act without using the word "voluntary." MODEL PENAL CODE 1985,
supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 218 n.14. Title 13 of Vermont's current code,
entitled, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, however, contains no voluntary act
requirement. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1-14 (1998 & Supp. 2001). The
MPC Commentaries note that the Louisiana code, read in conjunction with the
Reporter's Comments following the applicable section, required a voluntary
act. MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 218 n.14.
Similarly, Louisiana's current code defines criminal conduct as consisting of
an "act or failure to act that produces criminal consequences." LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:8 (West 1997). The Reporter's Comment following the section
defines "act" as "an external manifestation of will which produces
consequences."
Id. Reporter's cmt.
The MPC Commentaries discuss
California's proposed code, which would have required "general intent." Under
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is no clear consensus on how states implement a voluntary act
requirement, although most states have one designated
explicitly.
The maxim that civilized societies should not criminally
punish individuals for their "thoughts alone" has existed for
three centuries. Generally, the criminal law recognizes that we
cannot identify an individual's thoughts or predict whether
the proposal, "'[a] person acts with general intent when he consciously and
willingly performs the act or fails to perform the act described in the section
defining an offense."' MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1
at 218 n. 14. California's current penal code contains an implicit voluntary act
requirement in the form of an involuntary conduct defense. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 26(4) (West 1999) (stating that "[p]ersons who committed the act charged
without being conscious thereof' are not capable of committing the crime).
This resembles the codes of Idaho, Nevada, and South Dakota. See supra note
33. As discussed, infra, Oklahoma's code also resembles the California code.
The MPC Commentaries note that Georgia's definition of a "crime"
remains essentially unchanged in Georgia's current code. MODEL PENAL
CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 218 n.14. Georgia's current code
defines a "crime" as a "joint operation of an act or omission to act and
intention or criminal negligence." GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-2-1 (1999). The MPC
Commentaries also note that the Georgia code contained a rebuttable
presumption which remains in Georgia's current code. MODEL PENAL CODE
1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 218-19 n.14. The current Georgia code
presumes that the "acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are ... the
product of a person's will," and also presumes, subject to rebuttal, that every
person is of sound mind and discretion. Id. at §§ 16-2-3 to -4. The MPC
Commentaries compare the Georgia statute to provisions contained in the
codes of Kansas and Puerto Rico, and the proposed codes of the District of
Columbia and Oklahoma. MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01
cmt. 1 at 218 n.14. Similar to Georgia's code, "intention" is the linchpin of the
current statutes in Kansas and Puerto Rico. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3201
(1995) (stating that criminal intent is an essential element of every crime and
may be established through proof that the defendant's conduct was intentional
or reckless); 33 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 3022(27) (1983 & Supp. 1998) (defining
"voluntarily" as implying an "aim or will to commit the act"); id. § 3061
(requiring intent or criminal negligence for a person to be penalized for an act
or omission regarded as a crime); id. § 3153 (stating that unconsciousness at
the time of the act precludes liability). The MPC Commentaries' comparison
of the Georgia provision to the District of Columbia proposal is odd because
the MPC Commentaries also mention the same provision of the D.C. proposal
in the context of codes lacking a voluntary act requirement. MODEL PENAL
CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 218 n.14. The current D.C. Code
contains no provision similar to the Georgia provision. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§
22-101 to -5215 (2001 & Supp. 2002). The current Oklahoma statute-similar
to the provisions of California, Idaho, Nevada, and South Dakota--contains an
implicit voluntary act requirement in the form of an involuntary conduct
defense. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 152(6) (West 1983 & Supp. 2002)
(stating that "[p]ersons who committed the act charged without being
conscious thereof are not capable of committing crimes"); infra note 62 &
Appendix.
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antisocial behavior will result from them. 37 38Presumably, laws
also fail to deter conduct that is involuntary.
This historical backdrop raises key issues about the
voluntary act requirement. 39 For example, the requirement is
unusual because it can apply to either the defendant's mental
state or to the defendant's acts. 40 That is, it is applicable to
either the mens rea or actus reus elements of a crime. 4 1 Some
courts have adopted the term "unconsciousness" to refer to the
defendant's claim that she lacked the mental state to have
committed the crime and have adopted the term "automatism"
to refer to the defendant's claim that she did not engage in a
voluntary bodily movement. 42
Thus, the defense of
37. Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68
YALE L.J. 405, 405-06 (1959). The requirement of action therefore
serves a number of closely-related objectives: it seeks to assure that
the evil intent of the man branded a criminal has been expressed in a
manner signifying harm to society; that there is no longer any
substantial likelihood that he will be deterred by the threat of
sanction; and that there has been an identifiable occurrence so that
multiple prosecution and punishment may be minimized.
Id; see also MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 218 n.14
(stating that "a civilized society does not punish for thoughts alone"); HERBERT
MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 1-29 (1976) (analyzing the relationship
between law and thoughts).
38. MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 218 n.14.
39. See discussion infra Part III.
40. See id.
41. For a discussion of the difficulty of classifying the voluntary act
requirement as part of actus reus or mens rea, see Regina v. Harrison-Owen, 2
All E.R. 726 (Crim. App. 1951). In that case, a burglary trial, the defendant
contended that he entered the dwelling in a state of automatism. Id. at 726.
The prosecution responded to that defense with evidence of the defendant's
prior burglary convictions. Id.
On appeal, the conviction was overturned
because similar prior convictions were admissible only to refute a claim of lack
of mens rea, and in this case the defendant claimed he lacked actus reus. Id.
at 727-28.
42. See generally Eunice A. Eichelberger, Annotation, Automatism or
Unconsciousness as Defense to Criminal Charge, 27 A.L.R. 4th 1067 (1984)
(analyzing various criminal cases in which the automatism or unconscious
defense was used); see also State v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020, 1021-22 (Wash.
1910) ("An involuntary act, as it has no claim to merit, so neither can it induce
any guilt; the concurrence of the will, when it has its choice either to do or to
avoid the fact in question, being the only thing that renders human actions
either praiseworthy or culpable."); RONALD A. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 50 (1957) ("If a person is ...unconscious at
the time he commits an act... he is not responsible therefore. The absence of
consciousness not only precludes the existence of any specific mental state, but
also excludes the possibility of a voluntary act without which there can be no
criminal liability." (citations omitted)); cf. DRESSLER, supra note 26, at 88-89
(opining that the voluntary act requirement viewed as part of mens rea finds

HeinOnline -- 87 Minn. L. Rev. 283 2002-2003

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:269

unconsciousness can be distinct from the defense of
automatism even though both negate the argument that the
defendant acted voluntarily.
For example, individuals who suffer from a disorder called
Limbic Psychotic Trigger Reaction contend that they are totally
conscious and aware when they commit motiveless acts of
violence against other individuals. They have no control over
their bodily movements and they are extremely remorseful
afterwards. 43 The defense of automatism could be available but
not unconsciousness. In contrast, individuals who commit acts
of violence while in the throws of an epileptic seizure also have
no control over their bodily movements, but they are
unconscious as well. 44 These individuals could use the defenses
of both automatism and unconsciousness; however, many
courts use the two terms (automatism and unconsciousness)
synonymously, thereby ignoring possible differences in the
45
defendant's mental state.
Unfortunately, all these doctrinal roadmaps can be
muddled even further when automatism and unconsciousness
are conflated with the insanity defense. Here is where the real
injustice to a defendant lies. Some courts, for example, have
held that automatism and unconsciousness are defenses that
are distinct from the insanity defense, while others have held
that automatism and unconsciousness are a species of the
insanity defense. 46 This confusion can arise, for instance, in
cases involving epilepsy or sleepwalking. In such cases some
courts will say that epileptics and sleepwalkers were insane
when they committed their acts, whereas other courts will say
that epileptics and sleepwalkers were sane but suffering from
automatism or unconsciousness. 47 While the courts are nearly
split on whether to classify automatism and unconsciousness as
variants of insanity, whichever direction the courts take has
more justification in retributive than utilitarian theories of punishment; while
the threat of punishment can motivate an involuntary actor to adjust her
behavior, in the absence of a voluntary act based on free choice, "there is no

basis for social censure").
43. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 353-63 and accompanying text.
45. See infra note 311 and accompanying text.
46. See McClain v. State, 678 N.E.2d 104, 107 (Ind. 1997) ("[J]urisdictions
are split between recognizing insanity and automatism as separate defenses

and classifying automatism as a species of the insanity defense.");
Eichelberger, supra note 42, at 1073 (recognizing the split among the courts).
47.

See infra notes 353-68 and accompanying text.
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crucial consequences for defendants. In contrast to defendants
determined to be insane, defendants with automatism and
unconsciousness receive an unqualified acquittal and do not
48
face the possibility of being institutionalized.
Courts do not appear to fall into a similar trap when
differentiating automatism and unconsciousness from
diminished capacity, a defense applicable to defendants
suffering from abnormal mental conditions that do not reach
the level of insanity.4 9 Diminished capacity can be either a
complete
defense
resulting
in
an
acquittal,
like
automatism/unconsciousness, or, more commonly, a partial
defense resulting in the defendant's conviction of a lesser
crime. 50 The legislative and judicial befuddlement concerning
the concept of diminished capacity has, however, limited the
use and acceptance of the defense. 51 Regardless, there are few
48.
49.

Eichelberger, supra note 42, at 1072.
See generally DRESSLER, supra note 26, at 361; Stephen J. Morse,

Diminished Capacity, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 239, 239-42

(Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Morse, Diminished Capacity];
Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1-5 (1984) [hereinafter Morse, Undiminished

Confusion].
50. There are two categories of diminished capacity: the mens rea
category, in which the mental abnormality is offered as evidence to negate an
element of the crime charged rather than to excuse the actor's conduct, and
the "partial responsibility" category, which mitigates the defendant's guilt
even if the defendant exhibits the necessary mens rea for the crime. See
DRESSLER, supra note 26, at 361-62 (discussing the two forms of the
diminished capacity defense); Morse, Diminished Capacity, supra note 49, at
239 (defining the two forms of diminished capacity and discussing the
justifications and implementation problems of the two forms); Morse,
Undiminished Confusion, supra note 49, at 1 (addressing the two variants of
diminished capacity and proposing that the law adopt the mens rea variant).
Partial responsibility, the more controversial of the two categories, exists in a
relatively small number of states, and can be used only to reduce the charge of
murder to manslaughter. DRESSLER, supra note 26, at 361-62.
51. See Morse, Diminished Capacity,supra note 49, at 241. For example,
some argue that "diminished capacity" should not even be considered a
defense. According to the Third Circuit in United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d
889 (3d Cir. 1987), diminished capacity is "not a defense at all but merely a
rule of evidence." Id. at 897. The diminished capacity "defense" does not allow
acquittal for any reasons that are not already included in the definition of the
offense for which the defendant is charged. Id. Its primary value to the
defendant is that it may potentially negate the mens rea element of his or her
particular offense. Id. at 896. In addition, the burden of proving the requisite
mens rea for an offense lies with the prosecution. Thus, any evidence
introduced by the defendant that indicates a diminished mental condition
negating mens rea must be overcome by the prosecution rather than justified
by the accused.

RALPH REISNER ET AL., MENTAL DISABILTY AND CRIMINAL
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conceptually clear lines distinguishing diminished
capacity
52
from unconsciousness, automatism, and insanity.
These doctrinal dilemmas may seem very academic, but
the all-or-nothing approach to the voluntary act requirement
has had real effects in criminal cases. For criminal defendants
in the United States, it can mean the difference between an
unqualified acquittal if someone is determined to have acted
involuntarily, or prolonged institutionalization if they are
determined to be insane.5 3 Even graver, it can result in a death
sentence or a lengthy incarceration
if the defendant is found to
54
voluntarily.
acted
have
A. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE MODEL PENAL CODE'S DEFINITION
OF A VOLUNTARY ACT

In all respects, the MPC has been "stunningly successful in
accomplishing the comprehensive rethinking of the criminal
LAW 559 n.K (West, 3d ed. 1999); Morse, Undiminished Confusion, supra note
49, at 5-10.
52. Reed v. State, 693 N.E.2d 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), offers an
interesting illustration of these blurred lines. In Reed, the defendant suffered
from a medical condition known as transient ischemic attack (TIA), described
as a "small stroke" which causes periods of confusion and disorientation
resulting in aphasia. Id. at 989-90. Reed sought to introduce evidence that
she suffered from TIA as an indication that she did not voluntarily or
knowingly commit theft. Id. The trial court prohibited her from raising TIA
as an affirmative defense, however, since it could not be offered as a defense to
theft unless it amounted to a mental disease or defect under the insanity
statute. Id. at 991. Reed's position was that because she was not alleging
insanity, she should be permitted to raise a defense based on a medical
condition. Id. at 990-91. She also contended that she had an absolute right to
present a defense to show that she did not "knowingly" or "intentionally"
commit the theft. Id. at 989-91. On appeal, the trial court's decision was
overturned.
The court noted that Reed's inability to voluntarily and
knowingly commit theft was the result of a physical condition affecting "a
person of a sound mind." Id. at 991. Therefore, she was not required to give
the State notice of her intent to raise evidence of TIA under the insanity
statute. Id. at 992. The court also determined that "to the extent this
unconscious, involuntary behavior prevented her from forming the requisite
intent to commit theft, it is relevant to show that she did not knowingly
commit theft." Id. The court acknowledged the state supreme court's rejection
of the existence of the "diminished capacity" defense but determined that
"[allthough Reed may have unartfully phrased her argument by contending
that she did not have the ability to knowingly commit theft, we do not believe
that Reed was attempting to raise a diminished capacity defense." Id. at 993
n.6. Instead, the court explained that "Reed was merely attempting to show
that she did not voluntarily commit theft." Id.
53. See supra notes 13-48; infra notes 72, 346-47 and accompanying text.
54. See infra text accompanying note 72.
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law." 55 The MPC's voluntary act requirement, in particular,
while rooted in history, was impressively progressive in its
attempt to incorporate the science of the times when the MPC
was developed (the 1950s) and later when its Commentaries
were updated in the 1970s. 56 This section contends that the
failure to revise the MPC further has resulted in an antiquated
provision that reflects the "modern" science of the 1950s, not
the modern science of today.5 7 The ambiguous language,
format, and dichotomous nature of the provision have also
58
made its application confusing.

A striking feature of the MPC's voluntary act requirement
59
is that it never specifically defines the term "voluntary."
55.

Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law: Wechsler's

Predecessors, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1098, 1140 (1978). Herbert Wechsler was the
Chief Reporter for the Model Penal Code and has been credited for its success.
See Harold Edgar, Herbert Wechsler and the Criminal Law: A Brief Tribute,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1347, 1353 (2000); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Memory of
Herbert Wechsler, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (2000); Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Jr., Tribute in Memory of Herbert Wechsler, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1362, 136264 (2000); Henry Paul Monaghan, A Legal Giant is Dead, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1370, 1370 (2000); David L. Shapiro, Herbert Wechsler-A Remembrance, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1379 (2000); see also Kadish, supra, at 1098 (referring
to the Model Penal Code as "one of [Herbert] Wechsler's spectacular
achievements").
56. See supra note 29; infra notes 110-11, 165-66 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
Others have
commented on the dated nature of the Model Penal Code. See, e.g., Markus
Dirk Dubber, Penal Panopticon: The Idea of a Modern Model Penal Code, 4
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 53 (2000) (noting that "[tihe Model Penal Code is ripe
for fundamental reconsideration"); Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of
Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 815, 816 (1980)
(stating that "the Model Penal Code scheme is only the most recent advance in
a continuous chain of doctrinal refinements which extends as far back as law
and society"). For an interesting discussion of the challenges inherent in
reforming a restatement provision (in the context of product liability), see
Anita Bernstein, Restatement Redux, 48 VAND. L. REV 1663, 1666-77 (1995)
(book review).
58. See infra notes 59-94 and accompanying text.
59. See MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01(2) cmt. 2 at 219
(noting that "voluntary" is defined "partially and indirectly by describing
movements that are excluded from the meaning of the term"). See id. § 2.01(3)
("Liability for the commission of an offense may not be based on an omission
unaccompanied by action unless: (a) the omission is expressly made sufficient
by the law defining the offense; or (b) a duty to perform the omitted act is
otherwise imposed by law."); id. § 2.01(4) ("Possession is an act, within the
meaning of this Section, if the possessor knowingly procured or received the
thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to
have been able to terminate his possession."). This Article does not examine
"omission" and "possession," except indirectly.
See supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
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Instead, it provides four examples of acts that are not
voluntary: "(a) a reflex or convulsion; (b) a bodily movement
during unconsciousness or sleep; (c) conduct during hypnosis or
resulting from hypnotic suggestion; (d) a bodily movement that
otherwise is not a product of the effort or determination of the
actor, either conscious or habitual." 60 Although the MPC
explains that these examples emphasize "conduct that is within
the control of the actor,"6 1 it provides little additional guidance
and is otherwise vague. For example, the MPC Commentaries
never discuss what would constitute a "conscious" bodily
movement and do not define the term "unconsciousness,"
preferring to leave such interpretations to the courts. 62 Such
60. MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01(2) at 212. As the
MPC explanatory note indicates, the first three examples are "specific
conditions," whereas the last is more generic. Id. § 2.01 explanatory note at
213. It would be tempting to suggest that the flipside of the last example
could constitute a definition of a voluntary act (a bodily movement that is "a
product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or
habitual"); however, this definition would be under inclusive and there is no
indication that the MPC Commentators intended it to define a voluntary act.
Id. § 2.01(2)(d) at 212.
Lastly, this Article assumes that the
conscious/unconscious
dichotomy comports with voluntary/involuntary
behavior despite the seemingly awkward use of the words "conscious" and
"unconscious" under § 2.01(2). The actual MPC provision would suggest that
"unconsciousness" is a condition separate and apart from reflexes, sleep, etc.
The MPC Commentaries indicate, however, that reflexes and sleep are also
states of unconsciousness, perhaps simply more specific states or examples.
Id. § 2.01 cmt. 2 at 219-20. Presumably, then, the more generic and seemingly
redundant category of "unconsciousness" would allow in other kinds of
conditions.
61. Id. § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 215.
62. See id. § 2.01 cmt. 2 at 220 ("The provision [§ 2.01(2)] does not define
'unconsciousness' and thus does not attempt a legislative resolution of the
issue. It employs the term that has had standing in the statutory law of many
states, leaving the problem of interpretation, as it has previously rested, with
the courts."). A number of state statutory provisions have tried to define the
role of consciousness in the determination of culpability. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE § 26 (West 1999) ("All persons are capable of committing crimes except
those belonging to the following classes: .. .Persons who committed the act
charged without being conscious thereof."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194.010
(Michie 2001) ("All persons are liable to punishment except those belonging to
the following classes: .. .Persons who committed the act charged without
being conscious thereof."); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.10 (McKinney 1998) ("The
minimal requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of
conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act
which he is physically capable of performing."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 152
(West 1983) ("All persons are capable of committing crimes, except those
belonging to the following classes: ...Persons who committed the act charged
without being conscious thereof."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-3-1 (Michie 1998)
("Any person is capable of committing a crime, except those belonging to the
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vagueness is all the more confusing because many states have
defined a "voluntary act" in language reflecting the inverse of
example four (that is, a "'voluntary act' means a bodily
movement performed consciously or habitually as a result of
effort or determination"). 63 Yet, this approach is "simply
inaccurate" and incomplete without having the preceding three
examples as a guide: "It is easy to think of 'voluntary' conduct
the product of conscious or
which is not in the ordinary sense
64
habitual effort or determination."
The MPC's definitional problems are all the more troubling
because assessing voluntariness is a crucial first step in
Therefore, the voluntary act
establishing mens rea.65
requirement must be met before it can be determined if the
defendant satisfied the MPC's narrower mens rea requirements
(purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence), 6 6 and before
it can be shown that the defendant's conduct was not otherwise
due to a mental disease or defect under the MPC's insanity
67
provision.
following classes: .. .Persons who committed the act charged without being
conscious thereof .... ).

63. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 243 (2001); see also infra
Appendix.
64. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Comment on Basis of Criminal Liability;
Culpability; Causation:Chapter3; Section 610, in 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 105, 111

(1970). For example, a person may cause another injury by "stretching," an
activity that we might characterize as negligent even though it "does not
require effort or determination in any significant sense." Id. at 112 n.12.
65. See MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 216
(noting that "the demand that an act or omission be voluntary can be viewed
as a preliminary requirement of culpability"); see also DRESSLER, supra note
26, at 89 ("[A] 'voluntary act'. .. is a prerequisite to criminal responsibility,
i.e., it is an element of every criminal offense.").
66. See MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.02 explanatory note
at 227 & cmt. 1 at 229 (discussing the mens rea requirements that must be
proven in order to obtain a criminal conviction).
67. The insanity provision of the Model Penal Code reads as follows:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of [the] law. (2) As used in this Article, the terms
"mental disease or defect" do not include an abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
Id. § 4.01 at 163. Most states no longer have an insanity provision that
resembles MPC § 4.01. See REISNER ET AL., supra note 51, at 524-27.
Regardless, an act must be considered voluntary before it can be determined
that insanity compelled that act.
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B. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE MODEL PENAL CODE'S VOLUNTARY
ACT DICHOTOMIES

There have been numerous insightful commentaries
questioning the soundness and philosophical foundations of the
act requirement. 68 This Article takes a somewhat different
approach by questioning both the legal and scientific sensibility
of such amorphous classifications as "voluntary/involuntary,"
69
and "conscious/unconscious."
In terms of establishing liability, for example, the
voluntary act requirement's all-or-nothing approach is unusual
and artificially categorical. Typically, criminal law doctrine
assesses liability according to hierarchical categories or
"degrees," such as the four levels of culpability. 70 In criminal
homicide cases, the degree of culpability determines the
category of homicide (murder, manslaughter, or negligent
homicide) and the category influences the length of
sentencing. 71
These variations in degree reflect the
understanding that thought and behavior are complex and that
culpability and sentencing should incorporate that complexity
to the maximum extent possible while remaining practical.
The all-or-nothing approach also prompts uncomfortable
legal choices if the thoughts or actions at issue are ambiguously
"voluntary" or if the act committed is particularly serious, such
as homicide. In such cases, the choices can range from total
acquittal to even the death penalty. 72 This dilemma raises a
crucial question: Is the source of the behavior at issue so clear
as to warrant such extreme differences in liability and
sentencing?
The
MPC
Commentaries
concede
that
the
voluntary/involuntary act distinction can be vague and
troublesome, although the Commentaries do not always provide
support for the distinctions they make. For example, the MPC

68. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
69. In contrast, the MPC Commentaries provide assurance that such
distinctions have "proved useful in the development of the criminal law."
MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 215.
70. See id. § 2.02 explanatory note at 227 (stating that "the concepts of
purpose, knowledge, recklessness and negligence suffice to delineate the kinds
of culpability that may be called for in the definition of specific crimes").
71. See id. §§ 210.1-.4 & cmt. at 4-91 (discussing culpability and
sentencing for criminal homicide).
72. See supra notes 41-47, 59-62, infra notes 353-79, 501-03, 594-95 and
accompanying text.
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regards a "reflex or convulsion" to be clearly involuntary; 73
however, the only source the MPC cites for that proposition
states a contrary view. 74 As Australia's Model Criminal Code
75
recognizes, "some reflex acts can be regarded as voluntary."
According to the MPC Commentaries, "unconsciousness" is
"equally" clearly involuntary when it "implies collapse or coma,
76
as perhaps it does in [the] ordinary usage of the term."
However, the MPC believes it to be a "difficult issue" to
determine when certain acts should be "assimilated to coma"
for the "legal purpose" of finding involuntariness when cases
involve more amorphous "states of physical activity"; such
amorphous states exist when "self-awareness is grossly
impaired or even absent, as in epileptic fugue, amnesia,
77
extreme confusion and equivalent conditions."
The MPC notes that some case law affirms comparing
these more amorphous states with coma and, therefore,

73. MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 2 at 219 (stating
that "[a] ny definition [of voluntary] must exclude a reflex or convulsion").
74. See id. at 219 n.15 (citing only Ian D. Elliott, Responsibility for
Involuntary Acts: Ryan v. The Queen, 41 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 497 (1968)).
According to Elliott,
[Ilt is far from clear what is meant by reflex action, either in common
or scientific parlance. In particular, it is not clear whether reflex
action is necessarily involuntary. So far as scientific opinion is
concerned, the results of modern physiological research offer little
assistance to the lawyer. Researchers are divided on the question
whether to characterize reflex action as necessarily involuntary.
Watsonian Behaviourists would abandon the distinction between
voluntary and involuntary action altogether. Even if scientists were
unanimous in holding reflex action to be involuntary, the conclusions
of science might prove of little use to the courts. Researchers in
psychology and physiology are, it seems, rarely concerned to
investigate reflex action, or involuntary action, as factors which
exculpate D from blame.
Id. at 499-500 (citing FRANKLIN FEARING, REFLEX ACTION: A STUDY IN THE

HISTORY OF PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY ch. 16 & 297-300 (1930)). Well
known commentators also cite this proposition without support. See, e.g.,
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 210 (3d ed. 2000) (stating, without
support, the proposition that "[tihere is general agreement that a mere reflex
is not a voluntary act").
75. MODEL CRIMINAL CODE § 202.2 cmt. at 49 (final views of the Criminal
Law Officers Committee 1992), at http://www.law.gov.av/publication/
ModelCriminalCode/general-principles.pdf at 49 (Sept. 20, 2002) (noting
that "the reflex responses of a skilled sportsperson," for example, could be
regarded as voluntary).
76. MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 2 at 219
(emphasis added).
77. Id.
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involuntariness. 78 Yet, the MPC also mentions that case law
bolsters an alternative approach-providing exculpation
through the insanity defense by treating such amorphous
states as indicative of "mental disease or defect excluding
responsibility." 79 The MPC's reliance on the insanity defense
"offers the advantage that it may facilitate commitment when
the individual is dangerous to the community because the
condition is recurrent."8 0 The MPC admits, however, the
drawbacks of this choice: "[I]t bears harshly on the individual
whose condition is nonrecurrent, as in the case where an
extraordinary reaction follows the administration of a
therapeutic drug."8 ' Such cases also may not fit smoothly
within the confines of the insanity provision: "[Tihere may be a
difficulty in regarding some of these conditions as a 'mental
disease or defect' within the meaning of section 4.01 [the MPC
insanity defense provision] or other tests, although cognition is
82
sufficiently impaired to satisfy that aspect of the test."
The MPC fuels this confusion. On the one hand, the MPC
is deliberately vague to allow room for maneuvering. On the
other hand, the MPC acknowledges that this vagueness is
troublesome and that the voluntary act requirement can
conflict with other MPC sections, such as the insanity
provisions and cases of self-induced intoxication or narcosis.8 3
Compounding this doctrinal dilemma is a revelation: There
appears to be no valid scientific basis for a voluntary act
dichotomy, particularly in relation to consciousness.8 4 Soon
after the MPC's 1962 publication, commentators contended
that states of consciousness and unconsciousness are "a matter
of degree," existing along a continuum.8 5 This view also has
78. See id. at n.18.
79.
80.

See id.
Id. at 219-20.

81. Id. at 220.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 221 (stating that the problems presented by these cases are
addressed in MPC § 2.08).
84. See infra Part II; see also Elizabeth F. Loftus & Mark R. Klinger, Is
the Unconscious Smart or Dumb?, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 761, 763 (1992)

(noting the "stumbling block" created in psychology over "[tihe lack of
consensus on where the division between conscious and unconscious processes
lies").
85. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 18, at 651 (noting that "[c]onsciousness is a
matter of degree; no one is ever completely conscious or completely
unconscious"); Marshall, supra note 18, at 1260 ("Behavior can be considered
along a continuum extending from the utterly lacking in intent through the
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been reflected in modern commentary 6 and court cases.87 As
mentioned, the MPC agrees that certain conditions do not fall
clearly into either the conscious or unconscious categories. 88
Even when the law presumes such dichotomies, defendants
considered to be acting involuntarily may still fall into a
diverse range of categories: 89 (1) they may be conscious but
have no bodily control, as in the case of individuals diagnosed
with Limbic Psychotic Trigger Reaction; 90 (2) they may be
unconscious to the consciously intended.").
86. See Pillsbury, supra note 18, at 147 (relying on the discoveries of
modern science to conclude that "[tihe line between aware and unaware
mental activity appears very much a matter of degree"); cf. Joshua Dressler,
Does One Mens Rea Fit All?: Thoughts on Alexander's Unified Conception of
Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 955, 963 (2000) (explaining "that
'culpability' is not naturally an all-or-nothing concept" in the context of
proposed revised models for mens rea).
87. See infra Part III.
88. See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
89. See Elliott, supra note 74, at 499 (listing four different categories of
involuntary acts).
90. A person evidencing Limbic Psychotic Trigger Reaction (LPTR) may
commit an out-of-character, emotionless, homicidal act as a result of an
external stimulus that triggers painful memories of stressful past events and
propels the patient into a series of regressive, well recalled, and automatic
actions. Anneliese A. Pontius, Neuroethological Aspects of Certain Limbic
Seizurelike Dysfunctions: Exemplified by Limbic Psychotic Trigger Reaction
(Motiveless Homicide with Intact Memory), 9 INTEGRATIVE PSYCHIATRY INT'L
J. SYNTHESIS MED. & PSYCHIATRY 151, 164 (1993) [hereinafter Pontius,
NeuroethologicalAspects]. The homicidal acts occur due to a brief partial
limbic seizure. Anneliese A. Pontius, Homicide Linked to Moderate Repetitive
Stresses Kindling Limbic Seizures in 14 Cases of Limbic Psychotic Trigger
Reaction, 2 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 125, 135 (1997) [hereinafter
Pontius, Homicide Linked]. This seizure is kindled in part by the suddenly
revived traumatic memories. Anneliese A. Pontius, Neuropsychiatric Update
of the Crime "Profile"and "Signature"in Single or Serial Homicides: Rule Out
Limbic Psychotic Trigger Reaction, 73 PSYCHOLOGIST REP. 875, 878 (1993)
[hereinafter Pontius, Neuropsychiatric Update]. The loss of control also
implicates a temporary frontal lobe imbalance. Anneliese Pontius, Motiveless
Firesetting:Implicating PartialLimbic Seizure Kindling by Revived Memories
of Fires in "Limbic Psychotic Trigger Reaction," 88 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR
SKILLS 970, 979 (1999) [hereinafter Pontius, Motiveless Firesetting]. A
diagnosis of LPTR requires the occurrence of transient psychosis in the
context of a partial limbic seizure accompanied by unaltered consciousness
and full recall of the "unplanned, stimulus-triggered, motiveless acts."
Pontius, Homicide Linked, supra, at 126-27 tbl.1; id. note at 27. Although
most LPTR individuals have only one episode of violence, other LPTR
individuals appear to have recurrent episodes. Id. at 137. Some research
suggests that recurrent LPTR individuals may involuntarily or unconsciously
create a situation that triggers their violent reaction because such a triggering
reaction is in itself quite pleasurable. See id. Thus, the criminal law is
confronted by yet one more scenario comprising a mix of voluntary and
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unconscious or treated as such, as in the case of persons
experiencing somnambulism; 9 1 (3) they may appear to be
purposeful, as in the case of individuals suffering from postepileptic automatism; 92 or (4) they may have "wild and
undirected movement," as in the case of persons "attacked by a
swarm of bees." 93 While the law finds it "necessary to refer to
some such esoteric entity as the will" to create the impression
of unity among these diverse categories, "[tihe concept of an
in need of explanation as the concept of
unwilled act is as much
94
act."
involuntary
an
C. THE SOURCES OF THE MODEL PENAL CODE'S VOLUNTARY
ACT DICHOTOMIES

Several factors may have prompted the MPC drafters to
adopt a dichotomous voluntary act requirement, ranging from
statutory precedent to the dominance of Freudian
psychoanalytic theory. Significant support for the notion that
the MPC was influenced by a variant of psychoanalysis is found
in the writings of individuals who either contributed to the
creation of the MPC, or who were cited in its Commentaries. 95
This assertion should come as no surprise in light of the MPC's
era of origin. There is substantial consensus that Freud
"changed the face of intellectual history" with his theory that
physical symptoms that lack physical causes and are not
"consciously created and maintained" must derive from the
unconscious. 96 In Freud's view, conscious awareness was
merely a small part of thought compared to the pervasive
unconscious. 97 While Freud's theories offered a far more
complicated architecture of the mind than this simple
involuntary acts. In contrast to the sober individual who consciously drinks

alcohol knowing that it may render her violent and also unconscious, LPTR
individuals unconsciously stimulate triggers that may render them violent
while also conscious.
91. See infra notes 364-66, 448-506 and accompanying text; see also

MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 2 at 220 ("It seems clear
that the behavior of the sleepwalker should receive the same treatment
accorded conduct during unconsciousness, and Subsection (2)(b) so provides.").
92. Elliott, supra note 74, at 499; see also infra notes 354-56 and
accompanying text.
93. Elliott, supra note 74, at 499.
94. Id.
95. See infra notes 110-74 and accompanying text.
96. DREW WESTEN, PSYCHOLOGY: MIND, BRAIN, AND CULTURE 14 (2d ed.

1999).
97.

Id.
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"either/or"98
and
their
effect
on
the
MPC's
conscious/unconscious dichotomy is not "directly" provable,
evidence suggests that the concept of the unconscious had a
powerful effect on the law. Moreover, other legal, cultural, and
psychological sources markedly contributed to the MPC's
voluntary act dichotomies.
1. Statutes and Cases
Prior and existing laws profoundly influenced the MPC's
voluntary act dichotomies in three ways. First, there was
statutory precedent. 99 For example, as early as 1872,100 and
when the MPC was being developed, the California Penal Code
exempted from criminal liability "[persons who committed the
act charged without being conscious thereof." 0°' During that
time, the California Code did not refer to "voluntary" 1or
02
"involuntary" acts, nor to bodily movements. It still does not.
The MPC Commentaries, however, make explicit reference to
drawing upon the California Penal Code and a number of other
states' penal codes in creating the distinction "between
03
ordinary human activity and a reflex or a convulsion."'
Second, the MPC relied upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts'
definition of an act to propose the concept of an involuntary
movement as an "external manifestation of the actor's will,"104
even though the law of torts does not recognize a distinction
between voluntary and involuntary acts. 105 In turn, early tort
and criminal law cases were influenced by prominent
98. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
99. See generally Kadish, supra note 55, at 1098.
100. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 26(5) (H.S. Crocker 1872). Notably, the 1850
California Penal Code made no reference to the "without being conscious
thereof' exclusion. An Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments, ch. 99, §§ 110, 1850 Cal. Stat. 229, 229-30. The introduction of the term "conscious" is
consistent with the growing use of these terms in Europe during the 1800s.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
101. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 26(5) (West 1955). For an interesting
discussion of some of the earlier cases falling under this provision, see Viola G.
Glaister, Case Notes, CriminalLaw, 18 S.CAL. L. REV. 290, 290-92 (1945).
102. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(4) (West 1999).
103. MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 215 & n.4.
104. Id. at 221 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 2 (1965)).
105. The Restatement's use of the word "act," however, is exactly the same
as the MPC's use of the word "voluntary act," suggesting that, contrary to the
MPC, tort law thinks only in terms of actions and nonactions. In other words,
in torts, there is no such thing as an involuntary act. See Corrado, supra note
18, at 1195 n.10.
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philosophers and legal scholars who depicted acts as willed
bodily movements. 10 6 Third, and more generally, the MPC
Commentaries cite to a range of cases and literature that were
surveyed for the purpose of creating the requirement of a
voluntary act, and to illustrate the dichotomous nature of
10 7
voluntary/involuntary and conscious/unconscious.
These kinds of legal influences were also important
because, as its title suggests, the MPC was intended to be a
model. Therefore, it had to stay reasonably close to what state
legislatures would be persuaded to adopt and could not deviate
too much from the generally prevailing views of the era. At the
same time, much of the literature and law that the MPC cites
does not concern American cases but rather (a sparse number
of) cases decided primarily in Australia, Canada, England,
Ireland, and New Zealand. 10 8
While such international
precedent can be valuable, its impact is generally limited. 09
2. Psychological Theories of Human Behavior
The drafters of the voluntary act requirement drew upon
both past and present psychological theories of human
behavior"I 0 that were popular during the decade-long planning
and writing of the MPC (beginning in 1952 and extending until

106. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (citing John Austin and
Oliver Wendell Holmes, among others).
107. See MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. at 212-24.
108. See generally R.S. Clark, Automatism and Strict Liability, 5 VICT. U.
WELLINGTON L. REV. 12 (1968) (citing cases from Canada, England, Ireland,
and New Zealand); J. Ll. J. Edwards, Automatism and Criminal
Responsibility, 21 MOD. L. REV. 375 (1958) [hereinafter Edwards, Criminal
Responsibility]
(analyzing cases from England); J. Ll. J. Edwards,
Automatism and Social Defence, 8 CRIM. L. Q. 258 (1966) [hereinafter
Edwards, Social Defence] (discussing cases from Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, Scotland, and the United Kingdom); John Jennings, The Growth and
Development of Automatism as a Defense in Criminal Law, 2 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 370 (1962) (examining cases from Canada, England, and Ireland); P.B.A.
Sim, The Involuntary Actus Reus, 25 MOD. L. REV. 741 (1962) (citing cases
from England and New Zealand).
109. See George P. Fletcher, The Nature and Function of Criminal Theory,
88 CAL. L. REV. 687, 694 (2000). Fletcher notes that "American politicians
and policy makers are notoriously indifferent to the attitudes of jurists beyond
our borders." Id.
110. See generally DUANE P. SCHULTZ & SYDNEY E. SCHULTZ, A HISTORY
OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY 24-53 (7th ed. 2000) (providing an account of the

people, ideas, and schools of thought recognized to have had an influence on
modern psychology, although not specifically referencing the MPC).
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the Proposed Official Draft was published in 1962)."'1 These
theories affected most directly the statutes and literature that
the MPC Commentaries cited. 1 2 While the MPC developers
valued the contributions of professionals from a range of
disciplines outside the law, 113 they particularly relied on
psychiatrists 1 4 and those in the humanities and social
sciences.1 5 For example, Lionel Trilling, a Professor of English
at Columbia University and one of the most prominent literary
critics of the century, 1 6 as well as a renowned commentator on
Freud, 1 7 was included on the MPC's Criminal Law Advisory
111. Herbert Wechsler, Codification of CriminalLaw in the United States:
The Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1425-28 (1968).
112. See infra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
113. The MPC drafters sought "the knowledge, insight and experience
offered by the other disciplines and occupations concerned with crime and its
prevention." Herbert Wechsler, A Thoughtful Code of Substantive Law, 45 J.
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 524, 525 (1955).
114. See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 111, at 1442 (emphasizing the
contributions of three psychiatrists in the development of the Model Penal
Code's insanity provisions); Herbert Wechsler, Remarks at the Annual
JudicialConference of the 2d Judicial Circuitof the United States (June 25-27,
1964), in 37 F.R.D. 356, 382-86. The three psychiatrists that Wechsler refers
to in the preceding articles-Lawrence Z. Freedman, Manfred S. Guttmacher,
and Winifred Overholser-all served on the Criminal Law Advisory
Committee for the Model Penal Code. MODEL PENAL CODE 1985,'supra note
21, Part I, General Provisions §§ 1.01-2.13, at vi-vii. Guttmacher also was on
the Reportorial Staff for the Model Penal Code. See id. at v.
115. Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L.
REV. 1097, 1102 (1952) ("[Iln no other area of law have legal purposes and
methods been subjected to a more sustained and fundamental criticism
emanating from without the legal group-especially the psychological and
social sciences-but buttressed also from within."). Wechsler elaborated:
The further impeachment based on science rests ... in larger part on
the submission that the law-or at least some of its important
aspects-employs unsound psychological premises such as "freedom of
will" or the belief that punishment deters; that it is drawn in terms of
a psychology that is both superficial and outmoded, using concepts
like "deliberation," "passion," "will," "insanity," [and] "intent"; that
even when it takes the evidence of psychiatric experts, as on the issue
of responsibility, it poses questions that a scientist can neither regard
as meaningful or relevant nor answer on his own scientific terms;
and, finally, that though the law purports to be concerned with the
control of specified behavior, it rejects or does not fully use the aid
that modern science can afford.
Id. at 1103.
116. Trilling, Lionel 1905-1975, 105 CONTEMP. AUTHORS 426, 427-28
(2002); Thomas Lask, Lionel Trilling, 70, Critic, Teacher and Writer, Dies,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1975, at 1.
117. See, e.g., LIONEL TRILLING, FREUD AND THE CRISIS OF OUR CULTURE
(1951); Lionel Trilling, The Legacy of Sigmund Freud: An Appraisal,Part II.
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8
Committee. 11
There is no evidence that one school or psychological theory
was intended to dominate the development of the MPC. The
substance and format of the voluntary act and mens rea
requirements, however, appear to be more influenced by
concepts derived from Freudian psychoanalytic theory than by
the major competing behaviorist theories at the time.'19 For
example, early behaviorists, such as John B. Watson (18781958), believed that all mental processes, such as the conscious
and unconscious, were far too subjective to be studied
scientifically. 120 Human behavior could be more easily and
accurately explained by focusing on people's responses to
outside stimuli, thus rendering mental events irrelevant to the
purview of a scientific psychology.121 Thereafter, B.F. Skinner
(1904-1990), a behaviorist attributed with developing Watson's
theory "into a full-fledged perspective," 122 claimed throughout
his decades of work that "[there is no place in a scientific
analysis of behavior for a mind or self."123 Rather, a "scientific

Literaryand Aesthetic, 2 KENYON REVIEW 152 (1940).
118. MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, Part I, General Provisions §§
1.01-2.13, at vii.
119. See Jerome Bruner, Another Look at New Look 1, 47 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 780, 780 (1992) (noting the "[t]wo competing radical voices"
that controlled the psychological "arena" of the time during the 1950s:
"antimentalist behaviorism, on the one side, insisting that mental processes
did nothing, and magical-realist psychoanalysis, on the other side, insisting
that unconscious mental processes did everything").
120. See JOHN B. WATSON, BEHAVIORISM 5 (1924) ("As a result of this
major assumption that there is such a thing as consciousness and that we can
analyze it by introspection, we find as many analyses as there are individual
psychologists.").
121. See generally id. at 5-13 (asserting that once people become immersed
in behaviorism, they will realize the contradictions inherent in introspective
psychology and see that behaviorism answers questions that skeptics will
initially raise).
122. WESTEN, supra note 96, at 16.
123. B.F. Skinner, Can Psychology Be a Science of Mind?, 45 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1206, 1209 (1990). Skinner held this belief until the day he
died, having completed the American Psychologist article the evening before
his death. Id. at 1207. Moreover, this belief pervaded his scholarship. See
generally B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 1-23 (Bantam Books
1972) (1971) [hereinafter SKINNNER, BEYOND FREEDOM] (positing that a
"technology of behavior" may become available if it follows the path of physics
and biology of tracing interactions between organism and environment
through the vehicle of accessible conditions, rather than through states of
mind, feelings, or traits); B.F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 11-22
(1953) (asserting that methods of science can be used in the field of human
affairs and, if such scientific methods are used, we will come to realize that a
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analysis shifts both the responsibility
and the achievement [of
1 24
an individual] to the environment."
In sharp contrast to behaviorism, psychoanalysis focused
on the significance of internal mental events, many of which
were beyond an individual's conscious awareness. 125 Moreover,
doctors, medical schools, 126 and a substantial portion of the
psychological community, not to mention the public, 127 were
very much influenced by Freud's psychoanalytic concepts. 128 A
major part of this effect included the conceptual divide between
person's actions are the result of specifiable conditions that can be identified
and used to predict and anticipate behavior).
124.

SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM, supra note 123, at 23.

125. See, e.g., 1 NATHAN G. HALE, JR., FREUD AND THE AMERICANS: THE
BEGINNINGS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1876-1917, at 3-23,

434-61 (1971) (providing an overview of psychoanalysis and Freudian thought,
as well as the social, sexual, and psychological rubrics seen as its
underpinnings).
126.

HENRY K. BEECHER & MARK D. ALTSCHULE, MEDICINE AT HARVARD:

THE FIRST THREE HUNDRED YEARS 406 (1977) (referring to the "dominant role
of psychoanalysis" in psychiatry at Harvard "for several decades after World
War II").
127. See generally HALE, supra note 125, at 397-403 (illustrating the
popularization of psychoanalysis in the medical field and the general public in
the early part of the twentieth century). American society began to change its
ideas and practices, prompted in large part by Freud's immense influence and
the "formative years" of the psychoanalytic movement, particularly from 1911
to 1914. See PHILIP RIEFF, FREUD: THE MIND OF THE MORALIST, at xi (1979)

("In America today, Freud's intellectual influence is greater than that of any
other modern thinker.").
In 1909, Freud, a Viennese physician and
neurologist, presented a series of five lectures at a conference at Clark
University, where he discussed a theory of the human mind he had created
during the previous two decades. See generally HALE, supra note 125, at 3-16
(describing Freud's experiences coming to America and his lectures at Clark).
Although the Clark Conference was Freud's only visit to the United States, id.
at 3, Freud left an indelible impression before the audience of professionals,
laypersons, and press, whose interaction and influence ultimately led to the
"uniquely swift" dissemination of Freud's new ideas. Id. at 17. Moreover,
Freud had visited America "at a 'psychological moment,"' when conflict and
change were emerging in those areas of American life that psychoanalysis
appealed to most directly-sexual morality as well as nervous and mental
disorders. Id. Psychoanalytic theory also acquired unprecedented exposure
and acceptance during World War I because of the psychoanalytic treatment of
"war

neurotics."

BEN SHEPHARD,

A

WAR OF

NERVES:

SOLDIERS AND

PSYCHIATRY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 106 (2000). This influence led to the

absorption of psychoanalysis into mainstream culture, such as magazines and
novels. Id. at 163-64.
128. ELLENBERGER, supra note 4, at 546 ("The consensus is that Freud
exerted a powerful influence, not only on psychology and psychiatry, but on all
the fields of culture and that it has gone so far as to change our way of life and
our concept of [the individual].").
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the conscious and unconscious. 129 Psychoanalytic approaches
also appeared to have had a considerable impact on the
130
development of legal theories and explanations of crime.
Many references in the MPC Commentaries that depict the
13 1
voluntary act requirement draw upon psychoanalytic,
129. See MATTHEW HUGH ERDELYI, PSYCHOANALYSIS: FREUD'S COGNITIVE
PSYCHOLOGY 57 (1985). In an attempt to identify Freud's contribution to
modern psychology, Erdelyi admits that Freud did not discover the
unconscious. Id. According to Erdelyi, "[Freud] more than any other figure
made the unconscious a permanent part of modern scientific psychology, and
in so doing transformed the very meaning of psychology, which up to that
point had been conceived of as the science merely of consciousness." Id.
130. See, e.g., BERNARD GLUECK, STUDIES IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY, at vviii (1916) (suggesting that criminology draws upon many branches of science,
including psychology, in order to develop an understanding of the nature of
the delinquent); S. SHELDON GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL
LAW: A STUDY IN MEDICO-SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE 87-122 (1925); JOHN
C. GOODWIN, INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL (DeCapo Press 1981) (1924);
ERNEST BRYANT HOAG & EDWARD HUNTINGTON WILLIAMS, CRIME, ABNORMAL
MINDS, AND THE LAW (1923); WILLIAM HEALY, MENTAL CONFLICTS AND
MISCONDUCT 15-33 (1936); WILLIAM A. WHITE, INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL
LAW 1-9 (1923); see also Deborah W. Denno, Life Before the Modern Sex
Offender Statutes, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1317, 1322-44 (1998) (discussing the
literature). Several authors have produced works after the 1962 release of the
MPC that highlight the continued influence of psychoanalytic theory on the
development of thinking in criminal law. The following is a list of such works,
which illustrate the varying degrees to which modern writers embrace the
notion of a psychoanalytic contribution. See generally DAVID S. CAUDILL,
LACAN AND THE SUBJECT OF LAW: TOWARD A PSYCHOANALYTIC CRITICAL
LEGAL THEORY (1997) (discussing psychoanalysis as a supplement to the
discipline of law); ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE:
ON ETHICS, AESTHETICS, AND "LAw"-ON CRIME, TORT, AND PROCEDURE
(1971); HALE, supra note 125, at 313-68; JAY KATZ ET AL., PSYCHOANALYSIS,
PSYCHIATRY AND LAW (1967); MOORE, supra note 18, at 420-48; CHARLES G.
SCHOENFELD, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE LAW (Ralph Slovenko ed., 1973);
Franz Rudolf Bienenfeld, Prolegomenato a Psychoanalysisof Law and Justice,
53 CAL. L. REV. 957, 960 (pt. 1), 1254 (pt. 2) (1965); Joseph Goldstein,
Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence, 77 YALE L.J. 1053 (1968); Moore,
Responsibility, supra note 18; Symposium, Lacan and the Subject of Law, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 995 (1997); Symposium, Law and the Postmodern Mind,
16 CARDOZO L. REV. 699 (1995).
131. See MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 2 at 219-21
nn.16, 17, 19, 22-24; see also infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text. The
psychoanalytic literature cited in the MPC § 2.01 Commentaries has a wide
range.
See, e.g., ROBERT W. WHITE, THE ABNORMAL PERSONALITY: A
TEXTBOOK (1948) (citing throughout references to Freud and psychoanalysis);
Marshall, supra note 18, at 1256 (examining a continuum of unconsciousconscious behavior within a psychoanalytic framework); see also Margaret
Brenman, The Phenomena of Hypnosis, in PROBLEMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS:
TRANSACTIONS OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE 123, 125 (Harold A. Abramson ed.,
1951) [hereinafter
CONSCIOUSNESS, FIRST
CONFERENCE] (discussing a
psychoanalytic interpretation of hypnosis); David Rapaport, Consciousness:A
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medicalllegal, 132 and philosophical 133 literature published four
to six decades ago, primarily between the 1940s and 1960s,
when psychoanalysis was particularly forceful. 134 A striking
example of the impact of the psychoanalytic literature is the
135
MPC's decision to categorize hypnosis as an involuntary act.
This categorization contradicted the then "widely held view
that the hypnotized subject will not follow suggestions that are
repugnant to him." 36 Yet, the MPC Commentaries insist that
hypnotized subjects could not be acting voluntarily because
Psychopathological and Psychodynamic View,
in
PROBLEMS
OF
CONSCIOUSNESS: TRANSACTIONS OF THE SECOND CONFERENCE 18, 30, 40
(Harold A. Abramson ed., 1951) [hereinafter CONSCIOUSNESS, SECOND
CONFERENCE] (citing Freud to help explain the "continuous transitions"
between daydreams and hallucinations and discussing Freud's effort to reduce
the various "phenomen[a] of consciousness" to a "common denominator");
Lewis R. Wolberg, Hypnotic Phenomena, in PROBLEMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS:
TRANSACTIONS OF THE THIRD CONFERENCE 76, 76-106 (Harold A. Abramson
ed., 1952) (describing a psychoanalytic perspective of hypnosis); David G.
Wright, Variations in States of Awareness in Schizophrenic Patients, in
CONSCIOUSNESS, SECOND
CONFERENCE, supra, at 100-78 (describing a
psychoanalytic perspective of schizophrenia).
132. See MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 215 n.3.
The medical/legal literature focuses predominantly on automatism.
For
examples, see Clark, supra note 108; Edwards, Social Defence, supra note
108;. Edwards, Criminal Responsibility, supra note 108; Jennings, supra note
108; Sim, supra note 108, at 743-44.
133. See MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 215 n. 3
(citing Phillip Mullock, Responsibility, Propensity, & Choice, 15 MERCER L.
REV. 1, 3-4 (1964)).
134. Following World War II, psychiatric authority was more substantial
than ever before as a result of the prominent wartime role that psychiatrists
assumed in screening recruits and diagnosing military offenders. See KAREN
ANDERSON, WARTIME WOMEN: SEX ROLES, FAMILY RELATIONS, AND THE
STATUS OF WOMEN DURING WORLD WAR II 176 (Contributions in Women's
Studies, no. 20, 1981) (noting that "the focus of psychiatric concern shifted
from a prewar stress on psychosis to a wartime preoccupation with neurosis,"
only to later shift toward postwar emphasis on private practice); WALTER
BROMBERG, PSYCHIATRY BETWEEN THE WARS, 1918-1945: A RECOLLECTION
164 (Contributions in Medical History, no. 10, 1982) ("[W]ith the war's end,
psychiatry in the civilian sector had advanced on all fronts ....
New
medications, new methods, new techniques crowded the psychiatric scene."); 2
NATHAN G. HALE, JR., THE RISE AND CRISIS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN THE
UNITED STATES: FREUD AND THE AMERICANS, 1917-1985, at 211, 289 (1995)
(describing the seemingly "insatiable" demand for psychoanalysis after the
war and noting that "the high point of psychoanalytic influence" existed from
"the late 1950s to the mid-1960s"). Moreover, postwar literature warned of the
social and psychiatric maladjustments that returning veterans confronted.
See HALE, supra, at 206-09 (reviewing commentary regarding the mental and
emotional difficulties encountered by returning war veterans).
135. See supra notes 29, 60 and accompanying text.
136. MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 2 at 221.
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their "dependency and helplessness are too pronounced."1 37
This assertion is "supported" by a series of articles written by
psychoanalysts who argue that hypnotized individuals cannot
8
consciously control their acts. 13
When the MPC Commentaries were updated in the 1970s,
137. Id.
138. See id. at 221 nn. 22, 24. The MPC cites to the following articles
within these footnotes: Margaret Brenman, Experiments in the Hypnotic
Production of Anti-Social and Self-Injurious Behavior, 5 PSYCHIATRY 49, 60
(1942) (summarizing the results of hypnosis on six subjects to confirm "the
theoretical position taken earlier by the Nancy school," which holds that "in a
small percentage of hypnotic subjects such [anti-social or self-injurious] acts
can be induced even when contrary to the subject's personal wishes or his
moral nature"); Brenman, supra note 131, at 123 (introducing Brenman's
efforts to interpret hypnosis as a level of consciousness within a
psychoanalytical framework); Wesley Raymond Wells, Experiments in the
Hypnotic Production of Crime, 11 J. PSYCHOL. 63, 65, 100-01 (1941)
(commenting on the importance of hypnosis); William P. Swain, Note,
Hypnotism and the Law, 14 VAND. L. REV. 1509, 1511 (1961). Swain noted
that
[olften times a law-abiding citizen is shocked by the subconscious
desires expressed in his dreams. Perhaps under hypnotic suggestion
the normal restraints on such desires could be overcome, but it is
doubtful that without the presence of a subconscious desire most
people could be induced to commit a wrongful act.
Id.; see also Wolberg, supra note 131, at 87-89 (discussing repression and the
need to use hypnosis to bring out deeply repressed problems).
Brenman's commentary describes most succinctly how the psychoanalytic
perspective applies to hypnosis:
We find in deeply hypnotized subjects a far more frequent occurrence
of what we think of as archaic modes of thought than we do in
normal-state people. What do we mean by "archaic modes of
thought?" We mean, for example, that there is much more frequent
emergence of visual imagery, of symbolism, of thinking in terms that
Dr. Zilboorg spoke of yesterday, where there is a kind of timelessness,
there is no logic, in short what is psychoanalytic theory we think of as
"primary process" where logic, order, etc. do not determine the tone of
thinking.,
Brenman, supra note 131, at 127-28. The MPC Commentaries do not cite the
"Dr. Zilboorg" whom Brenman refers to, although Gregory Zilboorg did
contribute a chapter to the first conference.
See Gregory Zilboorg,
Psychoanalytic Concepts of Sleep and Dream, in CONSCIOUSNESS, FIRST

CONFERENCE, supra note 131, at 62-88 (discussing the psychoanalytic roots of
sleep and dream and what they mean symbolically). Herbert Wechsler also
cites one of Zilboorg's books and articles as a source of psychological criticism
of penal law in his influential article in the Harvard Law Review. See
Wechsler, supra note 115, at 1101 n.16, 1110 nn.63 & 65. In this same article,
Wechsler also frequently cites the writings of Sheldon Glueck, Manfred
Guttmacher, and Winfred Overholser, all of whom were key members of his
MPC Advisory Board and who have embraced a psychoanalytic focus. Id. at
1098 n.3, 1102 n.17, 1112 nn.30-31, 1119 n.66, 1120 n.68, 1125 n.82, & 1128
n.94.

HeinOnline -- 87 Minn. L. Rev. 302 2002-2003

20021

CRIME AND CONSCIOUSNESS

some of the newly added articles on the voluntary act
requirement
also referred to Freudian theories of
consciousness.1 39 Thus, the psychoanalytic grip remained
strong in both the MPC's creation and its revision.
3. The MPC's Advisory Committee Members
Further evidence that the MPC was significantly affected
by Freudian ideas comes from the writings and positions of
MPC advisory committee members. Four committee members
stand out in particular because of their fervent embrace of
Freud's theories.
Manfred S. Guttmacher, Chief Medical Officer of the
Supreme Bench of Baltimore, 140 was most responsible for
spearheading interest in forensic psychiatry in the early
1950s.14 1 In 1952, he considered it "essential that those who
administer the law recognize the role of the unconscious in the
142
making of human judgments and in antisocial behavior."
According to Guttmacher, "Sigmund Freud, the greatest figure
in modern psychiatry, made epochal advances in this
143
direction."
Lionel Trilling' 44 "wrote extensively" about Freud, whom

139. See MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 2 at 219 n.17
(citing Jeffrie G. Murphy, Involuntary Acts and CriminalLiability, 81 ETHICS
332, 338-39 (1971)); id. at 219 n.19 (citing D. O'Connor, The Voluntary Act, 15

MED. SCI. & L. 31, 33 (1975)). According to Murphy, "[slince Freud, we are
used to talking beyond the conscious. This has almost become our ordinary
way of talking." Murphy, supra, at 339. In turn, O'Connor asserts that "[t]he
merit of the recent discussions of the nature of voluntary conduct is that the
limitations of a pre-Freudian theory of conscious behavior enshrined in
McNaughton will be recognized within the debate on the nature of voluntary
and, more particularly, involuntary conduct." O'Connor, supra, at 31.
O'Connor also states that "[mlany of the difficulties that courts both in
Australia and in England have found in accommodating the principle of
involuntariness arise out of the rigidity with which the law has retained a
theory of conduct which largely ignores the psychic realities and operates on a

basis of consciousness." Id. at 36.
140.

MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, Part I, General Provisions

§§ 1.01-2.13, at vi.
141. M.S. Guttmacher, PsychiatristDies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1966, at 39;
Walter Weintraub, PsychiatricResidency Trainingin the V.A.: Then and Now,
26 MD. PSYCHIATRIST (Spring 1999), available at http://www.mdpsych.org/

sp99- wWeintraub.htm.
142.

MANFRED S. GUTTMACHER & HENRY WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND

THE LAW 20 (1952).

143.
144.

Id.
See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
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he considered "a figure of heroic proportions."14 5 In 1940, for
example, he asserted that "Freud's influence has been of the
greatest"-an impact "so pervasive that its extent is scarcely to
be determined" because it "has been infused into our life and
become a component of our culture of which it is hard to be
specifically aware." 146 In 1955, Trilling expounded further,
claiming that Freud's ideas "have become an integral part of
147
our modern intellectual apparatus."
Winfred Overholser, superintendent at St. Elizabeth's
Hospital, 148 was one of the country's leading medical
professionals in pioneering humane treatment for the mentally
14 9
ill and working for the rights of mentally ill defendants.
According to Overholser, Freud was as great an innovator as
Copernicus or Darwin. 150 Likewise, Overholser considered
Freud "a serious
scientific
worker
and
physician
... who... opened new vistas of thought which go to the heart
of human activities in all fields." 151 In particular, Freud's
concepts "permeated the entire field of psychiatry and . . .
fundamentally altered our views of the nature of mental
disorder and of its treatment." 52 While relying on Freud's
theories regarding the significance of the unconscious, for
example, Overholser noted that the unconscious is "so hidden
or disguised that to take any one symptom or phase of conduct
out of its context may give rise to serious injustices and
misunderstandings." 53
Attacking
the
"fundamental
assumption of the law" that "most acts are done on a basis of
reasoning and a weighing of the pros and cons," Overholser
stressed that reason alone does not dictate conduct. 54 Indeed,
145. Lask, supra note 116, at 40.
146. Trilling, supra note 117, at 156.
147. TRILLING, supra note 117, at 11-12 (noting that Freud's ideas "have
had a decisive influence upon our theories of education and of child-rearing,"
and have extended to the areas of anthropology, sociology, literary criticism,
and "even theology").
148. MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, Part I, General Provisions
§§ 1.01-2.13, at vii.
149. See Overholser, Winfred, in CURRENT BIOGRAPHY 466, 466-68
(Marjorie Dent Candee ed., 1954); Dr. Winfred Overholser Dies; Developed
PsychiatricCenters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1964, at 47.
150. Winfred Overholser, The Meaning of Freud for Our Time, 164 INT'L.
RECORD MED. 249, 249 (1951).

151. Id. at 257.
152. Id. at 249.
153. WINFRED OVERHOLSER,
154. Id. at 41.

THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW
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"there are circumstances under which emotional drives, little
understood by the actor, may cause him to perform acts even
1 55
against his will."
Sheldon Glueck, a Harvard University Law School
professor 156 and author of numerous significant studies of
criminal behavior and correctional treatment, 157 claimed that
the psychoanalytic presence was not strong enough, at least
when it came to the law. 158 Like Overholser, Glueck criticized
the substantive criminal law of the time because it focused on a
free will concept of the defendant's intent 159 and ignored
"[w]hat role unconscious motivation may have played in
formulating or biasing the 'criminal intent."' 160 Likewise,
Glueck condemned the available types of correctional
treatment, recommending instead
psychoanalytic treatment for
"psychoneurotic offenders."1 61
According to Glueck, the
potential difficulties involved in applying the psychoanalytic
method to criminals were "no reason for not experimenting
with it systematically or at least utilizing the insights that
study of psychoanalysis
gives into the intricacies of personality
162
maladjustment."
Herbert Wechsler, chief reporter for the MPC, 163 cited the
psychoanalytic-oriented works of all of these MPC advisors
(apart from Trilling)-as well as other psychoanalytic-oriented
works-in his renowned Harvard Law Review article
concerning The Challenge of a Model Penal Code. 164 In light of
the totality of all of these influences, the MPC could be
considered a product of the psychology of the times. The
dichotomies inherent in the MPC's voluntary act requirement
mirror a particular breed of psychology.

155. Id. at 42.
156. MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, Part I, General Provisions §§
1.01-2.13, at vi.
157. Glueck, Sheldon; and Glueck, Eleanor, in THE NEW ENCYCLOPiEDIA
BRITANNICA 311 (15th ed., 1994); Sheldon Glueck of HarvardDies; Studied the
Roots of Delinquency, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 1980, at D16.
158. See SHELDON GLUECK, CRIME AND JUSTICE 96-97 (1936).
159. See id.

160. Id. at 98.
161.

See id. at 243-44.

162. Id. at 244.
163.

See supra note 55 and accompanying text.

164.

See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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4. The MPC's Revisions
After 1962, the MPC Commentaries were updated and
revised.165
Because of their widespread effect and
entrenchment in the law, the MPC revisors decided "that the
substance of these Comments should remain substantially
undisturbed." 66 Likewise, there was no "systematic attempt to
assess the Code against scholarly views expressed since 1962,"
nor to "provide a comprehensive picture of what has happened
since 1962 in jurisdictions that have not undertaken
comprehensive legislative revisions." 167 The revisors primarily
"focused on how legislatures have responded to the proposals
embodied in the Code, and on fuller explication, when that
seemed useful, of how the provisions of the Code carry out the
168
objectives stated in the Comments."
Regardless of this limited effort to keep the MPC current,
much of the new science on conscious and unconscious
processes has developed since the MPC concluded its research
on the voluntary act requirement. 69 Therefore, even if the
revisors' goals had been to reexamine the voluntary act
provision, the most significant psychological literature on this
topic would not yet have existed.
The MPC now needs to be reassessed.
Despite the
influence of Freudian psychoanalytic theory on some members
of the MPC's advisory committee, Freud's own views of the
relationship between conscious and unconscious processes were
far more complex and permeable than the MPC
acknowledged. 170 Even if the MPC had successfully captured
Freud in all of his complexity, over the last four decades, the
165.

See MODEL PENAL CODE

1985, supra note 21, Part I, General

Provisions §§ 1.01-2.13, at xi-xiv, xli-lii.
166. Id. at xli.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See id. at xii; see also id. at 214 n.t (noting that "[w]ith a few
exceptions, [§ 2.01] research ended Jan. 1, 1979").
170.

See generally PETER GAY, FREUD: A LIFE FOR OUR TIME 366-67, 412-

16 (1989).
For example, Freud suggested the possibility of mental
communication between the conscious and the unconscious through the
vehicle of the "preconscious." Id. at 367. Freud also significantly revised his
theory of personality when, in 1923, he introduced his three-way division of
the mind into id, ego, and superego. Id. at 412-16. As Joseph Goldstein
perceptively noted shortly after the MPC was published, "it may be that the
psychoanalytic theory of man as an individual is too complex to permit
productive explorations of what may be even more complex-groups of human
beings interacting in the legal process." Goldstein, supra note 130, at 1054.
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status of psychoanalysis
as a science has been seriously
71
undermined. 1
Of course, this Article's role is not to debate the value of
Freudian ideas or of psychoanalysis generally. Rather, it
contends that modern science has changed the mind-behavior
landscape fundamentally. There has been a seismic shift in the
scientific community, and the law has yet to catch up. Rather
confusingly, the terms "conscious" and "unconscious" are still
used in this new science, but the ideas behind these terms have
been substantially altered.
This new psychological research supports the existence of a
continuum of conscious and unconscious thought processes, and
it generally dispenses with psychoanalytic concepts and
theories.' 7 2 These modern notions of cognitive processes, which
seem "intellectually much simpler" than those described in
psychoanalytic theory, are also now "solidly established" in
science.1 73 Regardless of this acceptance, however, substantial
conflict exists among scholars over how these processes
contribute to our thinking, what they are and do, and how or if
171. See generally HANS J. EYSENCK, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE
FREUDIAN EMPIRE (1990) (calling into doubt the validity of psychoanalysis as a

science); E. FULLER TORREY, FREUDIAN FRAUD (1992) (pointing out the lack of
scientific foundation in Freudian theory and assessing its widespread cultural
appeal against its usefulness); RICHARD WEBSTER, WHY FREUD WAS WRONG:

SIN, SCIENCE, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS (1995) (arguing that psychoanalytic

theory failed to provide a scientific explanation for all human nature); Peter
Brooks, Introduction, in WHOSE FREUD? THE PLACE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN
CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 1, 2 (Peter Brooks & Alex Woloch eds., 2000)

(noting that psychoanalysis "has become commonplace but also has been

challenged in its most basic assumptions"). But see Morton F. Reiser, Can
Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Emotional Neuroscience Collaborate in
Remodeling Our Concept of Mind-Brain?, in WHOSE FREUD? THE PLACE OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 248, 253-54 (commenting that

"psychoanalysis provides access to critically important levels and kinds of
mental functions that are not addressed by other disciplines"); Robert G.

Shulman & Douglas L. Rothman, Freud's Theory of the Mind and Modern
Functional Imaging Experiments, in WHOSE FREUD? THE PLACE OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 267 (accepting that "the

unconscious is acknowledged to contribute significantly to mental processes").
172.
173.

See infra Part II.
See Greenwald, supra note 7, at 766 (noting that "[u]nconscious

cognition is now solidly established in empirical research, but it appears to be
intellectually much simpler than the sophisticated agency portrayed in
psychoanalytic

theory");

see also DANIEL L.

SCHACTER,

SEARCHING FOR

MEMORY: THE BRAIN, THE MIND, AND THE PAST 190-91 (1996) (emphasizing

that the "nonconscious world of implicit memory revealed by cognitive
neuroscience" is "far more mundane" than the unconscious memories
described by Freud).
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they can be measured. 74 One idea garners consensus: The
boundaries between our conscious and unconscious are
permeable, dynamic, and interactive, and there is no valid
scientific support for a sharp dichotomy.175 The following Part
describes briefly the philosophical and scientific approaches to
consciousness to support this proposition and to introduce the
concept of "degrees of consciousness." This "degrees" concept,
and the research behind it, questions the MPC's binary
conscious/unconscious doctrine.
II. THE SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF
CONSCIOUSNESS
Societies have long been fascinated with the nature of
consciousness. 176
Originally, consciousness was examined
177
philosophically in the context of the mind/body dilemma,
specifically, the Cartesian dualist view that the world is divided
into two mutually exclusive parts: the physical and the
mental. 178 Since the theory of evolution, the inquiry has
174. See infra Part II.
175. See id.
176. Across the ages, societies have described the nature
in terms of their own particular focus and concerns.
HUMPHREY, A HISTORY OF THE MIND: EVOLUTION AND
CONSCIOUSNESS 17 (1992) (providing an insightful account
consciousness has come into the world and what it is doing

of consciousness
See NICHOLAS
THE BIRTH

OF

"of how sensory
there"); see also

JULIAN JAYNES, THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE BREAKDOWN OF THE

BICAMERAL MIND 2-3 (1990) (explaining that during the first half of the
nineteenth century, consciousness was viewed in terms of layers that reflected
an individual's past, consistent with "the age of great geological discoveries in
which the past was written in layers of the earth's crust").
177. JAYNES, supra note 176, at 3. For an interesting modern commentary
on this topic, see NICHOLAS HUMPHREY, THE MIND MADE FLESH 90-114
(2002).
178. In the seventeenth century, Descartes and Galileo drew "a sharp
distinction between the physical reality described by science and the mental
reality of the soul," which they believed was beyond the purview of scientific
research. See JOHN R. SEARLE, THE MYSTERY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 6 (1997)
[hereinafter SEARLE, MYSTERY]. This dualist perspective aided scientific
research at the time because religious authorities had ceased doubting
scientists' motives and because the physical world was mathematically
accessible in ways that the mind was not. See id. Beginning in the twentieth
century, this dualism became problematic because "it seem[ed] to place
consciousness and other mental phenomena outside the ordinary physical
world and thus outside the realm of natural science." Id.; see also JOHN R.
SEARLE, MINDS, BRAINS AND SCIENCE 10 (1984) [hereinafter SEARLE, MINDS]

(noting that because of the influence of Descartes's seventeenth century
philosophy, "we have an inherited cultural resistance to treating the conscious
mind as a biological phenomenon like any other"). There are still modern-day
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of mind or, more
become more scientific, focusing on the origin
179
particularly, how consciousness evolved.
At various points, the inquiry into consciousness has been
nearly halted altogether, most notably by behaviorism. 180 From
about 1920 to 1960, behaviorism dominated psychology at a
time when there was an increasing disdain for subjective
philosophical views and an avid embrace for what appeared to
be objective fact.' 8 ' Almost simultaneously, however, Freudian
theory began to have an immense impact in the United
States, 8 2 offering explanations for concepts that behaviorism
particular, conscious and unconscious mental
shunned-in
83
processes.
Starting in the 1970s, the growing disenchantment with
then-current psychological theories heralded in an era of
research that acknowledged the reality and significance of
conscious and unconscious processes, 184 but without their prior
This modern, non-Freudian,
Freudian interpretations.' 8 5
research now probes how consciousness will be defined and
through which disciplinary lens. Such developments highlight
the criminal law's outdated approach to defendants' claims of
unconsciousness in statutes and cases.

dualists. Roger Penrose, for example, believes that in addition to the physical
and mental worlds, a world of abstract objects, such as numbers, exists. See
ROGER PENROSE, SHADOWS OF THE MIND: A SEARCH FOR THE MISSING
SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 12-16 (1994).
179. See JAYNES, supra note 176, at 3; see also MERLIN DONALD, A MIND
SO RARE: THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS at xiv (2001)

(suggesting that "culture itself, as well as its two principal by-products,
languages and symbols, are consequences of a radical change in the nature of
consciousness"); HUMPHREY, supra note 176, at 17 (noting that "evolutionary

history is the biggest part of history and sensory consciousness is the best part
of the mind"). But see DAVID J. CHALMERS, THE CONSCIOUS MIND: IN SEARCH
OF A FUNDAMENTAL THEORY 120-21 (1996) (criticizing this view).
180. See JAYNES, supra note 176, at 14-15.
181. Id.; see also BAARS, supra note 7, at 7 (noting that "[blehaviorism

utterly denied that conscious experience was a legitimate scientific subject").
182. See supra notes 96-98, 125-34 and accompanying text.
183. Of course, a long philosophical history preceded and influenced Freud.
See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. The eventual acceptance of
Freud's views provided the foundation for current experimental work
demonstrating that individuals can engage in a wide range of sophisticated
mental processing without being aware of it. See Daniel C. Dennett,
Consciousness,in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE MIND 160, 162 (Richard L.

Gregory ed., 1987).
184.
185.

See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 87 Minn. L. Rev. 309 2002-2003

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:269

A. DEDUCTIONS AND DEFINITIONS
Much of the modern scientific controversy over
consciousness concerns its mere definition or whether it should
even be defined at all. How can we specify one of the "last
surviving myster[ies]"?186 Some renowned science writers avoid
any definition, for fear it may mislead or misrepresent.18 7 This
stance, while understandable, is unnecessarily confusing for
the purposes of this Article. This Article does not attempt to
study the mechanisms underlying consciousness, but rather
1
how the law can incorporate our current knowledge of it. 88
For these reasons, this Article recognizes, at least initially,
a wide range of definitions and levels of consciousness.
According to one view, consciousness is "the subjective quality
of experience,"' 89 the sum of one's thoughts and feelings,
circumstances and sensations. 190 Subjective self-awareness, or
what we call "I," is "the inner picture we each have of what it is
like to be ourselves," 19 1 the "inner eye." 192 This picture emerges
186.

DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 21 (1991); see also

JAYNES, supra note 176, at 1 ("Few questions have endured longer or
traversed a more perplexing history than this, the problem of consciousness
and its place in nature.").
187. See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 18 (discussing the concerns that
some scientists have about defining consciousness); Francis Crick & Christof
Koch, Toward A NeurobiologicalTheory of Consciousness, 2 SEMINARS IN THE
NEUROSCIENCES 263, 264 (1990) ("Until we understand the problem [of
consciousness] much better, any attempt at a formal definition is likely to be
either misleading or overly restrictive, or both."); Dennett, supra note 183, at
160 (noting that "[slome have gone so far as to deny that there is anything for
the term [consciousness] to name").
188. See, e.g., SEARLE, MYSTERY, supra note 178, at 5 (commenting that "if
we distinguish between analytic definitions [of consciousness], which aim to
analyze the underlying essence of a phenomenon, and common sense
definitions, which just identify what we are talking about, it does not seem...
at all difficult to give a common sense definition of the term").
189. CHALMERS, supra note 179, at 4. These experiences are enormously
far ranging: visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, taste, temperature (hot and
cold), bodily sensations, mental imagery, conscious thought, emotions, and
sense of self. Id. at 8-10.
190. See Dennett, supra note 183, at 160-64. According to Chalmers,
"[aiwareness can be broadly analyzed as a state wherein we have access to
some information, and can use that information in the control of behavior ...
[it is] a psychological property associated with experience itself, or with
phenomenal consciousness." CHALMERS, supra note 179, at 28.
191. NICHOLAS HUMPHREY, THE INNER EYE 52 (1986); see also JAYNES,
supra note 176, at 2 (referring to "the difference between what others see of us
and our sense of our inner selves and the deep feelings that sustain it"). As
Thomas Nagel has explained in a widely quoted phrase, "the fact that an
organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is
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from the commingling between appropriately relevant past
memories and present activities, enabling the past to "fill in"
the present. 93 Individuals can know directly only their own
consciousness; they project whatever consciousness they see in
others. 194 Thus, in general, consciousness typically refers to the
sum of a person's thoughts, feelings, and sensations, as well as
the everyday circumstances and culture in which those
thoughts, feelings, and sensations are formed.
Such a broad spectrum suggests that consciousness is not
one entity but rather a number of interactive parts, some of
which appear in the developing fetus and infant as well as in
other animals. 195 One perspective on consciousness proposes a
five-part model that reflects a continuum of low-to-high level
brain processing in which an individual acquires: (1) the sense
of self, (2) the sense of others (e.g., empathy), (3) the intention
196
to act (e.g., the meaning or sense attached to mental states),
(4) the experience of emotions, and (5) phenomenal qualities,
what philosophers call "qualia" for short. 197 These categories
something it is like to be that organism." Thomas Nagel, What Is It Like to Be
a Bat?, 483 PHIL. REV. 435, 436 (1974).
192. HUMPHREY, supra note 191, at 68-71.
193. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 37; see also GERALD M. EDELMAN, THE
REMEMBERED PRESENT: A BIOLOGICAL THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 155 (1989)
(explaining that "primary consciousness results from the interaction in real
time between memories of past value-category correlations and present world
input as it is categorized by global mappings (but before the components of
these mappings are altered by internal states)); ISRAEL ROSENFIELD, THE
STRANGE, FAMILIAR AND FORGOTTEN: AN ANATOMY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 84
(1993) (proposing that consciousness emerges from the "dynamic interrelations
of the past, the present, and the body image").
194. HUMPHREY, supra note 191, at 86.
195. See TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 25-27.
196. The concept of intentionality was initially discussed in philosophical
terms by Aristotle when he asserted, for example, that "[i]t is when a man
wills the harm he does that he is unjust and wicked." See ARISTOTLE, THE
ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 161 (J.A.K. Thomson trans., 1955) (the Nicomachean
Ethics). Franz Brentano readdressed the term in 1874 by distinguishing
between mental acts and mental contents. According to Brentano, there is
intentional content in all mental acts, including desires, hopes, expectations,
and memories. See FRANZ BRENTANO, PSYCHOLOGY FROM AN EMPIRICAL
STANDPOINT 138-53 (Oskar Kraus & Linda L. McAlister eds., 1st English ed.,
Routledge & Kegal Paul Ltd. 1973) (1874) (originally published in German as
"Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt"). Of course, intentionality is an
important component of modern efforts to characterize consciousness. See
SEARLE, MINDS, supra note 178, at 16 (defining "intentionality" as "the feature
by which our mental states are directed at, or about, or refer to, or are objects
and states of affairs in the world other than themselves").
Phenomenal qualities,
197. See TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 25-26.
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overlap. For example, there is an emotional component in most
states of consciousness that is capable of totally taking over
awareness. Presumably, "blind rage" is "a state of mind in
which emotion fills the whole of consciousness" to the point
where people may be capable of murder even though they may
not consciously experience their emotional memory. 198
Consciousness arises from nonconscious and unconscious
mental activities. 199 Very simplistically, the nonconscious
refers to those "brain activities that never directly enter
awareness [because of] their primitive level in the processing
hierarchy." 20 0 In contrast, the unconscious pertains to those
brain activities about which individuals "are presently unaware
but that may have been repressed at an earlier time and still
influence [their] actions." 20 1 The nonconscious is critical for
understanding behavior, despite its low mental rung. Some of
the cognitive deficiencies evident in mental disorders such as
schizophrenia, for example, appear to be linked to
abnormalities in nonconscious levels of brain activity. Since
the nonconscious also provides the foundation for all thought
processes, "nonconscious activity is the gateway to
consciousness. "202
Recent research reveals the interlinkages among these
three levels of mental activity. For example, some studies show
that the line between awareness and lack of awareness is not
as impenetrable as it may seem in the context of an individual's
everyday experiences. 203
The fact that certain types of
'qualitative feels," or "qualia" for short, constitute the most primitive
components (and therefore foundation) of consciousness. CHALMERS, supra
note 179, at 4. For example, an individual may have the raw feel of the color
red when looking at a red rose. Qualia supposedly comprise four controversial
characteristics: (1) intrinsicalness (they are not related to other objects); (2)
ineffableness (they cannot be described to others); (3) transparency (they can
be seen through); and (4) atomicity (they cannot be reduced to smaller or more
primitive components). TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 32.
198. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 30.
199. Id. at 15, 42.
200. Id. at 15; see also Dennett, supra note 183, at 162 (noting that the
nonconscious mechanisms for delivering conscious and unconscious mental
processes are "bits of organic machinery, as utterly lacking in a point of view
or inner life as a kidney or kneecap").
201. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 15.
202. Id. at 16-17.
203. See generally LAWRENCE WEISKRANTZ, BLINDSIGHT: A CASE STUDY
AND IMPLICATIONS at v (1986) [hereinafter WEISKRANTZ, BLINDSIGHT]

(reporting on experimental studies on "blindsight," a condition involving a rare
form of brain damage in which stroke patients, who are definitely blind, can
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stimulation can trigger unenjoyable or disturbing experiences
in brain-damaged individuals suggests that "activation must
cross some sort of threshold before it can result in
204
awareness."
Such research indicates that much of a person's "mental
life" takes place in a "twilight world of not properly conscious
impulses, inklings, automatisms, and reflexive action." 205 The
classic example is the process of driving a car. As one writer
explains, beginning drivers focus intensely on each step of the
process, no matter how basic-such as switching gears and
steering-and they are barely cognizant of the other aspects of
their environment, such as the changing scenery. Experienced
drivers, however, can smoothly operate a car while seemingly
unaware of the mechanics and procedures involved, often
concentrating on thoughts not even related to driving. 20 6 Thus,
our brains seem designed to function as much as possible at
this unconscious level, allowing our most heightened levels of
consciousness to handle tasks that are either particularly
20 7
difficult or new.

Some commentators contend that the ability to have
consciousness propels a belief that human beings act freely,20 8 a
still perceive items at a subconscious level that they are not able to "see"
consciously); LAWRENCE WEISKRANTZ, CONSCIOUSNESS LOST AND FOUND: A
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLORATION (1997) (hereinafter WEISKRANTZ,
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLORATION) (describing research on various
neuropsychological disorders that block a patient's ability to express overtly
what the brain covertly "knows"). Particularly relevant research illustrating
the tenuous line between awareness and lack of awareness includes studies on
blindsight, see WEISKRANTZ, BLINDSIGHT, supra, and infra note 233, and
studies on prosopagnosia, a defect in people's abilities to recognize familiar
faces, see WEISKRANTZ, NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLORATION, supra,at 26-27,
169-71, 184-85, 188, 222-26, 228, 231, 236; see also infra note 235 and
accompanying text.
204. Arthur W. Young, Conscious and Nonconscious Recognition of
FamiliarFaces, in ATTENTION AND PERFORMANCE 153, 155 (Carlo Umilta &
Morris Moscovitch eds., 1994).
205. JOHN MCCRONE, GOING INSIDE 135 (1999).
206. Id.; see also SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 177 (7th ed. 2001)

(noting that the MPC treats a "habitual action done without thought," such as
a person intending to drive one place but habitually driving to another, as a
voluntary action).
207. MCCRONE, supra note 205, at 135.
208. See SEARLE, MINDS, supra note 178, at 94-97. According to Searle, the
experience of engaging in voluntary, intentional human conduct as opposed to
hypnosis or passive reception suggests that we possess alternative courses of
action and, therefore, free will. Id. at 95. "[Elvolution has given us a form of
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perspective generally consistent with the criminal law's free
will view of human behavior. 20 9 Regardless, once consciousness
is recognized as a valid and real phenomenon-and it appears
that it has been---"we have to find a place for it in our scheme
of things" and explain it.2 10 The criminal law in particular
must explain it because consciousness is the foundation for
voluntary conduct.
B. THE PURPOSE OF CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSES

Research analyzing the preeminent role of the unconscious
in all of human thought and behavior complicates the role of
conscious mentality. "What is consciousness for, if perfectly
unconscious, indeed subject-less, information processing is in
principle capable of achieving all the ends for which conscious
minds were supposed to exist?" 2 11 Yet, a host of scientists have
suggested that this question simply raises (not lowers) the role
of consciousness.
Conscious experience is distinguishable
because of
its
accessibility
to an individual's thought
21 2
patterns.
Past experiences influence not only present behavior, but
also present consciousness. 2 13 Experimental research supports
the premise that one purpose of consciousness is to exact "a
experience of voluntary action where the experience of freedom ... is built into
the very structure of conscious, voluntary, intentional human behaviour." Id.
at 98. See also DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL at ix
(2002) (contending that explanations of our belief in "conscious will may
involve exploring how the mechanisms of the human mind create the
experience of will" and that "conscious will is a feeling that helps us to
appreciate and remember our authorship of the things our minds and bodies
do").
209. See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 52 (1978) (suggesting
that embracing "a deterministic view of human conduct" would be
"inconsistent with the underlying precepts of our criminal justice system");
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (depicting as a
'universal and persistent" element of our law the "belief in the freedom of the
human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to
choose between good and evil"); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590
(1937) (noting that "the law has been guided by a robust common sense which
assumes the freedom of the will as a working hypothesis in the solution of its
problems"); Smith v. Armontrout, 865 F.2d 1502, 1506 (8th Cir. 1988) ("The
whole presupposition of the criminal law is that most people, most of the time,
have free will within broad limits.").
210. See Colin McGinn, Can We Ever Understand Consciousness?, N.Y.
REV. OF BOOKS, June 10, 1999, at 4.
211. Dennett, supra note 183, at 162.
212. See infra notes 213-20 and accompanying text.
213. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 126.
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veto effect" on our developing behavior, 2 14 although it does not
determine every detail. 215 Consciousness "has the important
role (among others) of singling out which interpretation of a
given input appears the most correct from many alternatives
available." 2 16 This research could enlighten the criminal law
because offenders may have difficulty choosing those
interpretations that would contribute to law-abiding behavior.
Likewise, because unconscious activity may activate many
different explanations for a person's experiences-only a few of
which may be consistent with the total context--consciousness
becomes an efficient device for establishing consistency at a
relatively late stage of thought processing. Individuals achieve
2 17
cognitive consistency when consciousness emerges.
The accessible nature of consciousness is illustrated by a
proposed continuum of three types of conscious states arranged
according to the brain's representations of memory: 218 (1)
clearly conscious phenomena, such as "clear mental images,"
"deliberate inner speech," and "material deliberately retrieved
from memory"; (2) fuzzy, difficult-to-determine events, such as
"active but unrehearsed items in immediate memory" and
"subliminal events that prime later conscious processes"; and,
(3) clearly unconscious (or nonconscious) events, such as

214. See Benjamin Libet, Brain Stimulation in the Study of Neuronal
Functions for Conscious Sensory Experience, 1 HUMAN NEUROBIOL. 235, 23542 (1982); infra notes 259-72 and accompanying text.
215. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 126.
216. Id. at 172.
217. See id.
218. BAARS, supra note 7, at 11-13; TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 28 (noting
Baars's "excellent" discussion of states of consciousness); see also SEARLE,
MYSTERY, supra note 178, at 5 (explaining that "within the field of
consciousness there are states of intensity ranging from drowsiness to full
awareness"). There appear to be at least three memory-related components of
consciousness based on various brain sites: (1) passive consciousness, which is
mostly posteriorly based; (2) active consciousness, which is mostly anteriorly
based; and (3) self consciousness, which is also mostly anteriorly based, but
with some relevant memories that are posteriorly based. TAYLOR, supra note
9, at 31.
Passive consciousness pertains to an individual's phenomenal
experience of their surroundings, such as enjoying a beautiful sunset; active
consciousness pertains to the active processing of brain activities, such as
intentionality or thinking hard about a problem; and self consciousness refers
to self awareness or self reference, such as introspection.
Id. at 30-34.
Emotional states, dreaming, and slow-wave sleep, are other possible
components of consciousness. Id. at 31, 34. Recognition of these components
of course contradicts the theory of a unified mind embraced by Descartes. See
supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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"unretrieved material in long term memory."2 19 Clearly
conscious experiences include people's independently verifiable
reports of conscious mental images or events. In contrast,
clearly unconscious (or nonconscious) processes cannot be
reported voluntarily, even under the most favorable
circumstances, although they can be inferred by solid and
220
reliable evidence.
These issues are crucial for the criminal law because the
MPC's voluntary act requirement is based on a distinction
between conscious and unconscious processes. This distinction
reflects an older science, and thus gives rise to the challenging,
contemporary task of redefining these mental states. The
dated scientific foundation also suggests that the MPC's
characterization of unconsciousness by way of example-listing
particular conditions and states 22 1-is unsophisticated and
inaccurate. The following sections focus on the philosophy and
science of consciousness in an attempt to propose a more
workable and just solution.

219. BAARS, supra note 7, at 12. The continuum ranges as follows:
Clearly conscious phenomena

Attended percepts
Clear mental images

Deliberate inner speech
Material deliberately retrieved from memory
Fleeting mental images
Peripheral or "background" perceptual events
Abstract but accessible concepts
Fuzzy, difficult-to-determine events

Active but unrehearsed items in immediate memory
Presuppositions of conscious concepts
Fully habituated stimuli
Subliminal events that prime later conscious processes

"Blind sight" in occipital brain damage
Contextual information, set
Automatic skills component
Unretrieved material in long-term memory
Perceptual context
Abstract rules, as in syntax
Clearly unconscious events

Id.
220.
221.

See id.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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C. MAJOR PERSPECTIVES ON CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS
PROCESSES
222
There is a vast interdisciplinary study of consciousness.
Increasingly, psychologists, brain researchers, and other
scientists are probing a field once dominated by philosophers
and theologians. 223
This range in perspective adds to
potentially clashing accounts of what consciousness is or

whether it can be measured at all. 224

The conflict is most

obvious in attempts to address the mind/body dilemma and
resolve one of the most difficult questions in consciousness
225
research: Can consciousness be reduced to physical matter?
Assuming the answer is yes, how do brain cells create the
experience of seeing red, for example, or the overwhelming

222. The interdisciplinary nature of consciousness research is clearly
evident in three volumes of edited books resulting from periodic conferences
sponsored by the University of Arizona. See generally TOWARD A SCIENCE OF
CONSCIOUSNESS: THE FIRST TUCSON DISCUSSIONS AND DEBATES (Stuart R.
Hameroff et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter FIRST TUCSON DISCUSSIONS AND
DEBATES]
(presenting contributions
from
philosophy,
psychology,
neuroscience, biochemistry, and quantum theory to the study of
consciousness); SECOND TUCSON DISCUSSIONS AND DEBATES, supra note 18;
TOWARD A SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS III: THE THIRD TUCSON DISCUSSIONS
AND DEBATES (Stuart R. Hameroff et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter THIRD
TUCSON DISCUSSIONS AND DEBATES]; see also RITA CARTER, CONSCIOUSNESS
6, 7 (2002) (providing an interdisciplinary overview of consciousness research
with a focus on the increasing synthesis among the different ways that
disciplines approach their investigations).
223. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 6, 42. The most significant disciplines now
studying consciousness include the following: philosophy (which examines the
logical aspects of the mysteries of the mind and the brain); psychology (which
probes how different stimuli or tasks influence individuals' perspectives of
their inner conscious states); neuropsychology (which analyzes the neural
attendants to psychological responses); neuroanatomy and physiology (which
investigate the structure and function of the brain's nervous tissue); neural
network research (which creates theories of the brain's neural networks);
engineering and computer science (which develop instruments for examining
the brain and analyzing data); physics (which proffers more accurate tools and
theories); and mathematics (which applies mathematical constructs to help
explain the implications of various brain theories). Id. at 42.
224. See generally COLIN MCGINN, THE MYSTERIOUS FLAME: CONSCIOUS
MINDS IN A MATERIAL WORLD at xi-29 (1999) (explaining that consciousness is
a mystery because "our intelligence is wrongly designed for understanding
consciousness"). For example, Crick & Koch, supra note 187, at 237, shun
philosophy and Roger Penrose stresses the significance of quantum mechanics
as an approach to studying the mind. See generally PENROSE, supra note 178,
at 256-69.
225. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 48 (discussing the question of reducing
consciousness to physical matter).
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emotions of rage? 226
Philosophers and scientists commenting on the mind/body
dilemma in relation to consciousness primarily fall into three
groups: (1) non-reductionists, who contend either that
consciousness can never be reduced to physical matter or that
such reduction is possible but so difficult that it will not be
accomplished for a very long while; 227 (2) reductionists, who
claim that consciousness can be reduced although it may be
226. MCGINN, supra note 224, at 6-23 (analyzing the phenomenon of
consciousness arising out of a physical body).
227. Serious probing into the reducibility of consciousness commenced in
1974 with Thomas Nagel's renowned article, What Is It Like to Be a Bat?,
Nagel, supra note 191. Nagel claimed that no available reductionist theory
could explain fully what it is like to be a bat or any other sentient being
because mental experiences were so subjective. Id. at 435-50. Any potential
reductionist solution lies "in the distant intellectual future," id. at 436,
because theorists cannot yet conceive of how it may be true. See id. at 446-47.
John Searle contends that consciousness is irreducible and discards Nagel's
optimistic forecast. SEARLE, MINDS, supra note 178, at 75 ("I think we need to
abandon once and for all the idea that the social sciences are like physics
before Newton, and that what we are waiting for is a set of Newtonian laws of
mind and society."); SEARLE, MYSTERY, supra note 178, at 8 (questioning "how
brain processes, which are publicly observable, objective phenomena, could
cause anything as peculiar as inner, qualitative states of awareness or
sentience"). Instead, he acknowledges the causal role of brain processes in
consciousness through a three-part framework of "biological naturalism."
JOHN R. SEARLE, MIND, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIETY: PHILOSOPHY IN THE REAL

WORLD 54 (1998). According to Searle, consciousness 1) comprises inner
subjective processes and 2) therefore cannot be reduced to the "third person
phenomena" examined by neuroscientists. Id. at 53. Regardless, 3)
'consciousness is caused by brain processes and is a higher-order feature of
the brain system." Id. at 54. Therefore, the mind and mental processes are "as
biologically based as growth or digestion or the secretion of bile." SEARLE,
MINDS, supra note 178, at 54. However, neurophysiology will never provide a
sufficient explanation of the very nature of consciousness because
consciousness exists beyond the neurophysiological facts that cause it.
SEARLE, MYSTERY, supra note 178, at 18 (explaining that although
consciousness is caused by brain processes and is also an aspect of the brain,
"itis not a property of any individual elements and cannot be explained simply
as a summation of the properties of those elements"). Searle's view has been
extended further by David Chalmers. See CHALMERS, supra note 179, at 93124. According to Chalmers, "unlike nearly everything else in the world,
consciousness cannot be reductively explained, that is, accounted for in
completely physical terms." Id. at 93. Specifically, consciousness is "not
logically supervenient on the physical .... All the microphysical facts in the
world do not entail the facts about consciousness." Id. However, even if we
cannot explain consciousness reductively, it can be explained nonreductively.
Id. at 213 ("The cornerstone of a theory of consciousness will be a set of
psychophysical laws governing the relationship between consciousness and
physical systems."). Searle, however, vehemently disagrees with Chalmers's
approach. See SEARLE, MYSTERY, supra note 178, at 143-76.
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difficult to characterize physically or it may not possess all the
properties that the non-reductionists say are impossible to
achieve; 228 and (3) modellists, who assert confidently that
228. Francis Crick was perhaps the first to state the reductionist view most
forthrightly. All individuals and everything personal about them-their joys
and sorrows, memories and ambitions, their feelings of personal identity and
free will-constitute "no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve
cells and their associated molecules." FRANCIS CRICK, THE ASTONISHING
HYPOTHESIS: THE SCIENTIFIC SEARCH FOR THE SOUL 3 (1994). At the same
time, Crick concedes that he can only speculate about how consciousness
emerges from this interacting set of neurons. Id. at 203-63. "Eliminativist"
philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett, resolve Crick's dilemma by contending
that the more problematic aspects of measuring consciousness (such as
intentionality or qualia) do not exist; other philosophers are simply wrong
about describing the nature of inner experiences. See generally DENNETT,
supra note 186, at 253-82. According to Dennett, there is no mystery behind
how the brain's information processing capabilities are able to become
"conscious." Id. at 101-11. Rather, the brain continually creates hypotheses or
drafts of what is happening in the world. Id. Therefore, mental states become
conscious by successfully competing against other mental states for
domination of the control of an individual's behavior. Id. at 111-38. In
essence, conscious mental processing is simply the organization of these
competing activities. See generally id. at 412-30; see also DANIEL C. DENNETT,
THE INTENTIONAL STANCE at ix-xi (1987) (presenting a series of essays on
Dennett's thinking about "the intentionality of mental states"; specifically,
how individuals take on a stance that allows them to predict and interpret the
presumed rationality of others in order to better understand the world);
DANIEL C. DENNETT, KINDS OF MINDS: TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF
CONSCIOUSNESS 153-61 (1996) (examining the question of consciousness from
a multidisciplinary and evolutionary perspective, particularly focusing on a
comparison between the mental capabilities of humans and animals).
According to the "eliminative materialists," Paul and Patricia Churchland,
Dennett's view rightly exposes the fragile basis of "folk psychology." PAUL M.
CHURCHLAND &

PATRICIA S.

CHURCHLAND,

ON THE CONTRARY:

CRITICAL

ESSAYS, 1987-1997, at 8-15, 30-33 (1998).
In general, folk psychology
comprises common sense notions that individuals are active conscious agents
exercising intentions, beliefs, desires, choices, and voluntary conduct. The
Churchlands claim that folk psychology has three major empirical flaws.
First, the theory has substantial "explanatory gaps" because it has been
unable to explain "a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena:
mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and the
many forms of learning." Id. at 8. Second, folk psychology "has not progressed
significantly in at least 2500 years," because the Greeks "used essentially the
same [mental] framework"; thus, the theory "has not shown the expansion and
developmental fertility one expects from a true theory." Id. Third, folk
psychology appears unable to be "smoothly integrable with the emerging
synthesis of the several physical, chemical, biological, physiological, and
neurocomputational sciences." Id. For these and a host of other collateral
reasons, such a theory is a contender for outright elimination. See id. at 8-10;
see also Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland, Replies from the
Churchlands, in THE CHURCHLANDS AND THEIR CRITICS 217-310 (Robert
McCauley ed., 1997) (clarifying and defending the criticisms of folk
psychology). Paul Churchland has briefly touched on how such views impact
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consciousness can be measured. 229
Substantial wrangling also exists among the philosophers
and scientists within each of these three groups concerning the
230
extent to which they adhere to these general viewpoints.
Thus, the "race for consciousness" in science already has
produced a bewildering number of theories and hypotheses
about the "mystery" of the mind. Regardless of this potential
for confusion, however, the process of scientific testing and
debate has created at least one important result relevant to the
criminal law-the discovery that the boundaries between our
conscious and unconscious are permeable, dynamic, and
interactive.
The next section studies examples of the new
neuroscientific research on consciousness with three purposes
in mind: (1) to demonstrate more fully the more-or-less nature
of consciousness, which starkly conflicts with the criminal law's
all-or-nothing approach; (2) to show how this research may
have some bearing on criminal law doctrine; and (3) to discuss
how this research has already had some impact in criminal law
cases.
D. THE NEW NEUROSCIENTIFIc RESEARCH ON CONSCIOUSNESS

The philosophical questions posed about consciousness
provide a frame for neuroscientific insights into brain
functioning. Neuroscience's research on individuals, some
having unique types of brain damage,2 31 has produced some of
the most sophisticated cognitive science now being conducted.
on practical moral and legal issues. See PAUL M. CHURCHLAND, THE ENGINE
OF REASON, THE SEAT OF THE SOUL: A PHILOSOPHICAL JOURNEY INTO THE

BRAIN 309-14 (1995).

229.

The term "modellists" was created by the author for this Article's

purposes. This research is most concisely characterized by John Taylor. See
generally TAYLOR, supra note 9.
230. See generally id. at 327-40.
231. See SUSAN GREENFIELD, BRAIN STORY: UNLOCKING OUR INNER
WORLD OF EMOTIONS, MEMORIES, IDEAS AND DESIRES 19 (2000) (noting that
"[i]n neuroscience, one of the classic ways of investigating how the brain works
has been to study people in whom an injury or disease has damaged a specific
part of the brain"). In some rare circumstances, for example, a stroke, tumor,
or accident can weaken or destroy a small segment of an individual's normal
conscious perception and reveal otherwise hidden mechanisms that the
person's brain uses to register information unconsciously. These mechanisms
are far more difficult to detect in a normal conscious mind devoid of such
gateways into the unconscious. See Bob Holmes, Irresistible Illusions, 159
NEW SCIENTIST 31, 31 (1998).
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There are many thorough and detailed accounts of these
scientific discoveries. 232
This section briefly summarizes
examples of some of the research by examining the link
between emotions, memory, and behavior, and by discussing
how this research contributes to understanding voluntary and
involuntary acts.
1. The Links Among Emotions, Memory, and Behavior
Research
distinguishing
between
conscious
and
unconscious processes has focused on a wide span of areas,
233
ranging from the emotions to memory to visual perception.
While all three areas are potentially important for the criminal
law, the associations between emotions and memory are
particularly intriguing because the studies have included
individuals with behavioral disorders.
The tie between
emotions, memory, and behavioral disorder is not surprising;
"[e]motions
are ubiquitous in criminal law, as they are in
life."234
The spotlight on emotions originated with scientific
observations indicating that some brain-damaged individuals,
who are no longer able to recognize faces consciously, still
evidence the physical signs of emotion when researchers show
232. E.g., CARTER, supra note 222; GREENFIELD, supra note 231; TAYLOR,
supra note 9, at 99-120; FIRST TUCSON DISCUSSIONS AND DEBATES, supra note
222; SECOND TUCSON DISCUSSIONS AND DEBATES, supra note 18; THIRD
TUCSON DISCUSSIONS AND DEBATES, supra note 222; WEGNER, supra note 208.
233. Research into visual perception has been the most enlightening
vehicle for deciphering the various modes of consciousness. For the past two
decades, psychologists and philosophers have been particularly interested in
blindsight because the blind individuals who have it can still perceive items at
an unconscious level that they are not able to "see" consciously. See generally
WEISKRANTZ, BLINDSIGHT, supra note 203, at 35-46 (discussing experimental
studies on blindsight). For example, when researchers hold a bar of light
before the subjects' blind eye, the subjects can sense that the bar is present
and even determine whether it is vertical or horizontal although they cannot
"see" it and cannot explain how they know of its presence. Id. It appears that
blindsight patients activate a vestigial visual pathway that the conscious mind
does not recognize. See R. Rafal et al., Extrageniculate Vision in Hemianopic
Humans: Saccade Inhibition by Signals in the Blind Field, 250 SCIENCE 118,
118-21 (1990). Such differences are also detectable among non-damaged
individuals. Id. at 118-19.
234. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion
in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 270 (1996) (discussing the wide
range of criminal law doctrine that is influenced by presumptions about
human emotions and its consequences); see also Susan A. Bandes,
Introduction, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 1 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (stating
that "[e]motion pervades the law").
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them photographs of their loved ones. These results suggest
that on the unconscious level, recognition takes place. 235 The
reverse scenario, however, is comparably compelling for the
criminal law.
In particular, scientists have encountered
individuals whose consciousness is seemingly unimpaired but
whose unconscious awareness appears damaged. 236 One study,
for example, involved a 35-year-old man, E.V.R., who
237
experienced brain damage after having a tumor removed.
Within months after surgery, he switched from a life with a
successful career, happy marriage with two children, and
upstanding social reputation, to another life where he became
bankrupt after a series of questionable business deals and
divorced his wife to marry and divorce two women in
succession, one of whom was a prostitute. 238 Although surgery
did not affect E.V.R.'s intelligence or neurological status, he
was not able to retain employment after his surgery, and
239
became involved in difficult social and ethical dilemmas.
These findings with patients like E.V.R. suggested that
such individuals no longer had access to their visceral
240
reactions, a form of covert or unconscious awareness.
According to Hanna and Antonio Damasio, when individuals
assess a situation, they do not have the time to process every
possible element of it, positive or negative. Rather, individuals
rely on unconscious signals fueled by memories of similar
situations, typically involving rewards or punishments. These
24 1
memories guide their decision-making.
The Damasios' research illustrates this Article's earlier
account of how consciousness arises from, and interlinks with,

235. See ANTONIO DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND
EMOTION IN THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 52-68 (1999).

236. See Paul J. Eslinger & Antonio R. Damasio, Severe Disturbance of
Higher Cognition After Bilateral Frontal Lobe Ablation: Patient EVR, 35
NEUROLOGY 1731, 1731-41 (1985); see also Antonio R. Damasio, et al.,

Individuals With Sociopathic Behavior Caused by Frontal Damage Fail to
Respond Autonomically to Social Stimuli, 41 BEHAV. BRAIN RES. 81, 81-94

(1990).
237. Eslinger & Damasio, supra note 236, at 1731; Damasio, et al., supra
note 236, at 81-82.
238. Damasio et al., supra note 236, at 81-82.

239. Id. at 82.
240. See DAMASIO, supra note 235, at 224-29; see also note 533, infra
(describing Damasio's "somatic marker theory" in the context of the Weinstein
case).
241.

See DAMASIO, supra note 235, at 82-131.
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unconscious and nonconscious mental activities. 242 This theory
of interlinkage served as part of the defense in the Herbert
Weinstein second-degree murder case, which this Article
discusses more thoroughly in Part IV.24 3 Relying in part on

Antonio Damasio's expert testimony, Weinstein's defense
focused on the extent to which a brain cyst (emanating from the
nonconscious) hindered his ability to think rationally and
control his emotions (emanating from the unconscious)
while
244
arguing with, and ultimately killing, his wife.

More recently, researchers have discovered unusual cases
in which individuals, who have been brain-damaged since
infancy, are unable to learn norm-abiding rules of social and
moral behavior in childhood and adolescence. 245 When these
individuals reached adulthood, they showed no guilt or remorse
for their law-violating behavior and they were difficult
socially. 246
2. The Links Among Emotions, Memory, Decision Making,
and Perception
Other research on non-violent subjects supports the notion
that individuals have a covert mechanism in their brains that
designates which of their decisions is beneficial or harmful
based upon their emotional memories. 247 This mechanism
begins long before individuals are consciously aware that they
have even made a decision. 248 These and similar kinds of
results suggest that specific brain regions assist individuals to
anticipate rewards and punishments and that individuals start
reaching a "hunch" stage when they begin to make better
decisions. 249 Individuals with bilateral damage to specific brain
242. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
243. See infra notes 522-58 and accompanying text.
244. See infra notes 530-34 and accompanying text.
245. Steven W. Anderson et al., Impairment of Social and Moral Behavior
Related to Early Damage in Human Prefrontal Cortex, 2 NATURE
NEuROSCIENCE 1032, 1032-37 (1999).
246. Id.
247. Antoine Bechara et al., Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the
Advantageous Strategy, 275 SCIENCE 1293, 1293-95 (1997).
248. See id.
249. Id. This kind of decision making can be studied, for example, by
observing the card selection of people who are asked to play a card game with
the objective of winning the highest possible amount of money. Normally, a
pattern of choosing cards from the higher-yielding deck of cards emerges. Id.
Similarly, individuals exposed to a technique called "forced choice guessing,"
are asked to memorize certain information ordered to be difficult to recall,

HeinOnline -- 87 Minn. L. Rev. 323 2002-2003

324

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:269

regions that are activated in decision making never reach this
hunch stage, and do not show the kinds of physiological
250
responses typically evident before making a bad decision.
Such divergences between people's conscious and
unconscious processes do not end with decision-making abilities
and hunches. In subjects with both damaged and normal
eyesight, for example, researchers have found that an
individual's vision for action is distinctly different from their
vision for perception. 25 1 For example, people substantially
such as a long and complicated list of words or addresses. When they are later
asked to repeat the list and they are unable to remember all of it, researchers
present them with a similar list, including some items from the original.
Subjects then select the information that seems most familiar, and they are
almost always correct. Gay Snodgrass, The Memory Trainers, in MIND AND
BRAIN SCIENCES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 199, 199-233 (Robert L. Solso ed.,
1997) (reviewing the research on memory and conscious processing). More
recently, experimenters have been investigating whether undamaged brains
can learn knowledge unconsciously as well as recall it unconsciously. If
supported, this controversial area of research could provide a scientific
explanation for intuition. Holmes, supra note 231, at 31.
250. See Bechara et al., supra note 247, at 1293; see also Michael L. Platt &
Paul W. Glimcher, Neural Correlatesof Decision Variables in ParietalCortext,
400 NATURE 233, 233-38 (1999) (noting research showing that monkeys
display a level of neuron activity that correlates to their anticipated award). It
appears that these kinds of expectancies are integrated into the brain's
neurochemistry.
251. This incongruity was first discovered when researchers examined an
individual suffering from carbon monoxide poisoning, which damaged the
subject's visual cortex and left her unable to perceive consciously shapes or
objects. See M. A. Goodale et al., A Neurological Dissociation Between
Perceiving Objects and Grasping Them, 349 NATURE 154, 154 (1991). The
subject could not distinguish between vertical or horizontal orientation of
objects held before her, but she could still grasp such objects without difficulty.
Id. at 154. Likewise, the subject could not describe the orientation of a slot in a
disk but she had no difficulty orienting and pushing a card through the slot
when asked to do so. Id. In addition, although she could not distinguish
between a square object and a rectangular object, she formed the correct shape
with her hand when she picked them up. Id. at 155. Such differences are also
detectable among non-damaged individuals. A. David Milner & Melvyn A.
Goodale, The Visual Brain in Action, in THIRD TUCSON DISCUSSIONS AND
DEBATES, supra note 222, at 127, 135-39. In one experiment, psychologists
presented subjects with a selection of blocks shaped like poker chips placed on
a table to create an optical illusion. In one configuration, a chip was placed
inside a circle of other chips that were substantially larger than it was; in the
other configuration, an identically sized chip was placed inside a circle of other
chips that were substantially smaller than it was. Subjects always say that
the chip surrounded by the smaller chips is larger than the other chips; yet,
when these subjects grasp at the chips within both configurations, their hands
open to the identical width no matter which chip they are grabbing. Id. at 13637. From these experiments, researchers have been able to show that the
brain has developed two different visual systems that employ different regions
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overestimate the steepness of a hill while standing at the
bottom of it. 252 However, when asked, they accurately tilt their
hand to match the steepness, even without looking at their
hand. 253 People also judge hills to be even steeper if they are
254
wearing a heavy backpack or have just completed a run.
Similarly, older individuals perceive more steepness than
younger individuals, while unfit people see more steepness
than trained athletes. 255 It appears that people's conscious
misrepresentations have two self-serving functions. On the one
hand, these misrepresentations distort reality so that we may
not attempt hill climbing that could be physiologically futile.
On the other hand, they provide an accurate gauge of just how
much effort is needed to reach the top. 256 Unconsciously,
subjects' brains and bodies detect information that their
conscious brain does not recognize. 257 This finding suggests
that the conscious mind is not in full control of an individual's
perceptions and actions.
In terms of the criminal law, such evidence again sheds
doubt on the MPC's sharp conscious/unconscious dichotomy, as
well as the MPC's simplistic listing of medical and
psychological states to illustrate unconsciousness. Rather, the
issue of consciousness is far more complex and subjective.
Although the MPC drafters recognized this possibility, 258 there
was not nearly the volume of research supporting it at the time
the MPC was drafted.
An awareness of such complexity is not to suggest that
each defendant's mental state be judged on a standardless caseby-case basis. The criminal justice system does not have
sufficient time and resources for such an approach. The law
needs to draw lines somewhere. The question is where to draw
of the brain: a conscious perceptual system, that individuals use to describe
objects so that they can be compared and remembered; and an unconscious
visuomotor system, that individuals use to determine the size and location of

objects relative to the body. Whereas the conscious perceptual system was
fooled by the optical illusion, the unconscious visuomotor system was not. Id.
at 135-39.

252. See Sarah H. Creem & Dennis R. Proffitt, Two Memories for
GeographicalSlant: Separationand Interdependenceof Action and Awareness,
5 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 22, 22-26 (1998).
253. Id. at 23.
254. Id.
255. Id.

256. Id. at 33-34.
257.

See id.

258. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
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them.
Consciousness research provides a foundation for
identifying those factors that may affect people's perceptions of
the world and how they may act accordingly. This Article's
three-part standard of voluntary, involuntary, and semivoluntary acts, discussed in Part IV, allows more flexibility in
accommodating such research.
3. Unconscious Processes and Voluntary Acts
Some of the most powerful research in neuroscience
suggests that the unconscious may be in charge of how human
beings make decisions about willed movements, such as
choosing when to flex a wrist, bend a finger, or, quite possibly,
even to fire a gun. Of course, willed movements lie at the heart
of the criminal law's voluntary act requirement. In other
words, when do people consciously feel they have engaged in a
voluntary act?
This question was tested in a series of
experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet and his colleagues,
259
starting in the 1960s and continuing up to the present time.
A typical Libet experiment-much simplified for this
discussion-goes as follows: Libet would ask human subjects to
make hand movements whenever they felt like it while he
measured the electrical activity in their brains. With EEG
recordings, this could be done with almost millisecond
precision. 260 Libet found that the subjects' brain impulses
associated with their movements began about 300 to 350
milliseconds-or about a third of a second-before the subjects
259. See THE VOLITIONAL BRAIN: TOWARD A NEUROSCIENCE OF FREE WILL
at ix-xxi (Benjamin Libet et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter VOLITIONAL BRAIN];
Benjamin Libet, The Neural Time Factor in "Conscious" and "Unconscious"

Events, in EXPERIMENTAL AND THEORETICAL STUDIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS 123

(Thomas Nagel ed., 1993); Benjamin Libet, The Timing of a Subjective
Experience, 12 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 183, 183-84 (1989) [hereinafter, Libet,
Timing]; Benjamin Libet, Are the Mental Experiences of Will and Self-Control
Significant for the Performance of a Voluntary Act?, 10 BEHAv. & BRAIN SCI.
783, 784, 785 (1987) [hereinafter Libet, Mental Experiences]; Benjamin Libet,
Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary
Action, 8 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 529, 530-38 (1985) [hereinafter Libet,
Unconscious]; Libet, supra note 214, at 235-42; Benjamin Libet, Cortical
Activation in Conscious and Unconscious Experience, 9 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY &
MED. 77, 79-83 (1965); Benjamin Libet et al., Productionof Threshold Levels of
Conscious Sensation by Electrical Stimulation of Human Somato-Sensory
Cortex, 27 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 546, 546-78 (1964). A collection of Libet's
research on timing can be found in BENJAMIN LIBET, NEUROPHYSIOLOGY OF
CONSCIOUSNESS: SELECTED PAPERS AND NEW ESSAYS (1993).
260. Libet, Unconscious, supra note 259, at 530.
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reported any conscious awareness of their intention to make
the movement. 26 1 In essence, the motor-planning areas in their
brains began to stir a third of a second prior to when the
subjects became aware of the desire to act. According to Libet
and others, a subject's decision to move a finger or a wrist must
have originated unconsciously and only appeared to that person
262
as a conscious wish about a third of a second later.

Libet's results spurred an enormous reaction when they
were published in the 1980s. 263 They seemed to suggest that
people could not regulate their own thoughts. By the time
individuals are aware that they want to do something as minor
as flexing a finger, that decision has already been made by
264
lower-level brain mechanisms that they could not control.
Yet, Libet's results also showed that the conscious mind
was not totally powerless. It could still veto the unconscious
mind's proposed movement during a window of about 150 to
200 milliseconds that existed between the time individuals
became consciously aware of their intention to act and the
actual act.265 In other words, the conscious mind still had time
to block the actual movement before it occurred. Therefore,
"what consciousness actually gives us is a veto-not so much
266
freewill, as free-won't."
261. Id. at 529.
262. Id. at 536.
263. MCCRONE, supra note 205, at 133.
264. Id. Libet's extraordinary finding moved some psychologists to claim
that consciousness was a mere "epiphenomenon" devoid of any purpose. See
Max Velmans, Is Human Information Processing Conscious?, 14 BEHAV. &
BRAIN SCI. 651, 667 (1991). Neither Libet nor other scientists have endorsed
this view, however. For general commentary and critique of this view see
VOLITIONAL BRAIN, supra note 259, at ix-xxiii; Bernard J. Baars, A Curious
Coincidence? Consciousness as an Object of Scientific Scrutiny Fits Our
Personal Experience Remarkably Well, 14 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 669 (1991);
Ned Block, Evidence Against Epiphenomenalism, 14 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 670
(1991); Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Epiphenomenalism and the Reduction of
Experience, 14 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 680 (1991); Bruce Mangan, Epiarguments for Epiphenomenalism, 14 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 689 (1991);
Georges Rey, Reasons for Doubting the Existence of Even Epiphenomenal
Consciousness, 14 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 691 (1991).
265. Libet, Unconscious, supra note 259, at 537.
266. CARTER, supra note 222, at 86. According to Libet, such results
suggest only that the concepts of free will and individuality need to be revised,
but not rejected. See Libet, Timing, supra note 259, at 183. While the
processes linked to free will may not lead to an individual's initiation of a
voluntary act, they will contribute to selecting and controlling volitional
results. See Libet, Mental Experiences, supra note 259, at 783; see generally
VOLITIONAL BRAIN, supra note 259, at xv-xvii (discussing neuroscientific
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Libet's results have been replicated many times over
during the past two decades in a variety of experiments. They
also have been tested with an array of more complicated
behaviors. 267 These behaviors range from all types of sports
activities where a person's reaction time is important 268 to the
treatment of obsessive compulsive disorders, where individuals
are taught to veto their dysfunctional thoughts and urges
unwanted involuntary acts, such as
before they engage in 269
repetitive hand washing.
This is not to say that everyone agrees with how Libet's
results should be interpreted or what they mean in the
philosophical sense. 270 For example, one of the strongest initial
criticisms of Libet's results was that they suggested some
"binary" state where conscious awareness was suddenly
"clicked on" after, say, a third of a second. 27 1 The stronger and
now accepted argument is that consciousness evolves
gradually, starting from the unconscious and moving to preconscious states on the way to becoming a settled state of
consciousness. What seems like two modes of processingin Libet's experiments-is really a
conscious and unconscious
272
whole brain reaction.
For the purposes of the criminal law, Libet's research
confirms that there appears to be no sound scientific basis for
the MPC's dichotomy between voluntary and involuntary
behavior. The issue of consciousness is far more intricate and
subjective than the criminal law treats it. As Parts III and IV
theories of free will). See also Holmes, supra note 231, at 35 (quoting
neurologist and psychologist Vilayanar Ramachandran about the concept of
"free won't").
267. MCCRONE, supra note 205, at 120-64.
268. Bruce Abernethy, Mechanisms of Skill in Cricket Batting, 13 SPORTS
MED. 3, 3-9 (1981); Peter McLeod, Visual Reaction Time and High-speed Ball
Games, 16 PERCEPTION 49, 49-59 (1987).

269. Jeffrey M. Schwartz, A Role for Volition and Attention in the
Generation of New Brain Circuitry:Toward a Neurobiology of Mental Force, in
VOLITIONAL BRAIN, supra note 259, at 116.

270. All of this research spurs chicken-and-egg debates in the
neurosciences, particularly when an individual's emotions are at issue. The
debates center on what comes first: conscious awareness of the emotion (for
example, fear), or the autonomic processes that accompany it, such as a
pounding heart or increased adrenalin. See Libet, Timing, supra note 259, at

183; Libet, Mental Experiences, supra note 259, at 783. These debates were

See William James, On Some
originally recognized by William James.
Omissions of IntrospectivePsychology, 9 MIND 1, 2-3 (1884).
271. MCCRONE, supra note 205, at 134.
272. Id. at 134-39.
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of this Article discuss, there is a broad range of behavior that
may not be susceptible to a veto effect if individuals are
suffering from a condition-induced either internally or
externally-that triggers unconsciously motivated behavior
before conscious awareness can stop it.
4. Attempts to Distinguish Conscious and Unconscious
Processes
Scientists' attempts to locate, or distinguish between,
conscious and unconscious processes in the brain are ongoing,
but still too speculative. 273 Yet, several experiments provide
some interesting glimpses. 274 Some of the more compelling
273. See TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 66 (stating that "[t]he division into what
activity is truly conscious and what is not has yet to be discovered"); see also
Erdelyi, supra note 3, at 785. As Erdelyi explains, "it seems to be often
assumed implicitly that an actual dichotomy exists between the conscious and
the unconscious." Id. Although this dichotomy was explicitly assumed by
influential German psychologists in the 1800s, "mainstream" psychophysics
has abandoned this dichotomy in favor of arbitrary definitions, such as 50%
detection. Id. There is no consensus, however, on what marker constitutes
the absence of awareness. Different tests produce different measures of
consciousness, so that what seems to be unconsciousness in one study appears
to be consciousness or partial consciousness in another study. There is simply
no set standard or rule. Id.
274. Recent research on blindsight patients, for example, suggests that
"conscious seeing" appears to create different patterns of brain activity
compared to "unconscious seeing." See generally WEISKRANTZ, BLINDSIGHT,
supra note 203, at 26-27 (discussing studies in which patients had higher skin
conductance responses, indicating brain activity, while reading familiar names
or viewing familiar pictures, despite an inability to identify familiar names or
pictures consciously). The full implications of attempts to locate conscious and
unconscious processes are perhaps best illustrated in studies of individuals
suffering from anosognosia. See V.S. RAMACHANDRAN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE,
PHANTOMS IN THE BRAIN: PROBING THE MYSTERIES OF THE HUMAN MIND 12757 (1998). Occasionally, anosognosia results when there is stroke damage to
the right side of an individual's brain which leaves the individual paralyzed on
the left side of the body. Id. at 127-28. Although the paralysis is obvious,
anosognosics, who are totally sane and rational, insist that their lifeless limbs
are functional. Id. In one study, when the researcher asked a patient to touch
him on the nose, she claimed that she touched him even though her arm
remained motionless at her side. Id. When asked to clap, she moved her good
arm only but contended that she was clapping normally. Id. When the
patient continually failed to tie her shoe, however, she stated that she had
successfully tied it "with both hands," a reference that most non-paralyzed
individuals typically would not mention. Id. at 138-39. According to the
researcher, such a comment indicates that on some level, anosognosics may
know that they are paralyzed and unable to accomplish the tasks asked of
them, but deny the fact to preserve their self-esteem. Id. at 139. There also
appears to be more at issue than denial. Anosognosia occurs almost entirely
among individuals who are paralyzed on the left side, suggesting that the
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research relevant to the criminal law concerns efforts to
differentiate among varying types and levels of memory.
A recent study based on PET scans, for example, showed
that false memories can be clearly differentiated from true
memories. 275 Subjects were asked to remember a list of words
that experimenters read to them (on List A) and were then
asked to identify the List A words when experimenters read to
them a second list (List B). Some of the words on List A and
List B were identical (for example, "car"). However, List B also
contained some words that were similar to, but not the same
as, some of the words on List A. For example, if "candy" and
"cake" were on List A, the word "sweet" instead was on List
B. 276 If the subject said, incorrectly, that the word "sweet" was
on List A, that would constitute a false memory. If the subject
said, correctly, that the word "car" was on List A, that would
constitute a true memory. 277 During the PET scans, both true
and false recollections lit up the area of the subject's brain that
controls recall while the subject was being questioned.
However, the PET scans for true words also lit up the area of
the brain that distinguishes sound patterns and recognizes

neurological damage has occurred on the right side of the brain. Id. at 128.
This supports the view that anosognosia reflects a problem with the brain's
belief mechanism, not its perceptual mechanism. Id. at 134. It also suggests
that the left side of the brain organizes and makes sense of sensory inputs in
terms of a theoretical worldview and ignores those inputs that conflict with it.
Id. at 135. In contrast, the right half of the brain acts as a sort of devil's
advocate that forces the left brain to alter its world view when it is confronted
with new information. Id. at 136. It appears that the damaged right
hemisphere constricts the "devil's advocate," leaving the left brain free to
engage in denial and delusion. Id. at 127-57; see also Daniel M. Wegner &
Thalia Wheatley, Apparent Mental Causation, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 480, 480
(1999) (discussing an experiment showing that individuals "can arrive at the
mistaken belief that they have intentionally caused an action that in fact they
were forced to perform when they are simply led to think about the action just
before its occurrence"; therefore, the actual causal mechanisms of behavior
may be present in the unconscious, rather than conscious, mind). For a superb
account of research on consciousness and intent, see generally WEGNER, supra
note 208.
275. SCHACTER, supra note 173, at 182-91; Daniel L. Schacter et al.,
Neuroanatomical Correlates of Veridical and Illusory Recognition Memory:
Evidence From Positron Emission Tomography, 17 NEURON 267, 267 (1996).
Schacter emphasizes that "[t]he nonconscious world of implicit memory
revealed by cognitive neuroscience differs markedly from the Freudian
unconscious" and it is also "far more mundane." SCHACTER, supra note 173, at
190-91.
276. Schacter et al., supra note 275, at 268.
277.

Id.
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words; this is because the subject had actually "heard" the right
word ("car") the first time when the experimenter had read List
A and had remembered how it had sounded when the
278
experimenter read List B.
Initially, researchers were asked if these findings could
have implications in legal cases concerning repressed or
recovered memories as well as consciousness. The researchers
claimed that the science was still too complex and unrefined to
use in that capacity. 279 However, in Harringtonv. State,280 a
post-conviction hearing, an Iowa district court ruled for the
first time 281 on the admissibility of another sort of brain
technology, a new scientific test known as "brain
In
fingerprinting,"282 developed by Lawrence Farwell. 283
278. SCHACTER, supra note 173, at 182-91; Schacter et al., supra note 275,
at 268-70; see also Michael D. Rugg et al., Dissociationof the Neural Correlates
of Implicit and Explicit Memory, 392 NATURE 595, 595-98 (1998) (detailing a
study distinguishing between explicit and implicit memories).
279. Philip J. Hilts, In Research Scans, Telltale Signs Sort False Memories
From True, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1996, at C3 (referring to Dr. Schacter's
comments that it would be "farfetched" to use PET scans for examining false
memories in the context of a trial because the process is still too complicated,
and also expensive).
280. No. PCCV 073247 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Mar. 5, 2001) (order denying motion
for a new trial) (no slip op., on file with author).
281. Nell Boyce, Truth and Consequences: Scientists Are Scanning The
Brain For Traces Of Guilty Knowledge, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 15,
2001, at 40; Chris Clayton, "BrainFingerprints"AsDefense?, NAT'L L.J., Nov.
20, 2000, at 4.
282. The technique is officially called "Farwell Brain Fingerprinting." See
Lawrence A. Farwell, Brain Fingerprinting:A New Paradigm in Criminal
Investigations and Counterterrorrism, at http://www.brainwavescience.com
(last viewed Sept. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Farwell, Brainwavescience.com]
(providing links to and reviewing media accounts, commentaries, and
interviews concerning brain fingerprinting and the cases in which it has been
used); see also Lawrence A. Farwell & Sharon S. Smith, Using Brain
MERMER Testing to Detect Knowledge Despite Efforts to Conceal, 46 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 135, 135 (2001); Lawrence A. Farwell, Supplement to Forensic
Science Report: Brain Fingerprinting Test on Terry Harrington (Nov. 10,
2000), at http://www.brainwavescience.com/HarringtonSupplement004figs.
htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2002) [hereinafter Supplement].
283. Lawrence A. Farwell is the Chief Scientist and Chairman of the
Human Brain Research Laboratory in Fairfield, Iowa. A self-described
cognitive psychophysiologist, he has a Ph.D. in Biological Psychology from the
University of Illinois. Prior to receiving his Ph.D., Farwell was a consultant to
the Central Intelligence Agency on brain research and how such research can
uncover hidden information. In addition, he was formerly a research associate
in the Department of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School. Transcript of
Proceedings at 4-5, Harrington v. State (Iowa Dist. Ct. Nov. 14-15, 2000), (No.
PCCV 073247) [hereinafter HarringtonTranscript].
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Harrington, the results of the brain fingerprinting test were
introduced to prove that the petitioner, a suspect in a 1977
murder case, did not have details of the crime stored in his
memory and therefore was never present at the crime scene. 284
The Harrington court determined that at least a part of the
science involved in brain fingerprinting was well established in
the scientific community. 285 For a range of reasons, however,
the court dismissed the petition for a new trial286 and, Farwell's
284. Harrington,No. PCCV 073247, at 6-7. In 1977, Terry Harrington was
charged with first-degree murder of a nighttime security guard who had been
killed by a shotgun blast. State v. Harrington, 284 N.W.2d 244, 245-46 (Iowa
1979). In 1978, Harrington was tried, convicted, and sentenced to life in
prison for the crime despite alibi testimony that he and several witnesses
provided claiming that Harrington was at a concert with friends at the time of
the murder. Harrington,No. PCCV 073247, at 6-7. In 1979, a state appellate
court rejected Harrington's direct appeal. Harrington,284 N.W. 2d at 251. In
1990, his application for post-conviction relief was also denied. Harrington,
No. PCCV 073247, at 3. Finally, in 1993, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of Harrington's petition for habeas corpus. Harrington
v. Nix, 983 F.2d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). Eventually, in 2000,
Harrington retained Farwell to conduct tests to evaluate the information
stored in Harrington's brain that was relevant to the events of the night of the
murder. Lawrence Farwell, Forensic Science Report: Brain Fingerprinting
Test on Terry Harrington, at http://www.brainwavescience.com/Harrington
TechReport005.htm. The result of Farwell's first test was "information
absent," with a statistical confidence of 99.9%. In other words, the test found
that there was no information stored in Harrington's brain that matched the
facts from the crime scene. Id. The result of Farwell's second test for alibirelevant data was "information present," with a statistical confidence of 99.9%.
Id. Therefore, Farwell claimed that the information stored in Harrington's
brain matched his alibi scenario. Harrington,No. PCCV 073247, at 6-7.
285. Harrington,No. PCCV 073247, at 9. A brief overview of the science of
brain fingerprinting can be found in supra note 282 and accompanying text.
The court determined that "the P-300 effect is well established," but that the
MERMER technique that Dr. Farwell used "is not well accepted in the
scientific community." Harrington, No. PCCV 073247, at 9. The MERMER,
along with Dr. Farwell's mathematical model, also have "not been
independently tested" nor "subjected to peer review" and they are not "widely
accepted in the scientific community of psycho-physiologists." Id. Lastly, the
court noted that "choosing probe stimuli is subjective" and that "[t]he probe
stimuli used by Dr. Farwell to test Harrington do not meet his own standards
for selecting them." Id. at 10. For example, for more than twenty years,
Harrington was privy to trial transcripts and exhibits. Such access throws
doubt on Farwell's ability to select probe stimuli that were "sufficiently
significant" to provide "specific details of the crime . . . known only to the
perpetrator and the investigators." Id.
286. Harrington, No. PCCV 073247, at 19 (concluding that the newly
discovered evidence of the P-300 effect and of information contained in police
reports that was not provided to Harrington's attorney, in addition to the
"inherently unreliable" recantation of a key witness's testimony, were not
sufficient to warrant the grant of a new trial).
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claims to the contrary, 287 did not clearly hold on the issue of the
288
It
admissibility of the brain fingerprinting technique.
remains to be seen whether the Harringtoncourt's ambiguous
ruling will lead to the acceptance of the test in any jurisdiction.
Brain fingerprinting is based upon the principle that the
human brain houses information about all kinds of cognitive
activity, including the particulars of sensory perceptions and
experienced events. Whenever a person recognizes an object or
idea (such as the face of another person), his or her brain emits
an electrical response. 289 However, a person's brain does not
emit details of an electrical response when such a stimulus is

irrelevant or unfamiliar to him or her.290 In terms of the test's
287. The Harringtoncase provides no support for the headline in Farwell's
website claiming "Brain Fingerprinting Ruled Admissible in Court." Farwell,
Brainwavescience.com, supra note 282, at http://www.brainwavescience.com.
288. The Harrington court avoided a clear ruling on admissibility and did
not indicate what evidentiary test was being used to determine brain
fingerprinting's reliability, validity, or acceptance in the scientific community.
See Harrington, No. PCCV 073247, at 9. However, Iowa follows a limited
version of the test for scientific evidence that was established in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-96 (1993). See Leaf v.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 590 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Iowa 1999) ('Ve hold
that trial courts are not required to apply the Daubert analysis in considering
the admission of expert testimony. Nevertheless, trial courts may find it
helpful, particularly in complex cases, to use one or more of the relevant
Daubert 'considerations' in assessing the reliability of expert testimony.").
289. See HarringtonTranscript, supra note 283, at 36-37 (direct testimony
of Lawrence Farwell).
290. Id. at 38-39. A person's positive response to a stimulus occurs through
what scientists call a P-300 wave, a positive electrical charge that lasts for
three-hundred milliseconds (on average) after the subject recognizes the
stimulus. Id. at 37. The brain fingerprinting test measures this P-300 wave.
Id. The human brain, however, does not store everything a person ever
confronts. For information to be sufficiently significant in order to prompt a P300 response from a person's brain, it must be noticeable in the context in
which the person initially experienced it. See id. at 23-24, 36-37, 139-43. For
example, a person would likely think it noteworthy if he perceived an elephant
while sitting in a courtroom. Id. at 140. Later, when asked to recollect his day
in court, that person would probably elicit a P-300 response when exposed to
the word "elephant." Id. at 37, 140. Someone who works with elephants
everyday at a zoo, however, might not elicit a P-300 response when exposed to
the word "elephant" and asked about their work that day because, for them,
the perception would probably not be all that significant. See id. at 139-43
(redirect testimony of Lawrence Farwell). Brain fingerprinting also extends
beyond the P-300 effect by measuring a specific brainwave response called a
MERMER (an acronym for Memory and Encoding Related Multifaceted
Electroencephalographic Response). Id. at 18-19. The MERMER is a negative
electrical reaction that a person's brain emits immediately after it produces
the P-300 response. Id. Identification of the MERMER is guided by the same
scientific principles as identification of the P-300 and the two procedures are

HeinOnline -- 87 Minn. L. Rev. 333 2002-2003

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:269

forensic applications, brain fingerprinting can evaluate memory
impressions in order to compare the facts from a crime scene
(for example, the use of a specific murder weapon) with
memory evidence involuntarily stored in the brain of a suspect
or witness.

29 1

The presence of specific information in the suspect's brain
that only the criminal would know is detected by a test system
that requires the suspect to view words, phrases, or pictures on
a computer screen. 292 During the viewing, the suspect's
electrical brain responses to both neutral and crime-related
images are measured using a sensor-equipped headband
attached to the scalp, which transmits signals that are then
subjected to computerized analysis. The analysis determines
whether a particular electrical brain response has occurred,
and, based on that outcome, provides the statistical likelihood
that the crime-relevant details are present in the suspect's
memory. 293 According to Farwell, the technique has been
tested over 150 times with 100% accuracy, 294 and experts have
complementary. See id. at 19 (noting that "the MERMER is frosting on the
cake, of which the P300 [sic] is the cake"); see also id. at 47-48 (testifying that
MERMER raises the statistical confidence of the tests to 99.99%); Farwell &
Smith, supra note 282, at 137 (describing the components of the MERMER,
one of which is P-300).
291. See Harrington Transcript, supra note 283, at 36-54, 136-37
(describing the higher level of accuracy achievable with MERMER); see
generally Farwell,
Brainwavescience.com,
supra note
282,
at
http://www.brainwavescience.com (reviewing selected media accounts,
commentaries, and interviews concerning brain fingerprinting and the cases
in which it has been used).
292. The tester presents the suspect with three different categories of
stimulus information: (1) target, (2) irrelevant, and (3) probe. Harrington
Transcript, supra note 283, at 17-18. "Targets" are types of information that
the tester knows the suspect will recognize. Id. at 36. Because targets
predictably evoke a P-300 response, they allow the tester to establish a
baseline for when the suspect recognizes items. Id. at 40. "Irrelevants" are
types of information that the tester knows have no relevance to anything in
the suspect's memory. Id. at 39. Because irrelevants predictably do not evoke
a P-300 response, they establish a baseline for non-recognition. Id. at 40-41.
"Probes" are types of information that the tester shows to the suspect to
determine whether or not they evoke a P-300 response. Id. at 40. The
information is then compared with the suspect's test results with targets and
irrelevants. Id. at 18, 40-41.
293. Farwell & Smith, supra note 282, at 136-37.
294. Interview with Dr. Lawrence Farwell: Brain Fingerprintingand the
HarringtonCase, at http://www.brainscience.com/QandABrainFingerprinting
001.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Farwell Interview]. Farwell
claims that the process of brain fingerprinting is similar to the widely accepted
techniques of fingerprinting and DNA fingerprinting: evidence preserved from
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confirmed the scientific validity of using electrical brain signals
to measure information-processing brain activity. 295 At the
same time, the test is not without its detractors, as is explained
in Harrington.296 Experts have also expressed strong opinions
that brain fingerprinting is not ready for forensic use-for
example, the procedure is too subjective and scientists do not
know how the measured information gets into a person's brain
as a memory. 297 In other words, the test "cannot distinguish
298
between a real memory, a false memory or a dream memory."
The credibility of Farwell's claims awaits further testing
and validation by other scientists-and not by this Article.
Regardless, along with comparable kinds of research, 299 brain
fingerprinting undermines the more traditional views of
consciousness and unconsciousness that the MPC presents.
5. How "Smart" is the Unconscious?
Developments in memory and consciousness research raise
inviting questions for the criminal law: How "smart" or "dumb"
is the unconscious? 30 0 Are there things that the unconscious
can know or learn that an individual was never consciously
aware of?
These questions have generated substantial debate in the
the crime scene is compared with evidence on the suspect's person to
determine that suspect's presence at the crime scene. Lawrence A. Farwell,
ForensicScience Report: Brain FingerprintingTest on Terry Harrington (May
21, 2000), at http://www.brainwavescience.comHarringtonTechReport005.htm
[hereinafter Forensic Science Report]. Brain fingerprinting is more often

possible than other types of fingerprinting, however, because the only
requirements are the use of the suspect's brain and investigators' knowledge
of certain crime-related details. See Tod W. Burke, Brain 'Fingerprinting:
Latest Tool for Law Enforcement, LAW & ORDER June 1999, at 28, 29.
295. See Farwell Interview, supra note 294 (According to Farwell, experts

largely agree that "we can accurately and scientifically measure informationprocessing activity using electrical brain signals").
296. Harrington v. State, No. PCCV 073247, at 8-11 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Mar. 5,
2001) (order denying motion for a new trial) (no slip op., on file with author)

(describing possible shortcomings of brain fingerprinting and a failure to meet
probe selection standards).

297. Id. at 8.
298. Id.
299. See Shankar Vedantam, The Polygraph Test Meets Its Match, WASH.
POST, Nov. 12, 2001, at A2 (discussing a study using brain scans to determine

if subjects were lying).
300. See Loftus & Klinger, supra note 84, at 761-65 (addressing the
question and concluding that "the unconscious may not be as smart as
previously believed").
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psychological community 3 1 and have inspired some compelling
investigations. Studies show that there are some types of
complex information that individuals learn far quicker and
more effectively on the unconscious level than they could ever
decipher on the conscious level. 30 2
However, it is the
psychodynamic or "emotional" unconscious that can distort the
way people perceive and behave, as well as the biases that they
adopt. 30 3 These kinds of unconsciously learned biases become
301. The intelligence of the unconscious appears to depend on what kind of
information the individual is learning. Compare Greenwald, supra note 7, at
768 (noting that there are different levels of analysis at which the unconscious
operates and has been tested, ranging from the unconscious processing of
physical features, which requires a relatively low level of analysis, to the
information encoded in multiword strings, which requires a higher level of
analysis), with Pawel Lewicki et al., Nonconscious Acquisition of Information,
47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 796, 800 (1992) (noting that if "smart" means that the
unconscious has "its own goals or specific motivations and being able to pursue
them by triggering particular actions, such as those proposed in the
psychoanalytic literature, then the answer to this question would be 'no";
however, the answer to the question would be "yes" if "smart" means
"'equipped to efficiently process complex information"').
302. Presumably, such knowledge is not accessible to an individual's
consciousness "because it involves a more advanced and structurally more
complex organization than could be handled by consciously controlled
thinking." Lewicki et al., supra note 301, at 796 ("A considerable amount of
evidence indicates that as compared with consciously controlled cognition, the
nonconscious information-acquisition processes are incomparably faster and
structurally more sophisticated."). Evidence suggests, for example, that
subjects are able to learn complex and subtle rules unconsciously when they
are playing (as in one study) a computer game on the basis of their increasing
ability to "win" over time even though subjects are unaware that they are
following a pattern and are unable to articulate why their chances of winning
improve. Id. at 797-98. In this particular study, even when subjects were told
that there was a winning pattern and were provided as much time as they
wanted to study it, none of the subjects was able to even approximate the
winning pattern. Id. This result held when the study's authors administered
the test to psychology professors, or offered $100 to college students who could
decipher the rules. Id. For such complex tasks, psychologists rule out the fact
that subjects could be engaged in instance learning, which involves automatic
conscious learning. Id. at 796.
303. This association was tested in one study where volunteer college
students were shown computer-generated and altered faces of "fair" or "unfair"
college professors. See Thomas Hill et al., The Role of Learned Inferential
Encoding Rules in the Perception of Faces: Effects of Nonconscious
Perpetuationof Bias, 26 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 350, 354-59 (1989).
Unknown to the students, the distance between the eyes and mouths differed
consistently between the "fair" professors and the "unfair" professors. Id. at
355. When shown another set of twenty faces and asked to judge intuitively
who the students thought were fair, it became clear that the students were
inferring fairness on the basis of facial proportions, although they were unable
to articulate the reasons for their assessments. Id. at 357-58.
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all the more pronounced when there is an ambiguous or
complex reality that the bias helps to interpret. 30 4 The
emotional unconscious also appears to be the basis for selfdestructive habits that can possibly lead to criminal
305
behavior.
The research reviewed in this Part is new and going
strong. Attorneys have applied some of it in criminal law cases.
The findings confirm that there appears to be no acceptable
scientific
foundation
for
a
dichotomy
between
conscious/unconscious or voluntary/involuntary, and that
consciousness exists in degrees. 30 6 The research also throws
doubt on the viability of the criminal law's reliance on listed
conditions that legal actors typically use for guidance in
making determinations of unconsciousness.
Part III of this Article offers arguments to suggest that the
criminal law's voluntary act dichotomies have been confusing
in their legal applications, particularly with the common law's
more traditional involuntary act groups as well as those groups
listed in MPC section 2.01 and its Commentaries (e.g.,
somnambulism, epileptic seizure, reflex response). 30 7 As the
MPC Commentaries predicted, the voluntary act requirement,
expressed in terms of the defenses of automatism and
unconsciousness, can often conflict with other doctrines, most
particularly with the defense of insanity. 30 8 The potential
consequences of such muddles are enormous, and they could be
avoided.
III. WHEN DEFENSES COLLIDE: INVOLUNTARY ACTS
VERSUS INSANITY30 9
This Part examines, in a variety of contexts, the perplexing
ways courts have dealt with the automatism/unconsciousness
304.
305.

Id. at 359-61.
See text accompanying note 198, supra (explaining how "blind rage"

may cause people to reach a point where they may be capable of murder).
306. See Hill et al., supra note 303, at 351, 353 (suggesting that
unconsciously learned "rules" help in complex tasks such as facial recognition
and language acquisition); see also Lewicki et
(asserting that only the nonconscious mind
especially complex rules).
307. See supra notes 29-64 and accompanying
308. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying

al., supra note 301, at 796
can understand and apply
text.
text.

309. The first section of this Part's structure, and many of the cases it
discusses, are derived from Eunice Eichelberger's thorough annotation. See
Eichelberger, supra note 42, at 1072-81.
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involuntary act defense, and how it relates to the defense of
insanity. 310 For pragmatic reasons only, this Article recognizes
the practice of many courts and commentators, which is to treat
the terms "automatism" and "unconsciousness" as virtual
synonyms. 3 11 However, these two terms can and should be
distinguished: "If automatism is a defense, it is not because of
unconsciousness; the actors in [cases where the automatism
3 12
defense is raised] are not unconscious in any ordinary sense."
Automatism therefore may be separate from unconsciousness,
3 13
or on different points on a continuum.
A. How COURTS HAVE USED AUTOMATISM AND
UNCONSCIOUSNESS AS A DEFENSE

Routinely, courts have held that automatism or
3 14
unconsciousness constitutes a defense to a criminal charge.
310. For a comparative analysis of these defenses, see ROBERT F. SCHOPP,
AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY:
A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 132-217 (1991). This Article will make reference to
the intoxication defense although delving into that comparison too deeply is
beyond this Article's bounds. For an analysis comparing unconsciousness and
intoxication defenses, see Grant, supra note 18, at 1000-17.
311. See LAFAVE, supra note 74, at 405 ("A defense related to but different
from the defense of insanity is that of unconsciousness, often referred to as
automatism . . . ");infra note 319 and accompanying text. Black's Law
Dictionarydefines "automatism" as "[a] ction or conduct occurring without will,
purpose, or reasoned intention . . . ; behavior carried out in a state of
unconsciousness or mental dissociation without full awareness." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 129 (7th ed. 1999). Black's defines "unconscious" as "[w]ithout
awareness; not conscious." Id. at 1527.
312. Corrado, supra note 18, at 1191.
313. See supra notes 39-44.
314. For an overview, see Eichelberger, supra note 42, at 1074-76. Courts
have split on the allocation of the burden of proof. Some courts have
expressed the view that the defense has only the burden of producing evidence
of automatism or unconsciousness, thereby raising a reasonable doubt as to
the defendant's consciousness at the time of the crime. See, e.g., Gov't of the
Virgin Islands v. Smith, 278 F.2d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 1960) (holding that the
trial court improperly placed the burden of proof on the defendant and that
the defendant's burden was merely to go forward with the evidence to the
extent necessary to raise a reasonable doubt to his consciousness and freedom
from an epileptic seizure); People v. Hardy, 198 P.2d 865, 872 (Cal. 1948)
(clarifying the holding in People v. Nihell to mean that the burden on the
defendant of proving unconsciousness is merely the burden of producing
evidence which would raise a reasonable doubt); People v. Cruz, 147 Cal. Rptr.
740, 754 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that unconsciousness due to
involuntary intoxication is a complete defense to a criminal charge and that
the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a
defendant was conscious during the commission of a crime); People v. Maxey,
104 Cal. Rptr. 466, 472 (Cal. Dist Ct. App. 1972) (holding that the erroneous
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This approach started with Fain v. Commonwealth,315 where
the Kentucky state court determined that an individual cannot
be criminally responsible for acts committed while unconscious
(in this case, somnambulism). 316 Many courts have upheld and
expanded Fain's essential reasoning, 317 some explicitly holding
that unconsciousness is a complete defense, 3 18 while a few
instruction on unconsciousness did not prejudice the defendant when the
evidence showing that the defendant was conscious at the time of the shooting
was overwhelming and the trial judge clarified the issue); cf. People v.
Williams, 99 Cal. Rptr. 103, 119, 121 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that
jury instructions were prejudicial because they were incompatible with the
view of expert witnesses that a person with psychomotor epilepsy could appear
conscious while actually unconscious). Other courts have taken the position
that the defendant has the burden of proving automatism or unconsciousness.
See, e.g., People v. Nihell, 77 P. 916, 917 (Cal. 1904) (holding that the
defendant has the burden of establishing that he was in an unconscious
mental state); State v. Caddell, 215 S.E.2d 348, 363 (N.C. 1975) (affirming
defendant's conviction for rape, and holding that unconsciousness is an
affirmative defense with the burden resting on the defendant "to establish this
defense, unless it arises out of the State's own evidence, to the satisfaction of
the jury"); Fulcher v. State, 633 P.2d 142, 147 (Wyo. 1981) (holding that
unconsciousness is an affirmative defense which the defendant must establish,
because the "defendant is the only person who knows his actual state of
consciousness").
315. 78 Ky. 183 (1879).
316. Id. at 188-89. Fain suggested a mens rea type of understanding of the
voluntary act requirement, holding that an unconscious defendant could not
form the criminal intention necessary for criminal culpability. Id. But see
ROLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 660 (1957) ("[Tlhe phrase 'voluntary act'
means not more than the mere word 'act."').
317. See, e.g., People v. Grant, 377 N.E.2d 4, 8 (Ill. 1978) ("Certain
involuntary acts, i.e., those committed during a state of automatism, occur as
bodily movements which are not controlled by the conscious mind .... [A]

person, in a state of automatism, who lacks the volition to control or prevent
his conduct, cannot be criminally responsible for such involuntary acts.");
People v. Carlo, 361 N.Y.S.2d 168, 170 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (per curiam)
("'[Ciriminal liability' requires at the very least a 'voluntary act."'); People v.
Marzulli, 351 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 (N.Y. App. Term 1973) (per curiam) ("[An
involuntary act is not criminal."); State v. Peterson, 210 S.E.2d 883, 886 (N.C.
1975) ("[A) person cannot be held criminally responsible for acts committed
while he is completely unconscious .... "); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 204
S.E.2d 414, 417 (Va. 1974) ("Where not self-induced, unconsciousness is a
complete defense."); State v. Utter, 479 P.2d 946, 950 (Wa. 1971) ("An 'act'
committed while one is unconscious is in reality no act at all. It is merely a
physical event or occurrence ior which there can be no criminal liability.").
318. See, e.g., People v. Tiffith, 91 Cal. Rptr. 176, 179-180 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1970) (holding that unconsciousness is a complete defense to a criminal
charge, but finding defendant had failed to prove that he had a concussion
from a car accident); People v. Moore, 85 Cal. Rptr. 194, 198 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1970) (holding that a defendant suffering from a "schizophrenic fugue
state" was entitled to jury instructions on unconsciousness as a complete
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courts have attempted to give content to the terms
"unconsciousness" and/or "automatism.,,3 19 Notably, some
courts have suggested that different degrees of consciousness
may result in different degrees of culpability. For example, in
People v. Newton,320 the court differentiated diminished
capacity, a partial defense, from unconsciousness, a complete
defense, and required jury instructions on both in accordance
with the evidence presented. 32' The Newton court noted that
"[u]nconsciousness ...need not reach the physical dimensions
commonly associated with the term (coma, inertia, incapability
defense); People v. Edgmon, 73 Cal. Rptr. 634, 638 & n.5 (Cal. Dist. App. 1968)
(recognizing the defense of unconsciousness as a complete defense); State v.
Connell, 493 S.E.2d 292, 296 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
unconsciousness is a complete defense to the crime of taking indecent liberties
with a child, and that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on
unconsciousness); Greenfield, 204 S.E.2d at 417 (holding that unconsciousness
is a complete defense to criminal homicide only when it is not self induced).
319. For example, the court in Fulcher v. State, 633 P.2d 142, 145 (Wyo.
1981), tried to come to grips with unconsciousness as follows: "The defense of
unconsciousness perhaps should be more precisely denominated as the defense
of automatism. Automatism is the state of a person who, though capable of
action, is not conscious of what he is doing." More recently, the Indiana
Supreme Court in McClain v. State defined automatism as "the existence in
any person of behaviour of which he is unaware and over which he has no
conscious control." 678 N.E.2d 104, 106 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Donald Blair, The
Medicolegal Aspects of Automatism, 17 MED. SCI. LAW 167, 167 (1977)
(internal citation omitted)). The court also relied on "[a] seminal British case"
that defined automatism as "connoting the state of a person who, 'though
capable of action, is not conscious of what he is doing."' Id. at 106 (quoting
Bratty v. Attorney General of N. Ireland, 3 All E.R. 523, 527 (1961) (internal
citation omitted)). McClain noted that "[iun the states that have addressed the
issue, it is well-established that automatism can be asserted as a defense to a
crime .... [Tihe debate in these states has focused on the manner in which

evidence of automatism can be presented." Id. at 106-07. A California jury
instruction describes the defense of automatism:
A person who commits what would otherwise be a criminal act,
while unconscious, is not guilty of a crime.
This rule of law applies to persons who are not conscious of acting
but who perform acts while asleep or while suffering from delirium or
fever, or because of an attack of [psychomotor] epilepsy, a blow on the
head, the involuntary taking of drugs or the involuntary consumption
of intoxicating liquor, or any similar cause.
CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS:

CRIMINAL § 4.30 (6th ed. 1996) (alteration in

original). Corrado offers an interesting explanation of automatism and
voluntariness. He describes voluntary actions as actions that are "up to the
actor." Corrado, supra note 18, at 1192. To be "up to an actor," actions must
be spontaneous and purposive. Id. He suggests that automatistic behavior is
spontaneous without being purposive, and therefore is not voluntary. Id. at
1211.
320. 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
321.

See id. at 405-06.
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of locomotion or manual action, and so on); it can exist ...
where the subject physically acts but is not, at the time,
322
conscious of acting."
State v. Sikora323 provides another example of a court's
handling of a theory of degrees of consciousness, particularly in
the context of psychoanalysis. The appellant contended that
the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to admit
certain psychiatric testimony 324 of the defense's expert, Dr.
Noel C. Galen, a psychodynamic theorist. 32 5 According to
Galen, "mental disturbance and disorder, as distinguished from
objective disease, are merely gradients"; people range from
thinking quite normally to thinking very distortedly.326 Set
"between the two extremes is a rather jagged line which is
prone to and open to many variations." 327 The court summed
up its understanding of Galen's "thesis" as follows: "[M]an is a
helpless victim of his genes and his lifelong environment;
unconscious forces from within dictate the individual's behavior
without his being able to alter it." 3 28 While the court refused to
overturn a jury verdict of life imprisonment based on Galen's
testimony, it did note that "such psychiatric testimony properly
serves a post-conviction purpose," namely as evidence to be
considered in the sentencing or punishment phase. 329 Sikora
thus demonstrates a court's reluctance to accept a theory
involving gradations of consciousness; as the court said,
"[c]riminal responsibility must be judged at the level of the
conscious." 330 That reluctance, however, may be attributable to
factors other than the theory's inherent viability, such as
33 1
witness credibility.
In United States v. Berri,332 the United States Court of
Military Appeals seemed more amenable than the Sikora court
322. Id. at 405. For an interesting commentary on Newton, see JOAN
DIDION, THE WHITE ALBUM 26-33 (1979).

323.

210 A.2d 193 (N.J. 1965).

324.
325.

Id. at 194.
Id. at 197.

326. Id.
327.

Id.

328. Id. at 198.
329. Id. at 204.
330. Id. at 202.
331. See id. The Sikora court subtly intimated that Galen might not have
been entirely believable by referring to his seemingly specious logic in
testimony in another case. See id.

332.

33 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1991).
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to expert testimony suggesting gradations of consciousness. In
Berri, the defendant was convicted of attempted murder,
maiming, and assault intentionally inflicting grievous bodily
harm. 333 Experts for the defense testified that at the time of
the offense, the defendant suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (or post-Vietnam Syndrome), and was consequently
unable "to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of
his acts."334 The experts described the defendant's "severe
mental disease or defect" 335 in various ways: "he'd be aware of
behavior, but he might think it's a dream";336 "some of the
layers of consciousness were gone"; 337 "[h]e was aware of much
of the conduct, but it was as if he was watching someone else do
it";338 and "the accused was a person seeing a crystal clear,
silent world, observing himself go about doing things with no
awareness consciously, internal subjective conscious awareness
of what and why it was happening."339 When asked what the
defendant "knew" when he fired his gun, the expert witness
replied, "it's a question of what we mean by he." 340 The expert's
testimony therefore indicates the difficulty of classifying the
defendant's conduct as either conscious or unconscious. The
court affirmed the finding of the Court of Military Review,
holding that testimony regarding the accused's mental state
was relevant to specific intent. 34 1 The trial judge's instruction,
the court continued, prevented Berri from advancing "a
342
legitimate defense theory to the factfinder."
B. How COURTS HAVE DISTINGUISHED AUTOMATISM AND
UNCONSCIOUSNESS FROM INSANITY

Courts have explicitly recognized automatism or
unconsciousness as a distinct defense from insanity. According
to the court in Fulcher v. State,343 for example, "[a]utomatism
may be caused by an abnormal condition of the mind capable of

333. Id. at 338.

334.
335.
336.
337.

Id. at 339.
Id.
Id. at 340 n.8.
Id. at 340.

338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 341 (emphasis omitted).
341. Id. at 344.

342. Id. (emphasis added).
343. 633 P.2d 142 (Wyo. 1981).
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being designated a mental illness or deficiency. Automatism
may also be manifest in a person with a perfectly healthy
mind." 344 The Fulcher court, in particular, emphasized the
different consequences of an insanity defense as compared with
automatism or unconsciousness: 345 Unconsciousness acts as a
complete defense, concluding all action against a defendant
upon acquittal, but acquittal by reason of insanity usually
results in the commitment of the defendant to a mental
institution. 346 Other courts have employed similar kinds of
347
reasoning.
Contrariwise, other courts have held automatism or

344. Id. at 145.
345. See id.
346. Id.; see also McClain v. State, 678 N.E.2d 104, 109 (Ind. 1997)
(explaining that automatism should not be regarded by the courts as a species
of insanity because merging the two defenses "could result in confinement, at
least temporarily, not of the insane but of the sane. This is a significant
deprivation of liberty for an automatistic defendant where the outcome of the
commitment hearing is a foregone conclusion."); State v. Caddell, 215 S.E.2d
348, 360 (N.C. 1975) (noting that "the defenses of insanity and
unconsciousness are not the same in nature," and "[a]s a consequence, the two
defenses are not the same in effect, for a defendant found guilty by reason of
unconsciousness, as distinct from insanity, is not subject to commitment to a
hospital for the mentally ill"); Michael J.Davidson & Steve Walters, United
States v. Berri: The Automatism Defense Rears Its Ugly Little Head, ARMY
LAW., Oct. 1993, at 17, 18-19 ("The majority of authorities distinguish
automatism from insanity because the unconsciousness at the time of the
[crime] need not be the result of a mental disease or defect, and a criminal
defendant found not guilty by reason of unconsciousness-as distinct from
insanity-is not subject to commitment ....").

347. See, e.g., People v. Martin, 197 P.2d 379, 383 (Cal. 1948)
(distinguishing the unconsciousness defense from the insanity defense and
holding that the trial jury was properly instructed on unconsciousness); People
v. Methever, 64 P. 481, 483 (Cal. 1901) (discussing distinctions between the
unconsciousness defense and the insanity defense and holding that the trial
court did not err in failing to instruct on unconsciousness when the defendant
had pled insanity), overruled on other grounds by People v. Gorshen, 336 P.2d
492, 502 (Cal. 1959); People v. Rothrock 68 P.2d 364, 366 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1937) (distinguishing the unconsciousness defense from the insanity defense
and finding that the trial court did not err in refusing a continuance to secure
evidence concerning sanity when the defendant had plead unconsciousness);
McClain, 678 N.E.2d at 107-08 (holding that evidence of automatism resulting
from sleep deprivation is relevant to the issue of voluntariness and
distinguishing the automatism defense from the insanity defense); Caddell,
215 S.E.2d at 363 (noting that "unconsciousness, or automatism, is a complete
defense to a criminal charge, separate and apart from the defense of insanity,'
and that it is an affirmative defense); State v. Weatherford, 416 N.W.2d 47, 55
(S.D. 1987) (recognizing that insanity and unconsciousness are two "separate
and distinct" defenses).
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unconsciousness to be a species of the insanity defense. 348 For
example, in Loven v. State,349 the Texas Court of Appeals
specifically noted that "states of unconsciousness or
automatism, including epileptic states, are includable in the
in Lucas v.
Similarly,
of insanity."350
defense
351 the court construed automatism (chronic
Commonwealth,
alcoholism, abnormal brain waves, possible epilepsy and
as grounds for a jury determination of the
probable amnesia) 352
defendant's sanity.
C. How COURTS HAVE RESPONDED TO THE MOST COMMON
AUTOMATISMIUNCONSCIOUSNESS DEFENSES

1. Epileptic Seizures
Some courts have held that epilepsy constitutes an
automatism or unconsciousness defense when a defendant
suffered from an epileptic seizure at the time of the charged
offense, 353 but not before. 354 In turn, other courts have treated
348. See, e.g., Reeves v. State, 27 S.E.2d 375, 380-381, 385 (Ga. 1943)
(discussing a defense of unconsciousness due to head injuries as a type of
"delusional insanity" defense and holding that it was the prerogative of the
jury to accept or reject the defendant's statements); Hollander v. State, 296
N.E.2d 449, 451-52 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that automatism, in this
instance a "fugue" state of mind, is a species of insanity defense), overruled by
McClain, 678 N.E.2d at 106 n.4 (Ind. 1997); Futrell v. Commonwealth, 437
S.W.2d 487, 489 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (holding that defendant's contention that
he was suffering a "blackout" when he molested a young girl was adequately
covered by insanity defense instructions and did not require jury instructions
on unconsciousness); Fisher v. State, 47 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Neb. 1951)
(addressing a defense of unconsciousness as a type of insanity defense, the
court held that the trial court did not err in refusing an instruction concerning
the defendant's conscious mental state on the ground that she had not denied
the applicability of the legal presumption of sanity); State v. Bunk, 73 A.2d
249, 255 (N.J. 1950) (referring to a defense of unconsciousness due to "a
syncope or blackout spell" as a type of insanity defense and holding that the
trial court did not err in refusing the defendant's requested changes in jury
instructions concerning insanity).
349. 831 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
350. Id. at 391.
351. 112 S.E.2d 915 (Va. 1960).
352. Id. at 921.
353. See, e.g., Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 278 F.2d 169, 174-75 (3d
Cir. 1960) (recognizing that unconsciousness resulting from an epileptic
seizure may negate mens rea); People v. Anderson, 406 P.2d 43, 53 (Cal. 1965)
(reversing a conviction and holding that the trial judge should have given an
instruction on the issue of diminished capacity, despite the defendant's plea of
unconsciousness due to a psychomotor epileptic seizure, and also noting that
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the defense of epilepsy as part of an insanity defense. 355
Epilepsy is not a defense, however, where an epileptic
disregards a known condition, 356 or voluntarily induces the
states of diminished capacity and unconsciousness are not antithetical);
United States v. Olvera, 15 C.M.R. 134, 138 (C.M.A. 1954) (holding that an
epileptic fugue reflects an absence of criminal liability).
354. Notably, the state of possessing an epileptic condition is not grounds
for relieving liability; the accused must establish that the particular offense
charged was caused by an epileptic episode. See Starr v. State, 213 S.E.2d
531, 532 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (addressing a defense of unconsciousness due to
epilepsy as a type of insanity defense, the court held that an epileptic is
entitled to such a defense only during an attack or seizure); see also State v.
Pettay, 532 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Kan. 1975) (holding that if an epileptic is not
suffering a seizure at the time he commits a crime, he is criminally
responsible); People v. Jandelli, 455 N.Y.S.2d 728, 733 (N.Y. Crim. Term 1982)
(denying a motion to set aside a guilty verdict where the defendant, accused of
murdering his sister, claimed that at the time he was suffering from Penfield's
Automatism and had no control over his actions even though the prosecution
countered his defense with testimony indicating that the defendant's conduct
and recollections were inconsistent with symptoms of Penfield's Automatism);
People v. Magnus, 155 N.Y.S. 1013, 1014 (N.Y. Gen. Sess. 1915) (noting that
being an epileptic does not relieve an accused from criminal responsibility and
stating "it is only when he is unconscious of the act which he is committing
that he is not answerable criminally").
355. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 271 So.2d 232, 233 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)
(referring to a defense of unconsciousness due to epilepsy as a type of insanity
defense); State v. Wilson, 514 P.2d 603, 606 (N.M. 1973) (addressing a defense
of unconsciousness due to psychomotor epileptic seizure as a type of insanity
defense and holding that the defendant's sanity was an issue to be determined
by the jury); People v. Higgins, 159 N.E.2d 179, 183, 189 (N.Y. 1959)
(addressing an unconsciousness defense due to epilepsy as an insanity
defense; holding that a finding that the defendant was sane at the time of the
crime was contrary to the weight of the evidence; and recognizing four types of
epilepsy identified by experts, including psychomotor epilepsy, "during which
the patient is out of contact but has seemingly purposeful movements");
Zimmerman v. State, 215 S.W. 101, 105 (Tex. Crim. App. 1919) (recognizing
an unconsciousness defense due to epilepsy as an insanity defense and stating
that the fact that the defendant was subject to seizures would not change the
rule requiring the defendant to satisfy the jury that at the time of the crime
his mind was in such a condition that he did not know the nature and quality
of the act).
356. See People v. Decina, 138 N.E.2d 799, 803, 807 (N.Y. 1956) (holding
that the defendant may be tried for criminal negligence in the operation of a
vehicle resulting in the death of four children, where the "defendant knew he
was subject to epileptic attacks and seizures that might strike at any time,"
and did in fact have a seizure, during which he lost control of the car he was
driving (emphasis omitted)). Decina implicates the issue of "time-framing" in
a determination of voluntariness. As Dressler points out, "if a court
constructed an extremely narrow time-frame-specifically, the conduct at the
instant the car struck the victims-[the defendant's] conduct did not include a
voluntary act. A broader time-frame, however, would include the voluntary
acts of entering the car, turning the ignition key, and driving." DRESSLER,
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357

epileptic state.
In People v. Magnus, 358 the court reversed a conviction of
disorderly conduct based on "undisputed medical evidence" that
359
the defendant was suffering from "epileptoid automatism."
According to the court, a person with such a disorder "is
capable of committing an act which is apparently under his
control and suggested or prompted by the operation of his
mind, but the act may be accompanied by an abnormal and
unnatural consciousness, in which case it is automatic and
beyond the power of inhibition." 360 The court noted that being
an epileptic does not relieve an accused from criminal
responsibility; the defendant has to be unconscious at the time
of the act.36 1 In cases where an epilepsy defense has not been
successful, 362 the cases have often involved attempts by the
363
defendant to characterize epilepsy as insanity.
2.

Somnambulism
Somnambulism, or sleepwalking, may also constitute a

supra note 26, at 91. But cf People v. Freeman, 142 P.2d 435, 439 (Cal. 1943)
(holding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury to find the defendant
guilty of reckless disregard in negligent homicide by automobile regardless of
the fact that defendant was unconscious due to epilepsy at time of accident).
357. See, e.g., State v. Welsh, 508 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973)
(holding that the new jury should be instructed, on remand, to the effect that
unconsciousness is not a complete defense when an epileptic seizure is
voluntarily induced by intoxication).
358. 155 N.Y.S. 1013 (N.Y. Gen. Sess. 1915).
359. Id. at 1014.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. See, e.g., People v. Glover, 65 Cal. Rptr. 219, 222-23 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1967) (holding that the trial judge was correct in not instructing on
diminished capacity in the guilt phase of the trial when no expert testimony
was offered that the defendant suffered an epileptic seizure during the crime);
People v. Gambacorta, 90 N.E. 809, 812 (N.Y. 1910) (responding to a motion
for a new trial based on affidavits that purported to show that the defendant
was an epileptic and holding that there was no evidence that the defendant
was suffering from a seizure at the time of the murder); People v. Furlong, 79
N.E. 978, 982 (N.Y. 1907) (holding that the evidence clearly showed that the
defendant acted with a conscious and intelligible motive, and was not under
the influence of an epileptic seizure while committing a murder).
363. See, e.g., People v. Modesto, 398 P.2d 753, 757 (Cal. 1965) (reversing
on other grounds, but supporting a verdict finding the defendant legally sane
while undergoing a psychomotor epileptic seizure at the time he committed
murder); Quattlebaum v. State, 46 S.E. 677, 677-78 (Ga. 1904) (addressing a
defense of unconsciousness as a type of insanity defense and holding that the
jury had sufficient evidence to find that an epileptic defendant was "of sound
mind" during the offense).
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defense, 364 so long as the defendant claiming the condition had
no agency in producing it.365 Like epilepsy, somnambulism has
been recognized as a species of insanity. 36 6 In addition,
somnambulism has been accepted as a defense when the
charged offense was arguably purposive, or regarded as
expressing an unconscious desire. 367 Nevertheless, even when
364. See generally Peter Fenwick, Somnambulism and the Law: A Review,
5 BEHAV. SCI. AND LAw 350 (1987) (discussing the use of somnambulism as a
defense in English law); Grant, supra note 18, at 997 (noting that automatism
encompasses the involuntary acts of a somnambulist and discussing relevant
case law throughout the United States).
365. See, e.g., Stewart v. Peters, 958 F.2d 1379, 1387 (7th Cir. 1992)
(suggesting, in dicta, that the actions of an automaton or sleepwalker could
not be intentional); Lewis v. State, 27 S.E.2d 659, 665 (Ga. 1943) (holding that
an unconscious or somnambulist state "may be" a defense and anyone
producing such a state through intoxication is not entitled to such a defense);
cf. United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that if "a prisoner has an epileptic fit [where] he falls
over the prison wall, or if he sleepwalks out the prison gate, or if he is carried
out ... by other prisoners, then [no] actus reus [necessary for] escape exist[s]
because the prisoner has not performed a volitional act").
366. See, e.g., Tibbs v. Commonwealth, 128 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Ky. Ct. App.
1910) (holding the evidence, that the defendant was a somnambulist and was
in a state of no self-control, constituted an insanity defense); Bradley v. State,
277 S.W. 147, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925) (holding that somnambulism was
recognized as a species of insanity, and therefore the trial court's refusal to
grant a jury instruction on the somnambulism defense was prejudicial error).
A major distinction in discussions of automatism is that of sane versus insane
automatisms. Sane automatisms are considered to be those that are brought
on by external factors. Insane automatisms are brought on by internal factors,
and are "prone to recur and possibly cause violence." Fenwick, supra note 364,
at 350. Using a sane automatism as a defense results in acquittal, while
using an insane automatism as a defense usually leads to the defendant being
committed for psychiatric treatment.
Mark W. Mahowald & Carlos H.
Schenck, Medical-Legal Aspects of Sleep Medicine, 17 NEUROLOGIC CLINICS
215, 221 (1999). Generally, the sleep disturbances discussed in this Article
have been considered sane automatisms.
Mahowald and Schenck have
suggested two alternatives to this paradigm: first, a category of acquittal for
specific types of diagnoses, and second, a two-stage trial, one stage for the
actus reus (jury trial) and one stage for the mens rea (judge accompanied by
medical advisors).
Id.
Whether somnambulism is a sane or insane
automatism is a matter of intense debate, and the issue was before the
Supreme Court of Canada in the appeal of the Parks case. See Regina v.
Parks, [1992] 95 D.L.R.4th 27; see also infra notes 446-74 and accompanying
text (discussing the Parks case).
367. See Mahowald & Schenck, supra note 366, at 221; see also WILLIAMS,
supra note 25, at 12 (noting that "sleepwalking is a difficult case, because the
conduct of a sleep-walker may be purposive (though not recollected on
waking), and may be regarded as expressing unconscious desire" (citations
omitted)). See generally Bernadette McSherry, Getting Away With Murder?
DissociativeStates and CriminalResponsibility, 21 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHOL. 163,
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expert testimony suggested a lack of control on the part of the
defendant due to somnambulism, the defense has been
368
unsuccessful.
3. Concussion and Physical Trauma
Courts have held that concussion or severe trauma, such as
a blow to the head, may form the basis of a successful defense.
Such cases often involve appellate courts finding that the trial
court erred in refusing instructions on unconsciousness due to
concussion or physical trauma. 369 In other 370
cases, concussion
has been invoked unsuccessfully as a defense.
163-76 (1998) (discussing disassociative states and sane/insane automatism).
Several articles have examined the possibilities of violent behavior related to
sleep.
In one example, a 43-year old man had been suffering from
somnambulism since the age of five. See Carlos H. Schenck & Mark W.
Mahowald, A
Polysomnographically Documented Case of Adult
Somnambulism With Long-Distance Automobile Driving and Frequent
Nocturnal Violence, 18 SLEEP 765, 765-66 (1995). He had performed such
complex activities as driving and taking a shower during sleepwalking
episodes. Id. at 766. His behavior was often violent, as he would wield knives
and baseball bats, and would punch and even attempt to strangle his wife. Id.
His driving episode occurred when he was 25: He ran out of his house, opened
a screen door, got into his car, and drove to his parents' house, waking them
up by pounding on their door. Id. The patient was treated with clonazepam,
and the somnambulism episodes ceased. Id. at 768. Driving while in a
somnambulistic state is seen again in Parks, discussed infra notes 446-74 and
accompanying text.
368. See United States v. Foster, No. ACM 29283, 1993 WL 76323, at *1
(A.F.C.M.R. March 8, 1993) (convicting the defendant of sodomy and indecent
acts with his daughter and rejecting a defense that the defendant was a
diagnosed sleepwalker who "awoke in his daughter's room").
369. See, e.g., People v. Roerman, 10 Cal. Rptr. 870, 877 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1961) (holding that the trial court erred in omitting requested jury
instructions when evidence supported the possibility of unconsciousness due to
concussion); People v. Cox, 153 P.2d 362, 366 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944)
(holding that the trial court erred in refusing to accept medical testimony that
the defendant was unconscious due to a blow on the head, and erred by not
instructing the jury on unconsciousness as a defense); Newsome v.
Commonwealth, 154 S.W.2d 737, 740 (Ky. Ct. App. 1941) (requiring jury
instructions to acquit if there is evidence that a defendant was unconscious
due to a wound in his throat); Carter v. State, 376 P.2d 351, 358 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1962) (holding that on remand the new jury should be instructed on the
defense of unconsciousness, and that the defendant was criminally liable if he
drove his automobile knowing that he was subject to spells of unconsciousness
as a result of a prior train-automobile collision).
370. See, e.g., People v. Sedeno, 518 P.2d 913, 922 (Cal. 1974) (holding that
neither a blow to the defendant's head nor his testimony that he took a police
officer's gun in a reflex action required the trial judge to grant, sua sponte, a
jury instruction on unconscious defense); People v. Wilburn, 321 P.2d 452, 455
(Cal. 1958) (affirming a conviction for first-degree murder and holding that the

HeinOnline -- 87 Minn. L. Rev. 348 2002-2003

2002]

CRIME AND CONSCIOUSNESS

349

In Polston v. State,371 the defendant, who had been
drinking, was kicked in the head during an altercation,
apparently knocking him unconscious. 372 After regaining
consciousness, the defendant found his girlfriend, who had been
dancing with another man, and bit off two-thirds of her nose,
which could not be reattached. 373 The court held that the trial
court
properly
refused
requested
instructions
on
unconsciousness due to the concussion because there was
insufficient evidence to support such instructions. 374 In the
course of its holding, the court articulated the elements
necessary to establish the defense of concussion-based
automatism, which required the defendant to have a "healthy
mind" and to behave "in a state of unconsciousness ... devoid
' 375
of criminal intent.

4. Hypnotic States, Mental Disease, and Emotional Trauma
Courts recognize that a defendant may use an automatism
defense for involuntary acts committed while in a hypnotic
state. 376 Courts, however, seem reluctant, in practice, to grant
evidence showed that the defendant was conscious at time of the crime,
despite defendant's contention that he was unconscious as a result of being
shot by a retired police officer during the robbery); People v. Methever, 64 P.
481, 482-83 (Cal. 1901) (distinguishing the unconsciousness defense from the
insanity defense and holding that the trial court did not err in failing to
instruct on unconsciousness when the defendant pled insanity, and claimed
that at the time of the crime he was unconscious due to "injuries received upon
his head"), overruled on other grounds by People v. Gorshen, 336 P.2d 492, 502
(Cal. 1959); State v. Gish, 393 P.2d 342, 351-352, 358 (Idaho 1964) (holding
that the trial court did not err in refusing the defendant's request for jury
instructions that clarified the meaning of "unconscious mind," and finding no
evidentiary support for defendant's contention that he was suffering from
emotionally induced amnesia resulting from a blow to the head preceding the
homicide).
371. 685 P.2d 1 (Wyo. 1984).
372. Id. at 3.
373. Id. at 3-4.
374. Id. at 4.
375. Id. at 6. In total, the court listed six interlinking elements:
(a) The actor must be a person with a healthy mind (b) who
because of a concussion (c) resulting from a brain injury (d) that is a
simple brain trauma with no permanent aftereffects (e) acts in a state
of unconsciousness (f) in which his actions are devoid of criminal
intent.
Id. (citations omitted).
376. Davidson & Walters, supra note 346, at 17. See generally Swain,
supra note 138, at 1509 (discussing hypnosis in a legal context); Jack Solomon,
Note, Hypnotism, Suggestibility and the Law, 31 NEB. L. REV. 575, 577-81
(1952) (discussing the nature of hypnosis and the legal problems it poses); see
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the defense. 37 7 In turn, mental disease has occasionally
provided a successful automatism defense. 378 Courts often find
evidence insufficient to substantiate 379
a defense or instruction
based on emotional trauma, however.
Overall, courts seemed to be swayed by a number of
legitimate and predictable factors in determining whether to
grant a defense based on automatism/unconsciousness: the
also People v. Dunigan, 421 N.E.2d 1319, 1338 (Ill. Ct. App. 1981) (finding
that "an automatism defense is available to a defendant who lacks the volition
to control or present 'involuntary acts' which 'may have been committed'
during.., hypnosis"). But see LAFAVE, supra note 74, § 3.2(c), at 209-10
(noting that the hypnotism defense has been rejected where attempted and
that there are differences of opinion regarding whether hypnotic acts are
involuntary).
377. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 515 F.Supp. 758, 759-65 (E.D. Ky.
1981) (holding that where a defendant claimed she was under her husband's
hypnotic suggestion during the shooting of two United States Marshals, the
prosecution could offer testimony that a few weeks earlier, the defendant fired
shots at a neighbor, suggesting the defendant could form an intent to commit a
violent act); People v. Worthington, 38 P. 689, 691 (Cal. 1894) (reversing a
conviction for second-degree murder on other grounds, the court held that
there was no evidence to support the defendant's contention that she was
hypnotized at the time of the murder); People v. Marsh, 338 P.2d 495, 496, 498
(Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (holding that the trial court did not err "in refusing to
permit the defense to conduct a demonstration of hypnosis in the courtroom,"
in a prosecution for escape from a state prison in which the defendant
attributed his escape to hypnotic suggestion given to him by a fellow inmate).
378. See, e.g., People v. Wilson, 427 P.2d 820, 828, 830 (Cal. 1967) (holding
that unconsciousness is a complete defense to a criminal charge and
determining that the lower court had denied the defendant due process of law
by refusing a defense of unconsciousness due to mental disease); People v.
Lisnow, 151 Cal. Rptr. 621, 624 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1978) (holding that
the "defense of unconsciousness due to mental illness would constitute a
complete defense to such a criminal charge in the trial to determine guilt or
innocence," and therefore the trial court denied the defendant due process by
refusing to allow him to prove such a defense).
379. See, e.g., People v. Bufarale, 14 Cal. Rptr. 381, 386 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1961) (affirming a conviction for second-degree murder, the court held that the
trial jury was properly instructed to find the defendant not guilty if they found
that the murder was an unconscious act); People v. Gibson, 206 P.2d 375, 38082 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949) (holding that although the trial court erred in
rejecting testimony regarding the effect of emotional trauma on the
defendant's state of consciousness, the ruling was not prejudicial because his
own testimony clearly established that he was conscious when he murdered
his wife), overruled on other grounds by People v. Wetmore, 583 P.2d 1308,
1312-13 (Cal. 1978); State v. Grimsley, 444 N.E.2d 1071, 1075 (Ohio Ct. App.
1982) (holding that the evidence failed to establish that the secondary
personality of an individual with multiple personality disorder was conscious
and her acts voluntary); Commonwealth v. Crosby, 279 A.2d 73, 76 (Pa. 1971)
(holding that for unconsciousness to be considered a defense it cannot be the
result of emotion caused by the commission of a criminal act).
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facts of the case, the quality of the expert, the type and severity
of the defendant's condition. Courts are split, however, on
whether to grant either automatism/unconsciousness or
insanity for nearly all of the conditions that can qualify for an
involuntariness defense.38 0 Apart from conducting an empirical
analysis of a large set of cases to assess which factors are
driving courts in either direction (e.g., toward or away from
insanity), one can only surmise about the underlying reasons
38
(e.g., courts' concerns about the defendant's dangerousness). '
Regardless, for the defendant, the consequences can be
extremely disparate, ranging from total acquittal to a long civil
commitment. If neither defense is acceptable, in the most
serious cases the defendant can receive the death penalty. Part
IV considers a number of potential solutions for these kinds of
discrepancies that introduce unfairness into the criminal
justice system as well as hinder the system's efforts at
deterrence.
IV. REFORMING THE VOLUNTARY ACT CONUNDRUM
There are several possible solutions to the problems
created by the voluntary act requirement. This Part first
examines two approaches: (1) eliminate an explicit voluntary
act requirement altogether or, (2) if the requirement is
retained, base the requirement on social morals, not science.
Ultimately, this Article recommends a three-part voluntary act
requirement that provides defendants with sufficient
constitutional protections and advances the goals of the
380.

See supra notes 343-75 and accompanying text.

381.

Certainly, the MPC drafters emphasized concerns about recurring

dangerousness as a reason why a defendant's condition might be considered

insane rather than sane but involuntary. See supra text accompanying notes
79-82 (discussing the MPC's reliance on the insanity defense). Likewise, other
countries, such as England, consistently classify as insanity violent conduct
that may be considered sane but involuntary in the United States (such as
sleepwalking or epilepsy). See, e.g., Regina v. Burgess, 2 All E.R. 769, 774-76
(C.A. 1991).
The predominant justification stems from fears about
dangerousness. For example, in Burgess, the English Court of Appeal,
Criminal Division, held that the defendant's violence while sleepwalking was a
form of insane (rather than non-insane) automatism primarily because of the
possibility that the acts could be repeated in the future. Id. For this reason,
the Burgess court also explicitly refused to follow the Canadian decision in
Regina v. Parks, [1990] 56 C.C.C. (3d) 449, affd [1992] 95 D.L.R.4th 27, 28, in
which the Supreme Court of Canada ultimately found the defendant's
sleepwalking to be an act of non-insane automatism that warranted acquittal
of all charges. Burgess, 2 All E.R. 769, 774-75. See infra notes 446-74 and
accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 87 Minn. L. Rev. 351 2002-2003

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:269

criminal justice system.
A. ELIMINATE AN EXPLICIT VOLUNTARY ACT REQUIREMENT
ALTOGETHER

One approach to the voluntary act conundrum is to
eliminate entirely an explicit statement of the requirement.
382 and some states 383
For example, the federal criminal code
384
have never adopted an explicit voluntary act requirement.
States that have no explicit statutory requirement generally do
have an implicit requirement that is specified in a variety of
possible ways. For example, the state statutes contain some
sort of involuntary conduct defense or a comparable
intermediate voluntary act provision. 38 5 State legislatures
generally offer very little explanation for why they failed to
codify the explicit voluntary act provisions they had initially
proposed at the inception of the MPC. 386 Presumably, these
states viewed other alternatives more favorably. Regardless,
387
since the time of the MPC's 1979 update of revised statutes,
it appears that states have moved away from, not toward,
adopting an explicit statutory requirement.
There are more straightforward reasons explaining the
absence of an explicit voluntary act provision in the federal
criminal code beyond the federal code's differences in structure
(unlike the MPC, it has no general part)388 and the code's
As the MPC Commentaries
organizational problems. 3 89
acknowledge, 390 the first proposed federal criminal code did
have a voluntary act provision. 391 However, the final draft of
382. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.

384. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 30-32, 36 and accompanying text.
386. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Nor has Maine specifically
explained why in 1981 it repealed the provision it once had. See supra note 31

and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
388. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
389.

See id.

390. MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 216 n.4.
391. Originally, the proposed federal code stated that "[a] person commits
an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act, an
omission, or possession, in violation of a statute which provides that the
conduct is an offense." 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON

REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS § 301(a) (1970); see also MODEL PENAL
CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 216 n.4 (quoting the Brown
Commission's draft proposal).
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the federal criminal code submitted to Congress omitted the
word "voluntary."392 According to the federal code's drafters,
"[t]he issue of the voluntariness of the conduct, i.e., whether or
not it is conscious and the result of determination or effort" was
not stated explicitly in the final draft because it would have
"limited utility" and would also "raise the possibility of evasion
of limitations placed on defenses such as intoxication and
393
mental illness through inquiries as to voluntariness."
Indeed, as mentioned, the MPC Commentaries recognized the
conflict that a voluntary act requirement
could have with the
394
insanity and intoxication provisions.
There are other more practical reasons for eliminating the
voluntary act requirement. For example, it is not clear how
significant or widely used the voluntary act requirement is in
those states that still maintain it. In the early 1960s, H.L.A.
Hart claimed that courts had only "rarely" considered the
requirement and he questioned how much they actually
395
accepted it.
Even assuming that the MPC's provision
somehow improved courts' embrace of the voluntary act
requirement, it is still unknown how often courts actually use
it. There appear to be no statistics available that provide this
kind of information. 396 There also are relatively few appellate
court decisions turning on the concept of the defendant's

392.

MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 216 n.4

(quoting the Brown Commission's draft proposal).
393. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 301
cmt. at 27 (1971); see also MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt.
1 at 216 n.4 (quoting the Brown Commission's Final Report). For a criticism of

this stance, see Weinreb, supra note 64, at 106-18.
394. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
395. H.L.A. Hart, Acts of Will and Legal Responsibility, in FREEDOM AND
THE WILL 38, 41 (D. Pears ed., 1963) (claiming that the voluntary act
requirement "has only rarely been considered by the courts" and questioning
whether "the courts actually do accept the general doctrine"); see also H.L.A.
Hart, Acts of Will and Responsibility, in THE JUBILEE LECTURES OF THE
FACULTY OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD 115, 115-16 (0. R. Marshall ed.,

1960) (noting the author's failure to "find in any legal writings any clear or
credible account of what it is for conduct to be voluntary ...in the sense
required"). But see Murphy, supra note 139, at 334 (arguing in defense of the

classical distinction of voluntary/involuntary acts and contending that Hart's

"objections misfire" and his view "is seriously defective").
396. See Theodor Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Judicial Statistical

Inquiry Form, at http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questata.htm (last updated
Nov. 15, 1998) (Professors Eisenberg and Clermont may be collecting data on
defenses in the future).
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involuntariness. 397 The reasons for this dearth of appellate
review are not mysterious. Since a prosecutor cannot appeal an
acquittal, cases in which a defendant succeeds with an
involuntariness defense would not create an appellate
opinion. 398 Likewise, because it is not known how frequently
prosecutors accept defendants' claims of involuntariness, it is
also not known how often prosecutors decline to bring charges
in such cases or why (for example, statutory mandate or the
399
exercise of prosecutorial discretion).
In light of all of these considerations, why have an explicit
voluntary act requirement? The strongest response is that the
requirement, like culpability, is axiomatic and therefore one of
the pillars of the criminal law. 400 Conceptually, it drives all
other important doctrinal developments. 40 1 Without the
foundation of an explicit recognition of a voluntary act, basic
principles of liability (e.g., mens rea)40 2 as well as
proportionality of punishment, 40 3 would be seriously
threatened. An explicit statement also serves a number of
other critical functions-it may aid the interpretation of
unresolved issues that depend on the concept of voluntariness,
it may help legislatures in drafting criminal law statutes by
offering a uniform and set statement of principles, and it can
provide clear and open notice to the public of a principle of
liability that safeguards their constitutional rights under the
Eighth Amendment 40 4 and lies at the foundation of criminal
397.

Saunders, supra note 18, at 448.

398. Id.
399. Id.
400. See Weinreb, supra note 64, at 105; supra notes 24-28, 37-38 and
accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 24, 65-66 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
403.

See generally Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in III ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

CRIME & JUSTICE 1282 (Joshua Dressier et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) (overviewing
issues concerning the justification for punishment); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Desert,
Punishment and CriminalResponsibility, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 48-

53 (Summer 1986) (discussing the inadequacy of pure retributive and
utilitarian theories of punishment and the intermediary role desert must play
in society's assessment of the punishment an individual deserves).
404. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968) (upholding a conviction
for public drunkenness and distinguishing from Robinson v. California under

the rationale that the defendant "was convicted, not for being a chronic
alcoholic, but for being in public while drunk on a particular occasion");
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 665-66 (1962) (holding that a conviction
based on the defendant's "status" or "chronic condition" of being a narcotics
addict was "cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
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For these reasons, arguments presuming that only a
relatively few number of people use an involuntary act
defense-and therefore the defense cannot be that importantare not entirely relevant. The voluntary act requirement is
influential in so many other ways. 40 6 Empirical evidence also
shows that other important criminal law doctrines are applied
relatively sparingly, such as the insanity defense 40 7 and the
death penalty.40 8 Yet, despite their numerical limits, both the
insanity defense 40 9 and the death penalty 4 10 are powerful forces
in the criminal law. In this sense, the numbers do not matter;
Fourteenth Amendments") (citing Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 469-70
(1947)).
405. See Weinreb, supra note 64, at 106.
406. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
407. Statistics show that not only is the insanity defense rarely invoked, its
success rate is very low. See generally Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the
Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence,40 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 599, 648-49 (1989-90) (noting the tendency of the public and
the legal profession to grossly overestimate the number of insanity verdicts).
For example, nationally, insanity acquittals probably constitute no more than
0.2% of terminated felony prosecutions. NAT'L MENTAL HEALTH ASS'N, MYTHS
& REALITIES: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY
DEFENSE 15 (1983). Data from New York specifically demonstrate a similar

pattern. Defendants raise the insanity defense about once in every 600 to 700
cases and the defense is successful in about 25% of the cases in which it is
invoked. Id.
408. Although the rate of executions has increased in recent years, it still
remains less than the 2% high reported during the Depression Era. See
Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death:Are Executions Constitutional?,82 IOWA
L. REV. 319, 366 & n.282 (1997) (explaining that this country's record high of
199 executions in 1935 has not been equalled since that time); see also Death
Penalty Information Center, Statistics on the Death Penalty (2002), at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts.html#1
(last visited Oct. 17, 2002)
(listing the number of individuals executed per year since 1976);
http://www.death penaltyinfo.org/percapita.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2002)
(providing state execution rates since April 10, 2002). Starting in 1930, the
National Bureau of the Census began gathering "death by execution" statistics
in all states. RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 9
(1991). When the annual number of executions is compared to the annual
number of homicides, the data show that during the 1930s and 1940s, when
the rates of execution in this country were the highest (along with high rates
of homicide), fewer than 2 out of 100 homicides resulted in an execution (i.e.,
less than 2%). That rate dropped to less than 1 in 100 after the mid-1950s and
dropped further to less than 1 in 1,000 by the mid-1960s (0.1%).
PATERNOSTER, supra, at 9-11.
409. DRESSLER, supra note 26, at 335 (noting that "few doctrines of
criminal law engender more controversy than the defense of insanity").
410. Denno, supra note 407, at 321-24 (explaining the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on why "death is different" from other kinds of punishments).
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instead, basic principles of liability do.
B. IF THERE IS A VOLUNTARY ACT REQUIREMENT, BASE IT ON
SOCIAL MORALS, NOT SCIENCE
Another approach to the voluntary act conundrum is to
render the science of consciousness and voluntariness
irrelevant and view cases as fundamentally moral questions
After all, the science is complex.
about responsibility.
According to the more skeptical commentators, its
achievements are doubtful. 4 11 Why not simply say that certain
defendants are culpable because they violate society's moral
code? Attorneys can then cease trying to complicate matters by
incorporating scientific discoveries that can be difficult to
understand and perhaps even more difficult to prove when
applied to criminal behavior.
This approach, while appealingly straightforward, is naive
about the extent to which scientific knowledge pervades our
moral code. Mass media and the proliferation of information
have made us a society composed of "lay scientists," who use
such information to make a wide range of choices-personal,
professional, and certainly moral. 41 2 To presume some clear
morals-science dividing line ignores the extensive intertwining
After all, the public's fervent embrace of
of the two.
psychoanalytic theory propelled that theory's impact on the
MPC's development. 4 13 Likewise, the impetus behind the
creation of a number of the MPC's provisions,4 14 as well as, of
course, recent Supreme Court cases, 41 5 is to bring science into
the courtroom so that it can assist jurors in their
determinations and make their decisions as factually based as

411.

See generally JOHN HORGAN, THE UNDISCOVERED MIND: HOW THE

HUMAN

BRAIN DEFIES REPLICATION, MEDICATION, AND EXPLANATION (1999)

(contending that the workings of human consciousness are so complex that it

is absurd to think that scientific methods and techniques will explain it
effectively any time soon).
412.

See Carl Meyer, Science, Medicine, and the U.S. Common Law Courts,

in EXPERT WITNESSING: EXPLAINING AND UNDERSTANDING SCIENCE 1, 4-5

(Carl Meyer ed., 1999).
413. See supra notes 125-65 and accompanying text.
414. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 210.3 cmt. at 61-

65 (discussing the extreme mental or emotional disturbance defense).
415. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
588 (1993) (stating that scientific testimony does not have to be "generally
accepted" to be admissible).
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possible. 4 16 Scientific evidence can help constrain application of
a wrong-minded (and anti-science) moral code that unfairly
punishes defendants who are not legally culpable.
Legal trends reflect the jurisprudential value placed on
science as well as the need to enhance the accuracy and
modernity of a jury's decision making. They, however, by no
means discard the significance of society's norms and morals.
"Science can tell us how many chromosomes are in the nucleus
of a normal human cell, but science cannot tell us what it is to
be a normal human, a question for law, with all its normative
4 17
and contingent difficulties."

C. A PROPOSAL FOR A THREE-PART VOLUNTARY ACT
REQUIREMENT

The decision to retain a voluntary act requirement prompts
concerns about how the criminal law should create a
comprehensible guideline that can incorporate recent research
on consciousness. One possible standard is to adopt a range of
conscious states that reflect the brain's representations of
memory (from clearly conscious phenomena to clearly
unconscious or nonconscious events).4 1 8 While this degrees-ofconsciousness continuum may be workable for cognitive
scientists, it is an impractical way for ordering a legal roadmap
for assessing voluntariness. There is enormous diversity in the
ways that people can become unconscious as well as the
situations and acts they may experience. The law must draw
lines. A legal standard must also allow room for social mores
and an assessment of the defendant's particular situation. A
defendant's volitional capacity cannot be evaluated in a
4 19
vacuum.

416. See generally CRIMINAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: CASES,
MATERIALS, PROBLEMS (Robert J. Goodwin & Jimmy Gurule eds., 1997)

(exploring how the law of evidence is applied in criminal cases).
417. Robert A. Bohrer, The Fundamental Differences Between Science and
Law, in EXPERT WITNESSING: EXPLAINING AND UNDERSTANDING SCIENCE 41,

44 (Carl Meyer ed., 1999).
418.
419.

See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. Olvera, 15 C.M.A. 134, 138 (1954) ("[E]ven a

person who has lost contact with reality to the extent of developing a
'psychotic delusion' may be held criminally accountable if-within the
framework of delusion-he recognized that he was engaged in the performance
of an act considered reprehensible by society ....

[L]egal responsibility must

be appraised in accordance with the framework within which the subject was
acting at the time.").
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1. Composition of the Three-Part Requirement
In light of this dilemma, this Article recommends several
changes. The first change is to adopt a simple limiting
definition of "voluntary conduct" that meshes well with the
criminal law's traditional depiction of voluntariness in the
MPC, but without all the complicated and dated baggage.
definition
meets
these
Lloyd
Weinreb's
suggested
requirements: "A person does not engage in conduct voluntarily
if the conduct is not subject to [that person's] control."420 This
designation of voluntary conduct is left open conceptually for
two reasons: it can accommodate new research on
statement of criminal
voluntariness, as well as keep the main 42
liability accurate, even if it is incomplete. '
This Article's recommended requirement also has a
number of advantages relative to those used by most states and
the MPC's section 2.01. First, the focus on "control" avoids the
Cartesian dualism inherent in a voluntary act requirement
expressed in mind/body language and interpreted with respect
to either mens rea (unconsciousness) or actus reus
has confused courts 423
(automatism). 422 This dualist structure
424
and it misrepresents current science.

420.

Weinreb, supra note 64, at 112 (emphasis added); see also MODEL

PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 215 (defining the term
"'voluntary" as "conduct that is within the control of the actor"). For a
philosophical analysis of what could constitute a "control requirement," see
Douglas Husak, Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?, in PHILOSOPHY AND
THE CRIMINAL LAW: PRINCIPLE AND CRITIQUE 60, 77-82 (Anthony Duff ed.,
1998). For arguments concerning why the concept of "control" has problems of

its own, see Greenawalt, supra note 28, at 935-56. Likewise, this Article
contends that even though the word "control" is appropriate in the context of
delimiting involuntary acts, that does not mean it is necessarily appropriate in
other kinds of determinations, such as assessing whether a dangerous sex
offender should require civil commitment. See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 122 S.

Ct. 867, 870 (2002) (adopting a "lack of control" standard for determining the
civil commitment of sex offenders). Crane recognizes "that in cases where lack

of control is at issue, 'inability to control behavior' will not be demonstrable
with mathematical precision. It is enough to say there must be proof of
serious difficulty in controlling behavior." Id.
421. Weinreb, supra note 64, at 113.
422. See R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY:
PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 158-59 (1990) (discussing the
drawbacks of the dualist view); Saunders, supra note 18, at 461 ("The search
for a causal connection between volition and act has long been one of the
central aspects of the mind-body problem.").
423. See supra Part III.
424. See supra Part II.
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The proposed definition's exclusion of specific examples of
unconsciousness and involuntariness also allows a more
flexible approach to assessing the meaning of lack of control.
For example, substantial evidence suggests that a person's
sleepwalking and reflex responses may at times be conduct that
is not subject to that person's control. 425 Yet, there are
circumstances when people experiencing these states can in
fact control their behavior, particularly if they are given notice
426
that it may happen.
The use of the word "control" also provides a normative
anchor for jurors to interpret scientific evidence on conscious
and unconscious influences and the degrees of mental states
existing between those two poles. Jurors generally know what
it means to be in or out of control of their behavior, and
consciousness research can further inform them. However,
there must be some limits on the reach of the meaning of the
word "control" so that it cannot include such out of control
behavior as addiction 427 or dangerous sexual offenses. 42 8 This is
where social norms and values can contextualize the science of
involuntariness. Jury instructions can elaborate on the facts of
the case and the science at issue, perhaps defining the terms
"conscious" and "unconscious," if they are relevant, and putting
429
them in the context of the law and science of the case.
425. See supra notes 364-68 and accompanying text.
426. See Weinreb, supra note 64, at 112 ("Given notice, a person may be
able to control conduct which we would ordinarily regard as reflexive."). The
writers of Australia's Model Criminal Code excluded the word "reflex" from
their list of involuntary acts because of evidence that some individuals, such
as exceptional athletes, can control their reflex responses. See supra note 75
and accompanying text.
427. See Greenawalt, supra note 28, at 935.
428. See supra note 420 and accompanying text (discussing Kansas v.
Crane, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002)).
429. In general, model jury instructions on voluntary acts do not provide
much guidance beyond the state statute. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, THE
SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES ASSOCIATION AND THE COUNTY JUDGES
ASSOCIATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS,

NEW YORK 500 (1983) ("When a definition of a voluntary act is required, the
following instruction may be used: A person commits a voluntary act when he
performs such an act consciously and as a result of his own physical effort and
his own mental decision to do so."). On the other hand, the model jury
instructions for California and some other states are relatively more detailed.
See THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, OF THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA JURY

INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL, Part 4.30 at 198 (6th ed. 1996). California's model
jury instructions state
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This new voluntary act standard is not enough by itself. It
requires further restructuring to reflect three major concerns
associated with prior involuntariness cases. First, there is a
concern that potentially dangerous individuals may be
acquitted if the court determined they acted involuntarily.
Second, there is the worry that even when individuals acted
involuntarily, they may be subject to commitment under the
insanity provisions because courts fear the consequences of a
total acquittal or they are confused about what kinds of
behavior constitutes insanity as opposed to involuntariness.
Third, there is a realization that, depending on the
circumstances, a defendant attempting an involuntary act
defense can receive sanctions ranging from total acquittal (if
the defense succeeds) to the death penalty (if the defense fails).
Cases with comparable facts may result in radically different
punishments. Indeed, the potential for this extreme range in
sentencing may drive some of the inconsistencies and apparent
injustices associated with the voluntary act requirement.
In response to these concerns, this Article recommends
that the voluntary act requirement constitute three parts: (1)
voluntary acts, (2) involuntary acts, and (3) semi-voluntary
acts. The third category of semi-voluntary acts-which is
new-would include individuals who were either previously
shoehorned into the first two categories or wrongly given the
insanity defense. This approach, which is described in the
following sections, presumes that individuals are "both more
430
and less responsible than was commonly thought."

A person who while unconscious commits what would otherwise
be a criminal act, is not guilty of a crime.
This rule of law applies to persons who are not conscious of acting
but who perform acts while asleep or while suffering from a delirium or
fever, or because of an attack of [psychomotor] epilepsy, a blow on the
head, the involuntary taking of drugs or the involuntary consumption
of intoxicating liquor, or any similar cause.
Unconsciousness does not require that a person be incapable of
movement.
Evidence has been received which may tend to show that the
defendant was unconscious at the time and place of the commission of
the alleged crime for which [he or she] is here on trial. If, after a
consideration of all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was conscious at the time the alleged crime was
committed, [he or she] must be found not guilty.
Id.
430. MOORE, supra note 18, at 1674.
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a. Involuntary Acts
Involuntary acts would be defined quite narrowly and
generally restricted to a set of circumstances where an
individual's lack of control warrants a total acquittal. The
classic example derives from early English history: "[I]f A by
pushing B against C pushes C over a precipice A and not B is
guilty of pushing C over the precipice."43 1 New and traditional
medical/psychological conditions would be considered as
contributing to involuntary acts, but these conditions also
would be narrowly confined. In addition, there would be
relatively more detailed jury instructions specifying the
requirement for the defendant's lack of control.
b. Semi-Voluntary Acts
Semi-voluntary acts would include two main groups of
individuals: those who acted involuntarily or semi-voluntarily
but demonstrate the potential to be dangerous again (for
example, a violent sleepwalker), 432 and those who acted semivoluntarily but appear to have relatively greater control over
their behavior than "true" involuntary actors. The main
purpose of the semi-voluntary category is to prevent courts
from labeling as insane individuals who seem likely to engage
in recurrent acts but who do not evidence the kind of mental
disease or defect that would make 433them eligible for
commitment under the insanity provision.
A comparably important purpose is to put such individuals
on notice that they may be capable of acting violently again so
that they can attempt to prevent comparable acts from
431.

2 SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW

OF ENGLAND 100 (London, MacMillan 1883).

432.

There seems to be a treatment available for nearly every kind of

disorder relating to unconsciousness.
For example, healthy adult
sleepwalkers have in some cases been treated successfully through therapy

that helps them to identify and cope with stressors in a beneficial way.
Hypnosis and medication also have been used with varying degrees of success.
See generally SLEEP DISORDERS SOURCEBOOK (Jennifer Swanson ed., 1999)

(describing various sleep disorders and treatment options); Richard M. Berlin
& Usman Qayyum, Sleepwalking: Diagnosis and Treatment Through the Life
Cycle, 27 PSYCHOSOMATICS 755 (1986) (discussing the diagnosis and

treatment of sleepwalking in children, adults, and the elderly).
433.

See MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 4.01(1), at 163 ("A

person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as
a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his

conduct to the requirements of law.").
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recurring. This approach comports with the MPC's emphasis
434
that voluntary conduct need only include a voluntary act.
The classic MPC case is the epileptic defendant who drives a
car (a voluntary act) knowing that he is subject to epileptic
seizures (an involuntary act). When the car goes out of control
and people are killed because the epileptic defendant has a
seizure, the defendant is indicted for criminal negligence in the
operation of a vehicle resulting in death. 435 This indictment is
based on the defendant's voluntary conduct preceding the
seizure as well as his negligent mens rea that existed at the
time he entered and drove the car. 4 36 The focus is on the
defendant's awareness of the risk of engaging in a potentially
dangerous involuntary act.
The MPC and other state codes apply a similar (but more
complicated) approach to acts committed as a result of
voluntary intoxication, a topic relevant to, but beyond, this
Article's bounds. 437 Based on cultural and moral expectations,
434. See id. § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 217. The § 2.01(1) "formulation does not state
that liability must be based on the voluntary act or the omission simpliciter.
The requirement is that conduct that includes such action or omission occur."
Id.
435. See id. at 218 n.12 (citing People v. Decina, 138 N.E.2d 799, 803-04
(N.Y. 1956)); see also supra note 356 and accompanying text (discussing
Decina in the context of another epileptic seizure case).
436. See MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 218 n.12
437. Defendants have used the Model Penal Code's intoxication defense for
two reasons that are consistent with the voluntary act requirement's
automatisml/unconsciousness defenses: to prove that no physical act was
committed, and to prove that there was no mental state required by the
offense. See id. § 2.08 at 349 & cmt. 1 at 353. To disprove a voluntary act
under § 2.08, the MPC drafters suggested that intoxication may be accorded
its "full probative significance, whatever that may be," when an actor seeks to
negate an element of the offense involving actual physical activity. Id. at 353.
At the same time, however, MPC § 2.01(2)(b) "admits the possibility that an
actor could be unconscious because of intoxication ... liability might still be
based on voluntary behavior prior to unconsciousness." Id.
Regardless,
"nearly every jurisdiction takes the view that, although involuntariness
ordinarily exculpates persons of responsibility for what they do, it does not
exculpate persons whose involuntariness is the product of prior voluntary
intoxication." Peter Westen, Egelhoff Again, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1203, 1217
(1999). As the MPC Drafters point out, "the act of drinking itself, though
perhaps 'voluntary,' would not suffice to meet [the voluntariness] requirement
unless it were undertaken with the requisite culpability as to the actual result
that ensued." MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.08 cmt. 1 at 353
n.10.
Westen makes a similar point: "[W]hat prevents a voluntarily
intoxicated person from relying on resulting unconsciousness as a defense
is ...the act [voluntarily ingesting intoxicants] under circumstances in which
the person knows or should know that doing so creates an unjustified risk of
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legislatures and courts presume that individuals are aware of
the risks of engaging in involuntary, but criminal, acts when
they become voluntarily intoxicated. 4 38 For example, courts
have recognized that intoxicated offenders commit a
disproportionate number of crimes, particularly crimes of
to some studies, they commit nearly half
violence. 4 39 According
440
of all homicides.
c.

Voluntary Acts

Voluntary acts, as this Article has stated, constitute
conduct subject to an individual's control. 44 1 The next step is to
also
determine the individual's mental state, which
442
incorporates different levels of conscious awareness.
harm to others." Westen, supra, at 1217. In place of the specific/general
intent "rule" with regard to intoxication, MPC § 2.08 attempts to capture its
"net effect." MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.08 cmt. 1 at 354.
Stated briefly, that "net effect" (courts' concretizing of the vague
specific/general dichotomy) has operated as follows: Intoxication evidence
could be adduced to disprove the elements of purpose or knowledge, where
either sufficed to establish the offense, but intoxication evidence would be
precluded to disprove recklessness or negligence, where either sufficed to
establish the offense. Id. at 356-57.
438. The MPC Commentaries note that the case for "a special rule for
drunkenness in relation to awareness of the risk in recklessness," MODEL
PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.08 cmt. 1 at 358, draws strength from a
fundamental point: Awareness of the potential consequences of excessive
drinking on the capacity of human beings to gauge the risks incident to their
conduct is now so dispersed in our culture that it is not unfair to postulate a
general equivalence between the risks created by the conduct of the drunken
actor and the risks created by that actor's conduct in becoming drunk. Id. at
358-59. Becoming so drunk as to destroy temporarily the actor's powers of
perception and judgment is conduct that plainly has no affirmative social
value to counterbalance the potential danger. The actor's moral culpability
lies in engaging in such conduct. Id. In other words, the drafters of MPC §
2.08(2) seem to derive a moral conclusion from a utilitarian calculus: Engaging
in socially valueless activity warrants "moral culpability"; becoming drunk is
just as risky, hence as culpable, as drunken conduct. Because of the
"recklessness floor" read into many "general intent" crimes, intoxication
usually has been precluded as a defense to such crimes, regardless of the
intoxication's effect on the actor's awareness or knowledge of the risks
involved in pursuing actions. Id.
439. See Egelhoff v. Montana, 518 U.S. 37, 49 (1996) (stating that a large
number of crimes are committed by intoxicated offenders).
440. Id. at 50 (citing studies).
441. See supra note 420 and accompanying text.
442. The topic of how research on consciousness would illuminate the
different levels of mens rea is explored elsewhere. See Deborah W. Denno,
Rethinking Criminal Intent (draft in progress, on file with author). However,
the MPC does focus on consciousness and varying degrees of awareness when
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2. Application of the Three-Part Requirement
The proposed three-part standard is suitably flexible so
that it can be applied in a wide range of circumstances. It also
resolves the public's discomfort with doctrines that force all-ornothing choices. 443 The question remains, how would the threeassessing an individual's mental state, as the italicized terminology of Model
Penal Code § 2.02 demonstrates below:
Section 2.02. General requirements of culpability
(1) Minimum Requirements of Culpability. Except as provided in
Section 2.05 [concerning violations], a person is not guilty of an
offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or
negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material
element of the offense.
(2) Kinds of CulpabilityDefined.
Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an
offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result
thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or
to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is
aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes
they exist.
Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an
offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the
attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that
nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the elements involves a result of his conduct, he is aware
that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from
his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that,
considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe
in the actor's situation.
Negligently.
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of the
offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure
to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and
the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's
situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.02, at 225-26 (emphases added).
443. See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE,
LIABILITY AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995)
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part standard work in the "real" world?
This section examines six cases in some detail, showing
how the distinctions among these three parts can be made. In
order to better differentiate semi-voluntary acts from the two
other poles of behavior, the analysis relies for guidance on some
of the ten criteria followed in the "interest of justice" dismissal
statutes adopted in most states. 4 4 These criteria, which reflect
significant principles in the criminal law, include the "(a)
seriousness and circumstances of the offense," "(d) the history,
(presenting a research study based on the public's sense of justice on issues of
criminal law formation).
444. See generally James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Dismissal of State
Criminal Charge in Furtheranceof, or in Interest of, Justice, 71 A.L.R. 1 (5th
ed. 1999) (reviewing and discussing the interest of justice statutes throughout
the country). This Article uses New York's relatively more detailed interest of
justice statute for purposes of illustration because it has served as a
nationwide model. John F. Wirenius, A Model of Discretion: New York's
"Interests of Justice" Dismissal Statute, 58 ALB. L. REV. 175, 176, 177 (1994)
(noting that New York "has gone to unusual lengths to deal appropriately"
with interest of justice cases and that the New York statute "as it has
developed in fact is a boldly innovative schema which has been held up as a
model for other states with less well-enunciated criteria"). The pertinent
provision of New York's interest ofjustice statute operates as follows:
1. An indictment or any count thereof may be dismissed in
furtherance of justice ... [ifl such dismissal is required as a matter of
judicial discretion by the existence of some compelling factor,
consideration or circumstance clearly demonstrating that conviction
or prosecution of the defendant upon such indictment or count would
constitute or result in injustice. In determining whether such
compelling factor, consideration, or circumstance exists, the court
must, to the extent applicable, examine and consider, individually
and collectively, the following:
(a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense;
(b) the extent of harm caused by the offense;
(c) the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible at
trial;
(d) the history, character and condition of the defendant;
(e) any exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement
personnel in the investigation, arrest and prosecution of the
defendant;
(f) the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a
sentence authorized for the offense;
(g) the impact of a dismissal upon the confidence of the public in
the criminal justice system;
(h) the impact of a dismissal on the safety or welfare of the
community;
(i) where the court deems it appropriate, the attitude of the
complainant or victim with respect to the motion;
(j) any other relevant fact indicating that a judgment of conviction
would serve no useful purpose.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40(1) (McKinney 1993).
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character and condition of the defendant," as well as "(g) the
impact of a dismissal on the safety or welfare of the
community."445 Regina v. Parks446-a classic sleepwalking
case-is the first to illustrate how this new standard would
operate.
a. The Classic Case of Somnambulism: Kenneth Parks
In Parks,447 the twenty-three-year-old defendant fell asleep
one evening on his couch while watching an episode of
Saturday Night Live. 448 That night, the show was hosted by
449
Dennis Hopper and it contained some rather violent humor.
Later-it was unclear exactly when-Parks arose, got into his
car, and drove fourteen miles across town and through three
traffic lights to reach his in-laws' house. 450 There, he proceeded
to stab and beat his mother-in-law to death and attack his
451
father-in-law, nearly killing him.
Parks immediately went to the police and gave himself
up. 452 He did not deny what he had done. 45 3 His lawyers,
however, marshaling a team of experts, 454 claimed that the
events that took place that evening occurred during an episode
of sleepwalking and were therefore involuntary. 455 Parks was
totally acquitted of all charges, including unpremeditated
456
homicide and attempted homicide.
Parks's attorneys contended that Parks was truly
unconscious when he acted and he also was highly unlikely to
be dangerous again. For example, (1) both of Parks's attacks
seemed entirely motiveless and Parks turned himself into the
445. Id. § 210.40(1) (a), (d), (g). For an interesting discussion of how a
defendant's character could play a role in criminal cases, see Sherry F. Colb,
The Characterof Freedom, 52 STAN. L. REV. 235, 236-53 (1999) (reviewing
LAWRIE REZNEK, EVIL OR ILL? JUSTIFYING THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1997)).

446.

[1992] 95 D.L.R.4th 27.

447. Id.
448. See R. Broughton et al., Homicidal Somnambulism: A Case Report, 17
SLEEP 253, 255 (1994).
449. Id. at 255 n.1.
450. Id. at 255.
451. Parks, 95 D.L.R.4th at 31.
452.

Id.

453. Id.
454. Id. at 28.
455. Broughton et al., supra note 448, at 251.
456. Parks, 95 D.L.R.4th at 28.
Parks was acquitted because
somnambulism is considered a sane automatism by the Canadian courts. Id.
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police; (2) over one-third of Parks's extended family had a
marked history of sleepwalking and Parks himself suffered
various sleep disturbances when he was observed in a sleep lab;
(3) two of Parks's prison cell mates described incidents where
Parks sat up in bed and talked in his sleep; (4) experts testified
that Parks's sleepwalking was a rare event triggered by a
combination of precipitating factors (sleep deprivation and high
stress) that were unlikely to recur together; and (5) avoidance
of this stress combination in addition to treatment would likely
prevent further violence. 457 Indeed, after his acquittal, Parks
458
was put on medication and his sleepwalking episodes ceased.
459
Parks's acquittal is consistent with current law,
accepting the court's presumption that Parks was actually
sleepwalking and therefore unconscious. This case can also be
examined another way, however, using the ten "(a-j)" criteria
listed in the interest of justice statute as a guide. 460 First, (a)
Parks's acts were, of course, extremely serious (murder and
attempted murder) as were the circumstances surrounding
them (the brutality of the stabbing and beating). Clearly, (b)
the extent of harm caused was nearly as grave as it could be.
On the other hand, (d) Parks's character seemed strongly in his
favor because of a lack of motive (he apparently got along well
with his in-laws) and he had no personal gain from killing
them, financial or otherwise. 46 1
His problems with
sleepwalking and his family history of sleepwalking also were
accepted as "real." Even the prosecution never challenged the
conclusion that Parks was sleepwalking when he killed and
462
assaulted his in-laws.
There was, however, a great deal of stress in Parks's life at
the time and this had caused him a number of sleep
disturbances and tensions within his family. A year before the
attacks on his in-laws, Parks began to acquire a mass of
gambling debts, which he tried to hide by taking funds from his
family savings and embezzling at work.463 These acts cost him
457. Id. at 31-53; Broughton et al., supra note 448, at 257-63.
458. Broughton et al., supra note 448, at 260.
459. See supra notes 13, 24-38 and accompanying text.
460.

See supra note 444 and accompanying text.

461. Broughton et al., supra note 448, at 259-61.
462. Id. at 263. The prosecution had argued that Parks's acts should be

classified as insane

automatism, but the court decided to classify

somnambulism as a sane automatism See id.
463. Id. at 254.
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his job and he was charged with theft. 464 Parks was forced to
put his house up for sale to cover his debts, but his gambling
465
continued.
After renewed confrontation by his wife over his gambling,
Parks agreed to attend his first meeting of Gamblers
Anonymous.4 66 Parks and his wife then made plans to discuss
his gambling problems and financial difficulties with both of
their families. 467 The evening before they 46
were
to make these
8
family visits, Parks committed his violence.
If Parks was truly sleepwalking and unconscious, there is
(c) no evidence of guilt because he was not acting voluntarily
and (f) there would be no purpose and effect of imposing a
sentence on him.4 69 Presumably, deterrence would be either
limited or ineffective, and retribution unjust under the
circumstances.
Expert testimony and statistics on
sleepwalkers also would suggest that (h) Parks's dismissal
would not be a threat to the safety or welfare of the community
because repeated violent sleepwalking is very rare. 470 At the
same time, however, it seems that the expert testimony was
based on the presumption that Parks would be taking
medication and following a more stress-free life. 47' The public
may not (g) feel confident in the criminal justice system
472
knowing that Parks was free and unsupervised.
It is this concern with Parks's potential for recurring
violence and his medical history that makes the Parks case fall
into an ambiguous gray area. A balancing test of all the factors
involved in the case suggests that other courts may not acquit
473
someone like Parks.
464.
465.
466.
467.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 254-55.
Id.

468. Id. at 255.
469. See supra note 444 and accompanying text (listing the ten criteria
followed in the "interest ofjustice" dismissal statutes).
470. See supra note 451 and accompanying text.
471. See supra note 457 and accompanying text
472. According to Justices Lamer and Cory, the trial court should make an
order to "keep the peace" by imposing on Parks certain conditions (e.g., specific
treatment) consistent with the trial court's preventive powers. Regina v.

Parks, 95 D.L.R.4th 27, 30 (Lamer C.J.C., Cory J. concurring, dissenting).
473. For example, at around the same time, the English Court of Appeal,
Criminal Division, refused to follow Parks and decided that sleepwalking is a
form of insane automatism. Regina v. Burgess, 2 All E.R. 769, 774-75 (C.A.
1991); see also supra note 381 (discussing Burgess). Moreover, the Supreme
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Parks's history of sleep and financial disorders is a doubleedged sword; the evidence appears exculpatory for this
particular incident but inculpatory considering his potential for
future dangerousness. Indeed, the prosecution in the Parks
case argued on appeal that Parks's sleepwalking should be
classified as insane automatism because Parks could be violent
again and because sleepwalking was74 a "disease of the mind"
4
that warranted institutionalization.
This Article's recommendation of a three-part requirement
can prevent such gray area behaviors from being classified as
insane or voluntary because of a court's concern that they may
recur, particularly because the odds are so much against it.
Classifying Parks's behavior as semi-voluntary would preclude
an unqualified acquittal for him, but, at the same time, avoid
the injustice of putting someone like Parks in an institution for
the criminally insane. It also would discourage the temptation
to classify his behavior as voluntary. This same reasoning can
apply to other types of scenarios, as the following cases show.
b. Somnambulism with a Motive: Mrs. Cogdon
A fitting example for probing this Article's three-part
requirement is the case of the infamous Mrs. Cogdon, 4 75 whose
story is a focal point in criminal law casebooks. 476 While in a
somnambulistic state, Mrs. Cogdon "left her bed, fetched an axe
from the woodheap, entered [her daughter] Pat's room, and
struck her two accurate forceful blows on the head with the
4 77
blade of the axe, thus killing her."
The prosecution did not contest the evidence provided by
Mrs. Cogdon's physician, or that of a psychiatrist and a
psychologist. 478 All three experts indicated that Mrs. Cogdon
was not psychotic, but afflicted by "a form of hysteria with an
overlay of depression, and that she was of a personality in
which such dissociated states as fugues, amnesias, and

Court of Canada has recently shown the limited effect Parks has on other
kinds of disorders. See Regina v. Stone, [1999] 173 D.L.R.4th 66, 103-113.
474. See Parks, 95 D.L.R.4th at 28-29; supra note 462 and accompanying
text.
475. Norval Morris, SomnambulisticHomicide: Ghosts, Spiders, and North
Koreans, 5 RES JUDIcATAE 29, 29-30 (1951).
476. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 206, at 178-79.
477. Morris, supra note 475, at 30.
478. Id.
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somnambulistic acts are to be expected." 479 The experts also
agreed that if she had been awake
at the time, she would not be
48 0
eligible for an insanity defense.
While the experts did not speculate about Mrs. Cogdon's
motives, they considered her account of why she killed her
daughter "transparently insufficient". 481 According to Mrs.
Cogdon, she was defending Pat during a dream in which she
believed there was a war "'all around the house,' that soldiers
were in Pat's room, and that one soldier was on the bed
attacking Pat."482 This dream had been preceded by two
others. 48 3 In the first, Mrs. Cogdon spoke with ghosts she said
were sitting on the end of her bed and told her they had 'come
to take Pattie.' 484 In the second dream, which occurred the
night before the murder, Mrs. Cogdon awakened while
"violently brushing" Pat's face in an effort to remove spiders
that Mrs. Codgdon thought were all over Pat. 48 5 The next
morning, Mrs. Cogdon informed a doctor about the dream and
they discussed future psychiatric treatment in light of other
486
problems Mrs. Cogdon had mentioned.
Norval Morris's account of the Mrs. Cogdon case stresses
that "[oln the conscious level, at least, there was no reason to
doubt Mrs. Cogdon's deep attachment to her daughter"; indeed,
Mr. Cogdon testified that Mrs. Cogdon "'absolutely adored'
Pat. 487 The experts, however, "hinted" that Mrs. Cogdon's
unconscious was telling a different story. 488 Mrs. Cogdon's
"emotional motivation" for killing Pat seemingly stemmed from
Mrs. Cogdon's "acute conflict situation" with her own parents
as well as her "very great sexual frustration" within her
marriage. 4 89 She "over-compensated" for such frustration by
over-protecting Pat: "Her exaggerated solicitude for her
daughter was a conscious expression of her subconscious
emotional hostility to her, and the [dreams] were projections of

479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id.
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that aggression." 490 Ultimately,
the jury believed Mrs. Cogdon
49 1
and she was acquitted.
The criminal law has allowed for mitigation in cases where
defendants claim that unconscious emotional forces have taken
hold, but it is primarily in the context of the insanity defense or
the partial defense of extreme mental and emotional
disturbance. 492 Like Parks, the facts in Cogdon are a doubleedged sword. While Mrs. Cogdon was given an unqualified
acquittal, another court may regard the evidence more
ambiguously. For example, Mrs. Cogdon's mental, emotional,
and situational circumstances suggest that she could possibly
engage in more violence while sleepwalking. Mr. Cogdon
appears to be a prime target. These facts, along with Mrs.
Cogdon's psychiatric history, could have bolstered a finding of
insane automatism.
Again, this Article's three-part
requirement could preclude determinations of insanity or
voluntariness in such gray area situations if the behavior were
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. See e.g., Pollard v. United States, 282 F.2d 450, 453-55 (6th Cir. 1960)
(holding that the presumption of the defendant's sanity was overcome based in
part on neuropsychiatric evidence that the defendant's ineptly attempted bank
robberies could be attributed in part to unconscious feelings of guilt following
a neighbor's murder of the defendant's wife and infant child while the
defendant was at work); People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310, 1315-17 (N.Y.
1980) (referring to unconscious emotional factors underlying extreme mental
and emotional disturbance); WILLARD GAYLIN, THE KILLING OF BONNIE
GARLAND: A QUESTION OF JUSTICE 213-41 (1982) (discussing the

psychoanalytic rationales of Richard Herrin's conscious and unconscious
motivations in killing Bonnie Garland in the context of both the insanity
defense and the extreme mental and emotional disturbance defense). For a
discussion of theoretical and conceptual issues, see EHRENZWEIG, supra note
130, at 207-41; Moore, supra note 18, at 1563. For a discussion of partial
defenses and how they relate to unconsciousness and insanity, see supra notes
46-52 and accompanying text. Under the MPC, a person who would be guilty
of murder is instead guilty of the lesser offense of manslaughter if it were
determined that the person killed the victim while suffering from an "extreme
mental or emotional disturbance [EMED] for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse." MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 210.3(1)(b)
at 43. The reasonableness of the explanation or excuse is "determined from
the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as
he believes them to be." Id. This provision has two parts: subjective and
objective. The subjective part is the EMED requiring not that the defendant
possess a state of mind comparable to mental illness, but rather feelings
sufficiently intense to cause a loss of self control at the time of the murder.
The objective part requires a reasonable explanation or excuse for the EMED
that caused the person to lose control and kill; however, it is subjective to the
extent that it is determined "from the viewpoint of the person in the actor's
situation." Id. cmt. 5 at 61-64.
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instead considered semi-voluntary.
c.

Somnambulism Without an Apparent Motive: Scott Falater

The extreme range of possible sanctions applicable to some
involuntariness claims is illustrated by one of the most
publicized defenses of sleepwalking in the United States-the
1999 Scott Falater case. 493

Falater, age 43, was accused of

murdering his wife of twenty years after she was found face
down in their pool and stabbed forty-four times.4 94 After
Falater stabbed his wife, he changed his bloody clothes, put the
knife in the wheel well of his car,4 95 and then, according to a
neighbor's eyewitness testimony, returned to his wife's body,
dragging it into the pool and holding his wife's head under
496
water.
Falater claimed that he was sleepwalking for the entire
incident. 497 Like Kenneth Parks, Falater also brought in a
team of prominent experts, including Roger Broughton, who
4 98
had successfully testified for the defense in the Parks case.

493. For an account of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case,
see Jerry Kammer, Head-to-HeadIssues, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 25, 1999, at
A13 [hereinafter Kammer, Head-to-Head] (summarizing the prosecution and
defense arguments and in particular their opposing expert witnesses); Jerry
Kammer et al., Jury in Sleepwalking Murder Trial Says Second Attack Key to
Verdict, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 27, 1999, at A23 [hereinafter Kammer, Jury in
Sleepwalking Murder Trial] (reporting post trial reactions, including
comments from the jurors); Memorandum of Janet E. Tatman, Clinical
Psychologist, Well Being Systems, P.L.L.C., Initial Sleep Disorders
Consultation (Aug. 29, 1997) (on file with author) (outlining Scott Falater's
history of sleep disorder and the events leading up to the night of the murder);
ABC 20/20: The Sleeping Killer (ABC Television Broadcast, transcript
#99062505-j11, June 25, 1999) (including a short interview with Scott Falater
and selections from court proceedings); CNN Breaking News: Verdict to be
Read in Falater Murder Trial (CNN television broadcast, transcript
#99062501 VOO, June 25, 1999) (discussing the major issues of the case with
Greta Van Susteran, CNN legal analyst, prior to the reading of the verdict);
Phoenix Police Department Report, DR # 70087351 (Jan. 16, 1997) (on file
with author) (reporting the crime scene details of the murder of Yarmila
Falater).
494. CNN Breaking News: Verdict to be Read in Falater Murder Trial,
supra note 493.
495. Kammer, Head-to-Head,supra note 493, at A13.
496. Phoenix Police Department Report, supra note 493 (statement of Greg
Koons).
497. Kammer, Head-to-Head,supra note 493, at A13; CNN BreakingNews:
Verdict to be Read in FalaterMurder Trial, supra note 493.
498. CNN Breaking News: Verdict to be Read in Falater Murder Trial,
supra note 493.
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According to his experts, Falater had a number of disorders
that supported his claims: a history of sleepwalking; brainwave
patterns consistent with those of someone who sleepwalks;
sleep deprivation at the time of the incident, which often brings
on sleepwalking episodes; and no apparent motive to murder
his wife. 499 However, the jury's decision to reject Falater's
defense and convict him of first-degree murder relied on two
key factors: Falater's complex behaviors during the episode,
most particularly, the second (drowning) attack on his wife, and
the evidence that Falter never sought medical help for his
500
sleepwalking.
There were a number of aspects of the Falater case,
however, that accentuate the need for gradations in a voluntary
act requirement. First, the sanctions sought by the defense
and prosecution represented both possible poles of punishment:
While the defense claimed that Falater was an unconscious
sleepwalker who should be totally acquitted, the prosecution
claimed that Falater should get the death penalty. 50 1 By
raising the involuntariness defense of sleepwalking, Falater
was essentially precluded from bringing other kinds of defenses
that would have resulted in a more intermediary result (such
as the partial defense of diminished capacity). 50 2 There also
was no evidence that Falater suffered from a mental disease or
defect sufficient to constitute insanity, and he never made that
claim. Second, some of the jurors commented that the expert
testimony from both sides, which they "weighed heavily," was
confusing because of the all-or-nothing characterizations that
each side presented concerning Falater's mental state. 50 3
499. Id.
500. See Kammer, Jury in Sleepwalking Murder Trial, supra note 493
(reporting jurors' statements that the second attack "removed their
'reasonable doubt'").
501. See id.
502. In People v. Newton, 87 Cal Rptr. 394, 406-07 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1970), discussed supra notes 320-22 and accompanying text, the court allowed
jury instructions for both an involuntary act defense and a diminished
capacity defense. There is no evidence that Falater's attorneys requested both
types of jury instructions. Regardless, such a request could be more difficult
with a sleepwalking defense that historically has been associated with lack of
consciousness as opposed to a reflex reaction defense such as Newton's that
may be more easily characterized either way.
503. See Kammer, Jury in Sleepwalking Murder Trial, supra note 493.
After the trial one juror commented, "[tihat's what made the deliberations so
hard. We had two groups of experts that were telling us the exact opposite
things. It came down to a choice of whose experts do you believe."
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For both of these reasons, experts who provide critical
testimony in involuntary act cases feel particular pressure
because their testimony is forced artificially into extremes. For
example, Mark Mahowald, director of the Minnesota Regional
Sleep Disorders Clinic at the Hennepin County Medical Center
in Minneapolis, and one of the country's foremost experts on
sleepwalking violence, refuses to become involved in criminal
cases. 50 4 He claims that the adversarial nature of a trial
necessitates a dichotomous determination in cases where facts
50 5
and circumstances typically "tend to be shaded in gray."
Granted, there are all sorts of line drawing dilemmas
throughout the criminal law. As this Article has contended,
however, the problems with the voluntary act requirement are
particularly troublesome.5 0 6 Where does this leave Scott
Falater under this Article's proposed three-part standard? The
standard provides some latitude in determining how such a
case can be handled and allows an alternative apart from the
forced endpoints that the prosecution and the defense
507
represented.
d. Drug Ingestion:Ilo Grundberg
While somnambulism is the classic involuntary act
defense, there are many other kinds of conditions linked to
involuntariness that illustrate the complexity of these
determinations-ranging from concussion to hypoglycemia to
blackouts. 50 8 The voluntary ingestion of legal, therapeutic,
drugs (apart from alcohol) can constitute a particularly
complicated causal sequence because the condition is at least in
part externally induced (the defendant chooses to consume a
drug).
Some cases, however, like Grundberg v. Upjohn
Company,50 9 seem relatively more straightforward.
On June 19, 1988, Ilo Grundberg, age 57, shot her eightythree-year-old mother eight times in the head, although she
could not explain why. 5 10 The act seemed to be totally
504. Jeff Stryker, Sleepstabbing: The Strange Science of Sleep Behavior
and
One
Verdict:
Guilty!,
SALON.COM,
July
8,
1999,
at

http://www.salon.com/health/ feature/1999/07/08/sleepwalking/index.html.
505. Id.
506. See supra Part III.
507. See supra Part IV.C.I.b.
508. See supra Part III.B-C.
509. 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991).
510.

Steven R. Reed, A Tale of Two Attorneys vs. Drug Halcion; Unlikely
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unmotivated. According to the testimony of a court-appointed
psychiatrist, Grundberg had killed involuntarily because of her
extreme reaction to Halcion, a sleeping pill that she took for
5 12
insomnia. 511 As a result, the state dismissed its charges.
Grundberg then sued Upjohn Company, the manufacturer of
Halcion, for $21 million in a product liability action that settled
513
prior to trial.
The settlement included a confidentiality agreement, so
detailed facts about the case are not known. 5 14 It is known,
however, that Grundberg had been taking Halcion for thirteen
months before she shot and killed her mother; she testified that
she had no memory of the shooting; adverse side effects. to
Halcion increase with length of usage; and by 1987, Upjohn
Company was aware of twenty-four reports of murders,
5 15
attempted murders, and physical threats linked to Halcion.
At the same time, the circumstances in Grundberg's life were
not going well. 51 6 She was taking various medications for
chronic depression and anxiety along with Halcion. 5 17 Her job
loss six months before the murder prompted Grundberg to
move with her mother to Hurricane, Utah, where they lived
together in a mobile home. 5 18 On the day of the murder,
Grundberg consumed Valium and codeine as well as Halcion,
and shot her mother that evening. 51 9 On the basis of facts like
these, her lawyers were able to successfully establish causal
connections between Grundberg's ingestion of Halcion and her

Pair Joined to Win Landmark Case, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 29, 1992, State
Section, at 1.
511. Todd Paul Meyers, Halcion Made Me Do It: New Liability and a New
Defense-Fear and Loathing in the Halcion Paper Chase, 62 U. CIN. L. REV.
603, 611 (1993).
512. Id.
513. Id.; see also Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 90, 104 (stating the facts
surrounding Grundberg's complaint against UpJohn).
514. Grundberg's case has since spurred comparable types of criminal and
civil claims. A year after her settlement, for example, Upjohn was successfully
sued in a Texas civil district court trial in conjunction with another murder
case. See Reed, supra note 510; see also Myers, supra note 511 (examining
civil and criminal litigation in relation to Halcion).
515. Tim Friend, Halcion: Sleep Aid or Nightmare? Doubts Linger on
Effects of Psycho-Drugs, USA TODAY, May 28, 1992, at Al.
516. See Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 104.
517. Id.
518. See id.
519. Id.
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violence. 520
As in the Parks case, the Grundberg case can be seen
through another set of lenses. The facts in Grundberg cut both
ways. For example, if charges against Grundberg had not been
dropped, it is possible that another court could have held that
Grundberg was eligible for the insanity defense or that she
acted voluntarily-in other words, that she was a murderer.
The main purpose of the semi-voluntary act category is to
prevent courts from labeling as insane individuals who do not
show the kind of mental disease or defect that would make
them suitable for commitment under the insanity provision,
and who seem unlikely to engage in recurrent acts, assuming
such acts are even remotely predictable. The category also
prevents people from getting a sentence they may not deserve if
a court determined that they acted voluntarily.
Unlike alcohol, taking therapeutic psychotropic drugs can
often have unforeseeable effects that involve changes in
people's conscious levels of awareness as well as their
circumstances. This Article's proposed three-part requirement
is forward looking in terms of the kinds of cases and conditions
that the legal system can expect to see more of in the future.
For example, psychotropic drugs are now increasingly
prescribed for a vast array of symptoms, including stress. 52' It
is possible that these prescription trends will lead to a surge in
the kinds of cases that would rely on a defense of
unconsciousness or automatism when the effects of these drugs
520. See id.
521. See generally JOSEPH GLENMULLEN, PROZAC BACKLASH: OVERCOMING
THE DANGERS OF PROZAC, ZOLOFT, PAXIL, AND OTHER ANTIDEPRESSANTS WITH

SAFE, EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVES (2000) (presenting a zealous criticism of the

increasing and inappropriate use of Prozac and its pharmacological relatives,
and noting the potential consequences of such use, including violence and
suicide); FRED TEITELBAUM ET AL., 2001 DRUG TREND REPORT 3 (June 2002),
available at http://www.express-scripts.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2002)
(explaining that, between 2000 and 2001, about 37.3% of the 16.9% increase in
drug costs was due to increased utilization and 5.9% due to the introduction of
new drugs in 2001; in turn, nearly "two-thirds of the utilization increase is due
to the use of more prescriptions per utilizer and one-third to more members
using prescription drugs"); Christine Gorman, The Science of Anxiety, TIME,
June 10, 2002, at 46 (discussing the ever-expanding range of drugs used to
treat stress, anxiety, and depression); Mark Olfson et al., National Trends in
the Outpatient Treatment of Depression, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 203, 206-07
(2002) ("The proportion of individuals treated for depression who received a
prescribed psychotropic medication increased from 44.6% in 1987 to 79.4% in
1997," suggesting "an increased emphasis on pharmacologic treatments"
relative to psychotherapy and other treatments).
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are unpredictable or they mix badly with an individual's use of
other drugs.
e.

Brain Cyst: Herbert Weinstein

People v. Weinstein522 illustrates the conceptual overlap
between an involuntary act and the insanity defense. 523 In
1991, Herbert Weinstein, a 64-year-old semi-retired advertising
executive, was charged with second-degree murder for killing
his wife after she scratched his face during an argument about
their children. 524 Weinstein strangled his wife and then threw
525
her body out the window so that it would look like a suicide.
Results of a positron emission tomography (PET) scan and skin
conductance response tests indicated the existence of both a
frontal lobe arachnoid cyst and metabolic imbalances in
Weinstein's brain 526-evidence
that the court considered
reasonable in making a diagnosis of insanity. 527 According to
Weinstein's attorneys, Weinstein suffered from organic cerebral
defects that impaired his judgment during periods of stress; in
this case, the stress occurred when his wife scratched his face
5 28
during a heated dispute.
Weinstein was believed to be the first case in which a court
rendered admissible at trial testimony concerning the results of
PET scans to determine a defendant's insanity. 529 Another
facet of Weinstein's insanity defense rested on Antonio
Damasio's application of his "somatic marker theory" to
Weinstein. 530 Damasio is a renowned neuroscientist who has

522. 591 N.Y.S.2d 715 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
523. Daniel A. Martell, Causal Relation Between Brain Damage and
Homicide: The Prosecution, in 1 SEMINARS IN CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHIATRY
184, 186-87 (1996); Norman Relkin et al., Impulsive Homicide Associated With
an Arachnoid Cyst and UnilateralFrontotemporalCerebral Dysfunction, in 1
SEMINARS IN CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHIATRY, supra, at 179.
524. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Martell, supra note 523, at 184.
525. Relkin, supra note 523, at 173.
526. See Zachery Weiss, The Legal Admissibility of Positron Emission
Tomography Scans in Criminal Cases: People v. Spyder Cystkopf, in 1
SEMINARS IN CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHIATRY, supra note 523, at 203.
527. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 723-24 (finding that the PET and skin

conductance response test results passed the relevant test of admissibility).
528. Cerisse Anderson, Brain Scan Deemed Admissible at Trial: Guilty
Plea Follows Insanity Defense Ruling, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 20, 1992, at 1.

529. Id. But cf Weiss, supra note 526, at 206 (stating that in California
courts PET scans have been admitted in at least 11 previous murder cases).
530. Martell, supra note 523, at 186.
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published widely on consciousness disorders. 531
According to Damasio's theory, some individuals with
frontal lobe damage (like Weinstein) fail to "mark" with
accurate emotional signals those behaviors that are socially
acceptable, even though they are able to conceptualize a broad
range of acceptable behaviors. 532 Without these markers to
guide them, they cannot select the correct way to respond to a
particular situation when considering a choice of suitable
response options. 533 Presumably, Weinstein failed to screen out
selectively competing unconscious thoughts, which in turn
impaired his emotional and behavioral responses. 534 As
Damasio stated in his report for the Weinstein case,
The assault and killing of [Weinstein's] second wife constitutes a
radical departure from his usual comportment. We think it is
probably significant that this behavior came in response to an equally
unusual event, i.e., the fact that his wife attacked him physically by
scratching his face. Confronted with an unusual provocation he was
unable to select the most appropriate response option.
It is
reasonable to assume that his inability to respond correctly is part of
the same defect that so limits his emotional and psychophysiological
responses, and also that such a defect is due to his long-standing
neurological condition.535

Weinstein also could have claimed that he really did not
act at all-"that intense rage produced a dissociative state of
automatism."536
Most states of consciousness have an
emotional component that is capable of totally taking over
awareness. Individuals feeling blind rage may not consciously
experience their emotional memory, even during acts of
531. See supra notes 235-41 and accompanying text.
532.

ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND

THE HUMAN BRAIN 173-75 (1994); Damasio et al., supra note 236, at 82.
533. Damasio et al., supra note 236, at 82. Damasio describes his "somatic
marker" theory as follows: "Because [such individuals] are deprived of a
natural qualifying marker, they must depend instead on a reasoned costbenefit analysis of numerous and often conflictual options (involving both
immediate and future consequences). The adequacy and the speed of response
selection are degraded accordingly." Id.
534. See supra Part II.D.3-5 (discussing the overlap of conscious and
unconscious processes and their impact on an individual's behavior).
535. Martell, supra note 523, at 187.
536. Stephen J. Morse, Brain and Blame, 84 GEO. L.J. 527, 541 n.28
(1996); see also Stephen J. Morse, Brain and Blame, in 1 SEMINARS IN
CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHIATRY, supra note 523, at 231 (stating that "impulsivity

is one sensible and less jargony' term to characterize the problem of people
with somatic marking deficits"); Relkin et al., supra note 523, at 179
(characterizing Weinstein as acting in a "reflexively aggressive manner" when
killing his wife).
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murder. 537
The Weinstein case can be viewed in yet another way,
however, which is consistent with this Article's three-part
requirement. While Weinstein's acts and the circumstances
surrounding them were brutal, his character appeared strong
on many levels. For example, corroborated evidence indicated
that Weinstein had no record of violent behavior or indeed any
kind of psychiatric disturbance or illness. He did not drink to
excess or use illegal drugs, even before (he claimed) the
argument with his wife. Apart from some insignificant memory
loss (e.g., his failure to remember telephone numbers),
Weinstein had a clean bill of mental heath and was also
a full sex life
financially solvent. In turn, he and his wife had
5 38
without, apparently, extramarital relationships.
At the same time, a number of Weinstein's decisions and
behaviors were questionable. Immediately after he killed his
wife, Weinstein undertook a series of steps to make his wife's
death resemble a suicide. He threw her body out of the
changed and
window, scoured and cleansed the murder scene,
539
discarded his bloody clothes, and washed up.
Interviews with family members also indicated that
Weinstein, like Parks, had a gambling problem that caused him
serious debt. 540 Although Weinstein's wife kept a substantial
amount of money from a prior marriage, she refused to give
Weinstein money to gamble.5 4' Indeed, in the weeks before her
death, Weinstein attempted to convince his wife to become
One psychiatrist
involved with the Hemlock Society. 542
considered this attempt "significant [because Weinstein] staged
the crime scene to look like his wife had committed suicide."5 43
In addition, Weinstein reportedly assisted in his first wife's
suicide (she was terminally ill) and proposed aiding the suicide
of his father-in-law.5 44 Lastly, Weinstein showed little remorse

537.

See TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 30.

538. Relkin et al., supra note 523, at 173-74.
539.
540.

Martell, supra note 523, at 184.
Id. at 193; see also supra note 465 and accompanying text (discussing

541.

Martell, supra note 523, at 193.

Kenneth Parks's problems with gambling).

542. Id. at 192 (noting that Weinstein's records "showed appointments with
the Hemlock Society, a group devoted to suicide, in the weeks before his wife's
murder").
543. Id.
544. Id. at 193.
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for his wife's death 545 and started dating within months after
the incident; indeed, he remarried right before commencing his
prison sentence of seven to twenty-one years. 546 Ultimately,
Weinstein pled guilty under a plea bargain with the district
5 47
attorney and was convicted of first-degree manslaughter.
Under this Article's three-part analysis, a key issue would
be whether Weinstein's behavior could constitute a threat to
the safety or welfare of the community. While most arachnoid
cysts are congenital-suggesting that Weinstein had the cyst
since birth- 548 they "are not usually considered to be lesions
that promote abnormal aggression." 549 Rather, large cysts, like
Weinstein's, are associated with a range of relatively benign
complaints, such as headaches, dizziness, or mental
5 50
impairments; some people have no symptoms whatsoever.
Until Weinstein killed his wife, he showed no overt symptoms
linked to the cyst, apart from a period at age 22 when he had
two months of headaches with an unexplained cause.5 5 1 He
also has not committed additional acts of violence while serving
his prison sentence.5 52 Alternatively, some evidence indicates
that Weinstein could be a danger. Weinstein's cyst expanded
during his adult life, suggesting it may be a factor in later life
problems. 553 While in prison, he may not confront the kinds of
"novel and threatening" environments that apparently
contributed to his violence toward his wife. 554 How would
Weinstein act upon release when he is in a less controlled
environment? The public may lose confidence in a criminal

545.

Relkin et al., supra note 523, at 175.

546. Id. at 174.
547. Martell, supra note 523, at 193.
548. Id. at 184.
549. Relkin et al., supra note 523, at 172; see also Martell, supra note 523,
at 184 (describing Weinstein's cyst as rather "typical," and noting that in
many cases similar kinds of cysts will go undetected throughout a person's
life).
550. Relkin et al., supra note 523, at 172. While these are minor
complaints, other more serious complaints from cysts include "multiple
sclerosis-like sensorimotor impairments and epilepsy." Id.
551. Id. at 173.
552. Id. at 174. This information is accurate as of 1996. Id.
553. Id. at 177-78 (noting that tests performed on Weinstein following his
arrest showed a three centimeter shift of the left middle cerebral artery (MCA)
relative to the right MCA as compared to an angiogram given in 1948 which
showed a normally configured MCA, thereby indicating "indirect evidence of
the cyst's ...

enlargement" later in Weinstein's life).

554. See id. at 179.
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justice system if Weinstein was acquitted and committed
violence again.
Weinstein's background of neurological disorders and
compulsive gambling indicates that he could be dangerous in
the future, despite his age and history of nonviolence. This
Article's new semi-voluntary classification offers an alternative
to the insanity defense as well as the suggestion that Weinstein
acted voluntarily. For example, Norman Relkin, a behavioral
neurologist who conducted a range of tests on Weinstein,
contended
that Weinstein's
"volitional freedom was
compromised by the cyst,"555 in ways that affected his conscious
awareness and ability to "know" what he was doing. 556 As
Relkin explained, "[a]n important step in the process of
'knowing' is disturbed in such patients, relating to the
perception of 'gut feelings' and their integration with other
components of conscious experience." 557 This assertion does not
suggest complete involuntariness on Weinstein's part; nor does
it necessarily indicate insanity. The semi-voluntary category
offers a compromise between the two, relying on the new
consciousness research.
Of course, not everyone agrees with Relkin's assessment of
Weinstein.
Others suggest that the cyst could not have
contributed to Weinstein's violence. 558 Classifying Weinstein's
behavior as semi-voluntary, however, offers an alterative to an
unqualified acquittal as well as to the insanity defense if there
is agreement that he did not act voluntarily.

f.

Encephalitis:PeterBradley

Peter Bradley's unconsciousness defense derived from his
infliction with encephalitis, a very rare viral infection that
555.

Richard M. Restak, Brain Damage and Legal Responsibility, in 1

SEMINARS IN CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHIATRY, supra note 523, at 170 (1996).
556. Relkin et al., supra note 523, at 181.
557. Id.

558. See Samuel Jan Brakel et al., Neuropsychiatry at the Courtroom
Gates: Selective Entry or Anything Goes?, in

1 SEMINARS IN CLINICAL

NEUROPSYCHIATRY, supranote 523, at 220 (stating that there appears to be no
"scientific consensus on the relationship if any between PET scan patterns and

criminal tendencies"); Martell, supra note 523, at 188 (emphasizing that there
is an overall lack of data on the relationship between PET findings and
violence); Helen S. Mayberg, Medical-Legal Interferences from Functional
Neuroimaging Evidence, in 1 SEMINARS IN CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHIATRY,

supra note 523, at 198 (noting that "the sensitivity and specificity of... PET
to identify cause-specific abnormalities has not been determined, nor have
clear correlations with specific clinical findings been described").
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causes inflammation of the brain. 559
Left untreated, the disorder
can lead to brain damage or death.
After Bradley boarded a commercial plane on March 16,
2000, his medical condition purportedly fueled his attempt to
interfere with flight crew members and attendants. 560 While in
flight, Bradley created a disturbance when he made frequent
trips to the bathroom, 561 began taking off his clothes, wandered
from seat to seat, and muttered incoherent nonsense. 562 When
he finally did obey attendants and sat in the first class section
563
of the plane, he began threatening to kill other passengers.
He then tried and failed to open an exit door. 564 Bradley's
disruptions did not stop there, however. He broke open the
cockpit door and attempted to gain access to the throttle and
fuel controls.5 6 5 Bradley's efforts were thwarted when other
passengers wrestled him and the co-pilot restrained him with
plastic ties.566 When the flight landed, it was met by police who
5 67
whisked Bradley to the local hospital.
After weeks of research, the prosecution and defense
agreed that Bradley's seemingly motiveless attack was caused
by an "extremely rare reaction to encephalitis." 568 According to
the consulted neurologists, Bradley acted "in a delirious state"
that he did nothing to provoke. 569 He had no traces of drugs or
alcohol in his blood, and his only medication was for high blood
pressure. 570 Bradley's actions made no sense to lawyers and
559.

AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts, Attorney's Illustrated Medical Dictionary

E20 (2002); ANDREW W. COLMAN, A DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 242 (2001).

560. Bob Egelko, U.S. Willing to Drop Charges in Jet Attack: Passenger
Threatened Crew While Ill, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 19, 2000, at A26.
561. Dave Birkland & Lynda V. Mapes, Passengers Hailed in Midair
Fracas:Help in Subduing Man May Have Saved Alaska Jet, Official Says,
SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 18, 2000, at A15, available at 2000 WL 5526394.
562. Mary Ann Lickteig, Mental Exam Orderedfor Man Who Went Berserk
on Alaska Flight, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, available at http://seattlepi.

nwsource.com/local/flyl8.shtml (Sept. 14, 2002).
563. Egelko, supra note 560, at A26.
564. Birkland & Mapes, supra note 561, at A5.
565. Egelko, supra note 560, at A26.
566. Licktieg, supra note 562.
567. Id.
568. Kim Curtis, Encephalitis, Not Air Rage: Prosecutors and Defense
Agree, ABCNEWS.COM, Oct. 20, 2000, at http://abcnews.go.comlsections/travel/
DailyNews/ cockpitattackOO1020.html.

569. Id.
570.

Nathan Odgaard, Blue Springs Man Charged with Interfering with

Flight,EXAMINER NEWS, Mar. 20, 2000, at http://examiner.nettstories/032000/
newnew30001.shtml (Sept. 14, 2002).
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doctors, nor to friends and family who knew him well. He had
no record of mental or behavioral problems and no history of
57 1
drug or alcohol abuse.
Doctors seeking potential explanations for Bradley's
behavior were alerted to the possibility of viral encephalitis
when they noted that his spinal fluid had an unusually high
protein count.572
Bradley's encephalitis would have been
exacerbated by lack of sleep, headaches, hypertension
medication, and changing air pressure-conditions to which
Bradley was subjected at the time of his threatening
behavior. 573 Experts have commented, however, that "agitated
delirium" is a very rare reaction to encephalitis; "lethargy and
confusion" are far more frequent responses. 574 According to
Bradley's attorney, the encephalitic delirium made Bradley
unconscious during his actions, and his case merited
575
dismissal.
Bradley was indicted by a federal grand jury on the felony
charges of "assaulting a flight crew member and committing an
act of violence that was likely to endanger others on the
plane." 576 Eight months after the incident occurred, federal
prosecutors agreed to dismiss the charges as long as Bradley
remained under court supervision through an eighteen-month
pretrial diversion program. 577 Prosecutors noted that jurors
would be hesitant to convict Bradley at trial since the expert
psychiatrists involved in this case uniformly stated that
Bradley had been "either medically unconscious or temporarily
insane." 578 The court, while expressing reservations, agreed to
abide by the decision of the court's pretrial services office, and
Bradley was subsequently admitted to the diversion
5 79
program.
This final determination for Bradley is conceptually
consistent with this Article's new semi-voluntary act category.
The court did not need to turn to the insanity defense's mental
571.
572.
573.
574.
575.

Curtis, supra note 568.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

576.

Egelko, supra note 560, at A26.

577.

Id.

578. Id.
579. See Eric Brazil, Air Rage: Berserk Passenger Tries to Crash British
747, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 29, 2000, at Al, available at 2000 WL 6501284.
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disease or defect model (and institutionalization for Bradley) to
preclude a dismissal. However, because Bradley was harmful,
even in a non-blameworthy way, the public may feel more
confident in the criminal justice system knowing that Bradley
was in some kind of pretrial diversion program. This type of
resolution illustrates the practical and justice-seeking appeal of
a three-part standard.
3. The Diversity and Range of Semi-Voluntary Acts
This Article's three-part requirement provides some middle
ground for the criminal justice system. It offers a compromise
sanction for behavior that, under the current system, warrants
dispositions ranging anywhere from outright acquittal to the
death penalty.
The three-part requirement also can apply in a variety of
other circumstances, including those cases that push the "outer
edge" of what can be considered involuntary. In Torsney v.
Gold,5 80 for example, a psychomotor epilepsy defense was used
on behalf of the defendant police officer, Robert Torsney, who
had shot and killed a fifteen-year-old boy without provocation
or justification. Torsney was found not guilty by reason of
mental disease or defect for second-degree murder based upon
evidence that his impulsive shooting was attributable to
epilepsy. 58' However, rather shockingly, Torsney was released
from institutionalization shortly after his commitment because
doctors determined that he was symptom free and had never
shown signs of epilepsy.5 82 While there were conditions
attached to Torsney's release-including the stipulation that
his release could be revoked and a court could recommit him if
he were a danger to others 583-Torsney
could never be
prosecuted for the murder. At the same time, there was
evidence that Torsney showed many signs of impulsivity and
personal instability, 584 and the black community 585 and
580. 394 N.E.2d 262 (N.Y. 1979). For an excellent account of the Torsney
case, see WILLIAM J. WINSLADE & JUDITH WILSON Ross, THE INSANITY PLEA
133-58 (1983).

581.

Torsney, 394 N.E.2d at 263-64; WINSLADE & ROSS, supra note 580, at

141.
582. Torsney, 394 N.E.2d at 268; WINSLADE & ROSS, supra note 580, at
143-56.
583. Torsney, 394 N.E.2d at 263-64.

584. Id. at 274-75 (Wachtler, J., dissenting); WINSLADE & ROSS, supra note
580, at 145.
585. WINSLADE & ROSS, supra note 580, at 143 (noting that "[tihe black
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appellate court judges 586 greeted his release with "outrage."
The outcry was understandable. If Torsney's conduct had been
classified as semi-voluntary instead, this new category would
have been a far more accurate appraisal of his condition than
insanity.
Another unconsciousness defense that lies on the fringe of
science relates to the increasing study of multiple personality
disorder (MPD). 587 Elyn Saks suggests that the same legal
reasoning that allows for the successful use of an
unconsciousness defense in sleepwalking cases should apply to
individuals suffering from MPD. Both a sleepwalker and an
altered personality of an MPD individual act with knowledge
and intent while carrying out complex criminal behaviors. 588
Courts acquit individuals for crimes committed while
sleepwalking because the sleepwalkers' "ordinary, waking
selves do not govern their actions." 58 9 Likewise, Saks claims
that because the altered personalities (e.g., "A" and "B") are
different in the mind of the individual with MPD, "personality
A" cannot understand or control the behavior of "personality
B." Therefore, personality A cannot be punished for any
criminal acts that personality B may cause. 590 While there are
no set legal precedents for the courts to follow in MPD cases,
some courts find that evidence of MPD alone merits acquittal.
Yet other courts investigate the mental state of each individual
altered personality ("A" and "B"), or only the altered
personality believed to have committed the crime (for example,
only "B"). 59 1

community was outraged" when upon Torsney's release, his attorney stated

his plans to file for disability based on Torsney's mental illness).
586. Id. at 147 (stating that the appellate court judges were "appalled" and
expressed "outrage" over the arguments requesting Torsney's release).
587. See generally IAN HACKING, REWRITING THE SOUL: MULTIPLE
PERSONALITY AND THE SCIENCES OF MEMORY (1995) (discussing recent and

historical studies of MPD); MARTHA STOUT, THE MYTH OF SANITY: DIVIDED
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PROMISE OF AWARENESS (2001) (describing multiple
personality disorder and other dissociative disorders).
588. ELYN R. SAKS & STEPHEN H. BEHNKE, JEKYLL ON TRIAL: MULTIPLE
PERSONALITY DISORDER AND CRIMINAL LAW 693 (1997); Elyn R. Saks,
Multiple Personality Disorder and Criminal Responsibility, 25 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 383, 435 (1992); see also Sherry F. Colb, The Three Faces of Evil, 86 GEO.
L.J. 677, 683 (1998) (reviewing ELYN R. SAKS & STEPHEN H. BEHNKE, JEKYLL
ON TRIAL: MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER AND CRIMINAL LAW (1997)).
589. Saks, supra note 588, at 435.
590. Id.
591. Id. at 386-87.
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The focus on such relatively exotic conditions 592 should not
downplay the applicability of an unconsciousness defense to
more traditional kinds of conditions. Parts II and III of this
Article indicated how wide ranging such conditions can be and
how often they can be classified under the umbrella of insanity
when semi-voluntariness would be more appropriate. Scientific
research continues to show the increasing complexity of human
behavior and thought.5 93 It seems only reasonable and just
that the criminal law should reflect these discoveries, within, of
course, the practical bounds of the criminal justice system.
Incorporating consciousness research should make
attorneys knowledgeable of the kinds of involuntariness
defenses they can and should be offering their clients,
particularly in high stakes cases involving a potential death
penalty. A striking illustration of such attorney ignorance is
the case of Tracy Housel, an American with British citizenship
who was recently executed. 594 It was not until years after
Housel's 1986 conviction and death sentence that Harvard
doctors and endocrinologists working for his appeal discovered
that Housel suffered from a rare form of hypoglycemia. The
condition induced blackouts and mood swings for much of
Housel's life when his blood sugar was low.5 95 There is some
evidence that Housel's medical condition could have
contributed to the murders he committed.5 96 It is not known
whether introducing such evidence at Housel's trial would have
had any impact. However, it most definitely would have
enabled jurors to view the case in an alternative way fitting
with the protective purpose of the criminal law's voluntary act
requirement.
D. CONSCIOUSNESS AND CULPABILITY

The contributions of consciousness research could
enlighten many other aspects of the criminal law, most

592. See SAKS & BEHNKE, supra note 589, at 8 (stating that MPD affects
between 0.1 and 1 % of the population).
593. See supra Part II.D.
594. Matthew Engel, Briton on Death Row Executed, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Mar. 13, 2002, at A7, LEXIS, News Library, Guardian File; David
Rose, Mother's Last-Ditch Clemency Plea for Briton on Death Row, THE
OBSERVER (London), Feb. 10, 2002, at A10, LEXIS, News Library; Observer
File.
595. Rose, supra note 594.
596. Id.
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particularly interpretations of mens rea standards if the focus
turned to voluntary acts. 597 For example, the MPC requires
that a person acting purposely have as their conscious object5 to
98
engage in a certain kind of conduct or cause a certain result.
What should conscious object mean in light of the new
consciousness research?
The more challenging analysis with consciousness research
involves the MPC's knowledge requirement. A person acts
knowingly, for example, when "he is aware that it is practically
certain that his conduct will cause" a particular result.5 99 What
should the term "awareness" mean in this context? If there is
really very little that people are aware of, at least consciously,
how should we conceptualize such a standard? The terms
"purposely" and "conscious object, '600 as well as the terms
"recklessly" and "consciously disregards," 60 1 appear to be
relatively more straightforward because they require explicitly
some degree of conscious thought. Likewise, the "negligence"
standard of "should be aware" 60 2 is based on people's normative
expectations of what they anticipate from others.
Yet, all the mens rea terms are vague. Questions about
these definitions show that mens rea is simply an attempt to
legally classify the workings of the human mind.
Consciousness research can help make this effort more
accurate.
The research findings also suggest the potential for looking
at other MPC provisions differently-attempt, for example-or
the remaining inchoate crimes, because there is relatively less
conduct by which to gauge liability and more emphasis on the
defendant's mental state. This approach also applies to other
crimes or aggravating factors dependent on the defendant's
mental state, such as bias crimes. Encouraging a paradigm
shift in the criminal law is less a goal of such examinations
than is the continual need to reassess and update doctrines
that have a life-altering impact on those coming through the
criminal justice system.

597. See generally Denno, supra note 442.
598. MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 21, § 2.02, at 225 (emphasis

added).
599.
600.
601.
602.

Id. § 2.02(2)(b) (emphasis added).
Id. § 2.02(2)(a).
Id. § 2.02(2)(c).
Id. § 2.02(d).
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CONCLUSION
This Article examined the criminal law's voluntary act
requirement, particularly in the context of the MPC, which
leaves the work of defining voluntariness to the courts.
Generally, courts have adopted the terms "unconsciousness"
and "automatism" to correspond, respectively, to the voluntary
act requirement's mens rea and actus reus crime elements.
Discussion showed how the MPC's voluntary act requirement
reflects the Freudian psychoanalytic conception of a
conscious/unconscious dichotomy, which was a familiar way to
view the world in the 1900s. Although the MPC's voluntary act
provision was impressively progressive at the time of the
MPC's inception in 1962, it no longer reflects the MPC's goal of
infusing modern interdisciplinary sciences into the law. This
Article concludes that there appears to be no acceptable
scientific rationale for a voluntary act dichotomy because
consciousness and unconsciousness range along a continuum.
After reviewing selected aspects of the new consciousness
research, this Article examined how the voluntary act
requirement conflicts conceptually and substantively with
other key criminal law defenses, primarily insanity. The issue
is troublesome because courts may adjudicate like individuals
differently based upon their confused comprehension of these
defenses and the science that underlies them.
After
considering possible solutions to this dilemma, this Article
proposed that the voluntary act requirement should be
substantially simplified and constitute three parts: (1)
voluntary acts, (2) involuntary acts, and (3) semi-voluntary
acts. The third category of semi-voluntary acts takes cases
from the first two categories under the presumption that
current criminal law paradigms are both too harsh and too
lenient, depending on the type of person being adjudicated.
This Article offered no recommendations concerning how these
three-part categories should be handled procedurally because
that topic, while very important, is fodder for a much larger
inquiry than can be handled here.
This Article showed that consciousness research can be
consciousness-raising. It makes us aware of the inadequacies
in our legal paradigms and some of the ways they can be
rectified and modernized. Perhaps, with time, it will make us
more fully aware of the ways individuals suffer because of
them.
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APPENDIX
Voluntary Act Requirements in State Statutes: Then and Now
EXPLICIT VOLUNTARY ACT REQUIREMENT

State6 03

Alabama

State code
or
proposed
state code
provision
explicitly
requiring a
voluntary
act, as of
1979604

ALA. CODE
§§ 13A-21(2), 3
(1994)

Current state
code
provision
explicitly
requiring a
voluntary act
Current state
code
provision
defining a
voluntary act
(if statute
contains such
a provision)
ALA. CODE
§ 13A-2-3
(1994)

ALA. CODE
§ 13A-2-1(2)
(1994)

Statutory language of
current state code
provision explicitly
requiring a voluntary act
Statutory language of
current state code
provision defining a
voluntary act (if statute
contains such a
provision)
The minimum requirement
for criminal liability is the
performance by a person of
conduct which includes a
voluntary act or the
omission to perform an act
which he is physically
capable of performing.
VOLUNTARY ACT. An act
performed consciously as a
result of effort or
determination, and such
term includes the
possession of property if the
actor was aware of his
physical possession or
control thereof for a
sufficient time to have been
able to terminate it.

603. This Appendix compares the voluntary act requirement statutes and
proposed codes existing on January 1, 1979, with state statutes in effect on
January 1, 2001. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
604. The 1979 information is based on MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra
note 21, § 2.01 cmt. 1 at 218 n.14. With a few exceptions, research collected in
the Model Penal Code Commentaries ended on January 1, 1979. Id. at 214
n.t.
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EXPLICIT VOLUNTARY ACT REQUIREMENT
Arizona

ARIZ.

REV.
STAT.
ANN. §§

13105(32)
to -201
(West
2001)

Arkansas

ARK.
CODE
ANN. §

41202(1)
(Michie
1977)
Colorado

ARIZ. REV.
STAT.
ANN. § 13201 (West
2001)

The minimum requirement for
criminal liability is the performance
by a person of conduct which
includes a voluntary act or the
omission to perform a duty imposed
by law which the person is
physically capable of performing.

ARIZ. REV.
STAT.
ANN. § 13105(37)
(West
2001)

'Voluntary act" means a bodily
movement performed consciously
and as a result of effort and
determination.

ARK.
CODE

A person does not commit an
offense unless his liability is based
on conduct that includes a

§ 52-204(a)
(Michie
1997)
ANN.

voluntary act or the omission to
perform an act which he is
physically capable of performing.

COLO.
REV.
STAT. §§

COLO.
REV.
STAT. §

18-1501(9),
-502
(West
2001)

The minimum requirement for
criminal liability is the performance
by a person of conduct which

18-1-502
(West
2001)

includes a voluntary act or the
omission to perform an act which
he is physically capable of
performing.

COLO.
REV.
STAT.
ANN. § 181-501(9)
(West
2001)

"Voluntary act" means an act
performed consciously as a result of
effort or determination, and
includes the possession of property
if the actor was aware of his
physical possession or control
thereof for a sufficient period to
have been able to terminate it.
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EXPLICIT VOLUNTARY ACT REQUIREMENT
Delaware

DEL.

CODE
ANN. tit.
11, §§

242-43
(2001)

Hawaii

HAW.
REV.
STAT. §§
702-200,
-201
(1976)
(amended

DEL.
CODE
ANN. tit.
11, § 242
(2001)

A person is not guilty of an offense
unless liability is based on conduct
which includes a voluntary act or
the omission to perform an act
which the person is physically
capable of performing.

DEL.
CODE
ANN. tit.
11, § 243
(2001)

"Voluntary act" means a bodily
movement performed consciously or
habitually as a result of effort or
determination, and includes
possession if the defendant
knowingly procured or received the
thing possessed or was aware of the
defendant's control thereof for a
sufficient period to have been able
to terminate possession.

HAW.
REV.
STAT.
ANN. §
702-201
(1993)

In any prosecution it is a defense
that the conduct alleged does not
include a voluntary act or the
voluntary omission to perform an
act of which the defendant is
physically capable.

1986)

Illinois

ILL.
COMP.
STAT.
ANN. §§
4-1, -2
(West
1972 &
Supp.

"Voluntary act" means a bodily
movement performed consciously or
habitually as the result of the effort
or determination of the defendant.
ILL.
COMP.
STAT.
ANN. 5/41 (West
1993)

A material element of every offense
is a voluntary act, which includes
an omission to perform a duty
which the law imposes on the
offender and which he is physically
capable of performing.

1988)
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EXPLICIT VOLUNTARY ACT REQUIREMENT
Indiana

IND.
CODE
ANN. § 341-2-1(a)
(Michie
1979)

IND. CODE
ANN. § 3541-2-1(a)
(Michie
1998)

A person commits an offense only if
he voluntarily engages in conduct
in violation of the statute defining
the offense. However, a person who
omits to perform an act commits an
offense only if he has a statutory,
common law, or contractual duty to
perform the act.

Kentucky

KY. REV.
STAT.
ANN. §§
501.010
(3),
.030(1)

KY. REV.
STAT.
ANN. §
501.030(1)
(Michie
1999)

A person is not guilty of a criminal
offense unless... [h]e has engaged
in conduct which includes a
voluntary act or the omission to
perform a duty which the law
imposes upon him and which he is
physically capable of performing.

(Michie

Maine

1975)

Ky. REV.
STAT.
ANN. §
501.010(3)
(Michie
1999)

"Voluntary act" means a bodily
movement performed consciously as
a result of effort or determination
and includes the possession of
property if the actor was aware of
his physical possession or control
thereof for a sufficient period to
have been able to terminate it.

ME. REV.
STAT.
ANN. tit.
17-A, §
51
(repealed
1981)

ME. REV.
STAT.
ANN. tit.
170A, §31
(West
1983)

A person commits a crime only if he
engages in voluntary conduct.
Voluntary conduct includes an act
or voluntary omission. See also
State v. Case, 672 A.2d 586, 589
(Me. 1996) (holding that to
constitute voluntary conduct for
which a person could be held
criminally liable, the "act must be
the result of an exercise of
defendant's conscious choice to
perform [it], and not the result of
reflex, convulsion, or other act over
which the person has no control"
(alteration in original)).
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EXPLICIT VOLUNTARY ACT REQUIREMENT
Missouri

Montana

Mo.
ANN.
STAT. §
562.011
(West
1999)

Mo. ANN.
STAT. §
562.011(1)
(West
1999)
Mo. ANN.
STAT. §
562.011(2)
(West
1999)

MONT.
CODE
ANN. §§
45-2101(25),
-202
(1979)

MONT.
CODE
ANN. § 452-202
(2001)

MONT.
CODE

ANN. § 452-101(32)
(2001)

New
Hampshire

N.H.
REV.

New Jersey

ANN. §
626:1(I)
(1996)
N.J.

STAT.

STAT.

ANN. §
2C:21(a)
(2001)

N.H. REV.
STAT.
ANN. §
626: 1(I)
(1996)
N.J. STAT.
ANN. §
2C:2-1(a)
(West
1995)
N.J. STAT.
ANN. §
2C:2-1(a)
(West
1995)

A person is not guilty of an offense
unless his liability is based on
conduct which includes a voluntary
act.
A "voluntary act" is
(1) A bodily movement performed
while conscious as a result of effort
or determination; or
(2) An omission to perform an act of
which the actor is physically
capable.
A material element of every offense
is a voluntary act, which includes
an omission to perform a duty
which the law imposes on the
offender and which he is physically
capable of performing, except for
deliberate homicide under 45-5102(1)(b) for which there must be a
voluntary act only as to the
underlying felony.
An "involuntary act" means an act
that is: (a) a reflex or convulsion;
(b) a bodily movement during
unconsciousness or sleep; (c)
conduct during hypnosis or
resulting from hypnotic suggestion;
or (d) a bodily movement that
otherwise is not a product of the
effort or determination of the actor,
either conscious or habitual.
A person is not guilty of an offense
unless his criminal liability is
based on conduct that includes a
voluntary act or the voluntary
omission to perform an act of which
he is physically capable.
A person is not guilty of an offense
unless his liability is based on
conduct which includes a voluntary
act or the omission to perform an
act of which he is physically
capable.
A bodily movement that is not a
product of the effort or
determination of the actor, either
conscious or habitual, is not a
voluntary act within the meaning
of this section.
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EXPLICIT VOLUNTARY ACT REQUIREMENT
New
York

N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§
15.00(2), 15.10
(McKinney
1998)

N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 15.10
(McKinney
1998)

N.Y. PENAL
LAW §
15.00(2)
(McKinney
1998)

Ohio

I.

OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§
2901.21(A)(1),
(C)(2)
(Andersen
2000)

I4.
OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §

2901.21(A)(1)
(Andersen
2000)
OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §

Oregon

OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 161.085(2),
.095(1) (1983)

2901.21(D)(2)
(definition of
involuntary
60 5
act)
(Andersen
(2000)
OR. REV.
STAT. §
161.095(1)
(2001)

OR. REV.
STAT. §
161.085(2)
(2001)

The minimal requirement for
criminal liability is the
performance by a person of
conduct which includes a
voluntary act or the omission to
perform an act which he is
physically capable of
performing.
"Voluntary act" means a bodily
movement performed
consciously as a result of effort
or determination, and includes
the possession of property if the
actor was aware of his physical
possession or control thereof for
a sufficient period to have been
able to terminate it.
[A] person is not guilty of an
offense unless ... (1) The
person's liability is based on
conduct that includes either a
voluntary act, or an omission to
perform an act or duty that the
nerson is canable of nerforming.
person is canable of performing
Reflexes, convulsions, body
movements during
unconsciousness or sleep, and
body movements that are not
otherwise a product of the
actor's volition, are involuntary
acts.
The minimal requirement for
criminal liability is the
performance by a person of
conduct which includes a
voluntary act or the omission to
perform an act which the person
is capable of performing.
"Voluntary act" means a bodily
movement performed
consciously and includes the
conscious possession or control
of property.

605. This provision describes bodily movements that are not voluntary.
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EXPLICIT VOLUNTARY ACT REQUIREMENT
Pennsylvania

PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN.
§ 301(a)
(West 1998)

PA.
CONS.
STAT.
ANN. §
301(a)
(West
1998)

A person is not guilty of an
offense unless his liability is
based on conduct which includes
a voluntary act or the omission
to perform an act of which he is
physically capable.

Texas

TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN.
§ 6.01(a)
(Vernon
1974 &
Supp. 1994)

A person commits an offense
only if he voluntarily engages in
conduct, including an act, an
omission, or possession.

Utah

UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 761-601(1), -2101(1)
(1978)
(amended
1983)

TEX.
PENAL
CODE
ANN. §
6.01(a)
(Vernon
1994 &
Supp.
1994)
UTAH
CODE
ANN. §
76-2101(1)
(1999)

UTAH
CODE
ANN. §
76-1601(1)
(1999)

No person is guilty of an offense
unless his conduct is prohibited
by law and: (1) He acts
intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, with criminal
negligence, or with a mental
state otherwise specified in the
statute defining the offense, as
the definition of the offense
I requires.
"Act" means a voluntary bodily
movement and includes speech.

HeinOnline -- 87 Minn. L. Rev. 395 2002-2003

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:269

NO EXPLICIT VOLUNTARY ACT REQUIREMENT

State

Connecticut
Florida
Iowa

Minnesota
Nebraska

Likely location of
voluntary act
requirement
if state
Seurement
pro
sa
code
or proposal, as
of 1979,
hadre
contained such a
requirement
CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-3, -5 (West
1972)
FLA. STAT. ch. 775
(1979) (Definitions;
General Penalties)
IOWA CODE ANN. chs.
701-02 (West 1979)
MINN. STAT. § 609.02
(1972) (Criminal Code;
Definitions)
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28109 (23) (Supp. 1978)

New Mexico

N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 30
(Michie 1978)

North
Dakota

N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-02-01(1) (1997)

Virginia

VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.21 to -17 (Michie 1975)

Washington

WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. ch. 9A.08 (West
1977)

Wisconsin

WIS. STAT. ANN. §§
939.01-.23 (1958 &
Supp. 1981)
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22101 to -109 (West 1967
& Supps. 1970, 1979)

District of
Columbia

Likely location of voluntary
Lkl oaino
outr
act requirement if current
code were to contain such a
u em n
requirement
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-3,
-5 (West 2001) (Definitions;
Criminal Liability)
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.01-.25
(West 2000 & Supp. 2002)
(Definitions; General Penalties)
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 687-747
(West 1993 & Supp. 2002)
(Criminal Law, General
Provisions and Definitions)
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.02 (West
2002) (Criminal Code;
Definitions)
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-109(23)
(1996) (defining "voluntary act"
as "an act performed as a result
of effort or determination," but
lacking a voluntary act
requirement)
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-4 (Michie
1994) (requiring an "act" for the
commission of an offense, but not
qualifying the required "act" with
"voluntary" or a similar adjective)
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-01(1)
(1997) (requiring an "act" for the
commission of an offense, but not
qualifying the required "act" with
"voluntary" or a similar adjective)
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-1 to -17
(Michie 1996) (Crimes, In
General)
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
9A.04.010-.88.140 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2002) (Principles of
Liability)
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 939.01 -.74
(West 1996 & Supp. 2001)
(General Provisions)
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-101 to
-5215 (2001 & Supp. 2002)
(Criminal Offenses)
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"IMPLICIT VOLUNTARY ACT" REQUIREMENT
State

Provision mentioned
in Commentaries
Context in which
Commentaries

Current
statutory
provision

Current
statutory
language

CAL.PENAL
CODE §
26(4) (West
1999)

"Persons who
committed the
act charged
without being
conscious
thereof' are not
capable of
committing the

mention provision

California
(proposal)

CAL. (p) S.B. 27 §
2002(a)(1) & (2)
Proposed code would
have required "general
intent," defined as
conscious and willing
performance of the act
constituting the

crime.

offense.

Idaho

Not mentioned in
Model Penal Code &
Commentaries § 2.01
cmt. 1 at 218 n.14.

IDAHO CODE
§ 18-201(2)
(Michie
1997)

Nevada

Not mentioned in
Model Penal Code &
Commentaries § 2.01
cmt. 1 at 218 n.14.

NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN.
§ 194.010(4)
(Michie
2001 &
Supp.)

Oklahoma
(proposal)

OKLA. §§ 1-110(3),
-201(a) (1975 p)
Commentaries
compare, without
comment, Oklahoma's
proposal to Georgia's
provision,

OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21,
§ 152(6)
(West 1983
& Supp.
2002)

South
Dakota

Listed with state codes
containing no explicit
voluntary act
requirement. But see
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
22-3-1(4) (Michie 1979)
(same as current
provision)

S.D.
CODIFIED
LAWS § 223-1(4)
(Michie
1998)

"Persons who
committed the
act charged
without being
conscious
thereof"are not
capable of
committing the
crime.

"Persons who
committed the
act charged
without being
conscious
thereof' are not
capable of
committing the
crime.

"Persons who
committed the
act charged
without being
conscious
thereof' are not
capable of
committing the
crime.
"Persons who
committed the
act charged
without being
conscious
thereof' are not
capable of
committing the
crime.
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INTERMEDIATE REQUIREMENT
Provision mentioned in
Commentaries
StateLanguage of provision
mentioned in
Commentaries
Vermont
(proposal)

Louisiana

Georgia

VT. (p) §§ 1.1.3, 1.1.4
Commentaries note that
Vermont's proposed code
required the equivalent of a
voluntary act without using
the word "voluntary."
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:8
& Reporter's cmt. (West
1974)
The Commentaries note
that the Louisiana code,
read in conjunction with
the Reporter's Comments
following the applicable
section, required a
voluntary act.

Current code provision
containing voluntary act
requirement
Language of current
code provision
containing voluntary act
requirement
None; see VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, §§ 1-14 (1998)
(Crimes and Criminal
Procedure, General
Provisions)
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:8
& Reporter's cmt. (West
1997)
Louisiana's current code
defines criminal conduct as
consisting of an "act or
failure to act that produces
criminal consequences,"
and the Reporter's
Comment following the
section defines "act" as "an
external manifestation of
will which produces
consequences."
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-2-1
(Harrison 1999)
"A 'crime' is a violation of a
statute.., in which there is
a joint operation of an act
or omission to act and
intention or criminal
negligence."

GA. CODE ANN. § 26-601
(Harrison 1983)
Commentaries note that
Georgia's provision
required the concurrence of
an act or omission and
either intention or criminal
negligence (MPC
misquotes).
Georgia
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-603
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2-3,
(presumption) (Harrison 1983)
16-2-4 (Harrison 1999)
The Commentaries note
Georgia current code
that the Georgia code
contains the same
contained a rebuttable
rebuttable presumption,
presumption that the "acts
and also presumes, subject
of a person of sound mind
to rebuttal, that every
and discretion are ... the
person is of sound mind and
product of a person's
discretion.
I will ....
I
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Kansas

Puerto Rico

§ 21-3201

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3201

(1974) (requiring willful or
wanton conduct)
The Commentaries
compared Kansas's
provision to Georgia's.

(1995) (stating that
criminal intent is an
essential element of every
crime, and may be
established through proof
that defendant's conduct
was intentional or reckless)

P.R. LAWS ANN. §§

P.R. LAWS ANN. § 3022(27)

3022(27), 3061 (1984)

(1984) (defining

The Commentaries
compared Puerto Rico's
provision to Georgia's.

"voluntarily" as implying an
"aim or will to commit the
act"); P.R. LAWS ANN. §
3061 (1984) (requiring
intent or criminal
negligence for a person to
be penalized for an act or
omission regarded as a
crime); P.R. LAWS ANN. §
3153 (1984) (stating that
unconsciousness at the time
of the act precludes

KAN. STAT. ANN.

I liability)
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